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An Advance Retrospective 
on Russian LiteratureThis book outlines with theoretical and literary historical rigor a highly innovative approach to the writing of Russian literary history and to the reading of canonical Russian texts.
  —William Mills Todd III, Harvard University
Russian authors […] were able to draw their ideas from their predecessors, but also from their successors, 
testifying to the open-mindedness that characterizes the Slavic soul. This book restores the truth.
—Pierre Bayard, University of Paris 8
This edited volume employs the paradoxical notion of ‘anticipatory plagiarism’—developed in the 1960s 
by the ‘Oulipo’ group of French writers and thinkers—as a mode for reading Russian literature. Reversing 
established critical approaches to the canon and literary influence, its contributors ask us to consider how 
reading against linear chronologies can elicit fascinating new patterns and perspectives.
Reading Backwards: An Advance Retrospective on Russian Literature re-assesses three major nineteenth-
century authors—Gogol, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy—either in terms of previous writers and artists who 
plagiarized them (such as Raphael, Homer, or Hall Caine), or of their own depredations against later writers 
(from J.M. Coetzee to Liudmila Petrushevskaia). 
Far from suggesting that past authors literally stole from their descendants, these engaging essays, contributed 
by both early-career and senior scholars of Russian and comparative literature, encourage us to identify the 
contingent and familiar within classic texts. By moving beyond rigid notions of cultural heritage and literary 
canons, they demonstrate that inspiration is cyclical, influence can flow in multiple directions, and no idea is 
ever truly original. 
This book will be of great value to literary scholars and students working in Russian Studies. The introductory 
discussion of the origins and context of ‘plagiarism by anticipation’, alongside varied applications of the 
concept, will also be of interest to those working in the wider fields of comparative literature, reception 
studies, and translation studies.
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Introduction: Countersense and 
Interpretation
Muireann Maguire and Timothy Langen
….[W]ho said that the logic of life is compulsory in art?
— Daniil Kharms and Aleksandr Vvedenskii, ‘The Oberiu Manifesto’1
In the 1960s, the ‘Oulipo’ group of French writers and philosophers 
developed, as part of their playful pseudoscience of ‘pataphysics’, 
a concept they called ‘le plagiat par anticipation’ (plagiarism by 
anticipation). And while we will have much more to say about 
anticipatory plagiarism, a few words about this brilliantly inventive 
and peculiarly disciplined group are necessary to distinguish them 
from other, notably Russian, twentieth-century literary innovators. 
The Oulipo (Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle) movement proved 
productive and long-lived, publishing manifestos well into the 1980s, 
surviving the deaths of its founders (Raymond Queneau and François 
Le Lionnais) and of its most famous member, Georges Perec. Like the 
Russian avant-garde movements of the early twentieth century, the 
Oulipo writers proposed a radical reconstruction of literary technique in 
the pursuit of creative freedom, and an equally sweeping re-evaluation 
of what constitutes a literary text. But the Oulipo was no second 
OBERIU; Queneau and Le Lionnais were not plagiarizing Kharms and 
Vvedensky.2 Like their Russian predecessors, Oulipo favoured artistic 
experimentation; unlike them, they privileged process over product. 
The Oulipo writers were not primarily interested in creating literature 
or performances; instead, they were preoccupied by the development 
of new contraintes—constraints, or systems of rules—which would force 
writers to compose within strict limitations. While their results might 
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appear absurd—for example, Le Lionnais wrote poems consisting of 
a single letter, or of a sequence of numbers and punctuation marks; 
Perec designed rhyming acrostics—the constraints underpinning 
these creations were tightly plotted and internally coherent. Their 
approach to literary production is epitomized by Queneau’s A Hundred 
Thousand Billion Poems (Cent mille milliards de poèmes, 1961). This set 
of ten sonnets where each of the lines could be physically cut out and 
re-inserted in place of any other lines, giving a potential maximum of 
1014 unique fourteen-line poems, was in fact structured according to the 
mathematical operation of permutation.3 We might add that the use of 
mathematics as a literary trope had been plagiarized well in advance 
of the Oulipians’ efforts by Dostoevsky’s Underground Man, with his 
nonconformist insistence that ‘two-times-two-is-five is also sometimes a 
very lovely little thing’.4 
Also unlike the Russian avant-garde and absurdist tradition, the 
Oulipians did not reject their antecedents. On the contrary, they 
celebrated their own immersion in literary tradition, especially where 
Greek classics and French medieval poetry and prose were concerned; 
and they revelled in identifying past examples of contrainte in literature, 
particularly if it happened to foreshadow an Oulipian technique or if it 
had been exercised unwittingly. Hence connection, rather than rupture, 
was a core tenet of the group’s philosophy. A favourite contrainte was 
the lipogram, a text missing at least one letter of the alphabet. The 
most famous example of this is Perec’s 1969 novel The Disappearance (La 
Disparition), which omits the letter ‘e’; three years later he published 
Les Revenentes [sic], which omits every vowel except ‘e’. The lipogram is 
in fact an ancient form; the sixth-century AD Greek poet Tryphiodorus 
wrote a twenty-four-volume version of the Odyssey, in each successive 
volume of which he contrived to leave out one letter, following the order 
of the Greek alphabet.5 Tryphiodorus and other ancient lipogrammatists 
were much admired by the Oulipians, although the casual reader 
might be more inclined to sympathize with De Quincey’s opinion that 
the ancient poets who ‘gloried in dispensing with some one separate 
consonant, some vowel, or some diphthong’ resembled ‘that pedestrian 
athlete who wins a race by hopping on one leg, or wins it under the 
condition of confining both legs in a sack’.6 Extended ad absurdum, as the 
Oulipo writers often did extend their conceptions, any sentence can be 
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qualified as lipogrammatic: the one you are reading is a lipogram on the 
letters j, k, v, and z. 
Lipograms also open up the Oulipians’ concept of anticipatory 
plagiarism. Our use of contrainte in the final sentence of the last 
paragraph was unintentional: we had no plan to embargo those four 
consonants. But should a future author deliberately compose a sonnet 
or a novel excluding j, k, v, and z, our essay could be hailed (at least 
by Oulipian critics) as an example of anticipatory plagiarism of that 
precise contrainte. Both Perec and Le Lionnais mischievously alleged 
that writers commonly plagiarize, not their antecedents, but their 
posterity, by anticipating—and, from a certain perspective, stealing—
the subjects, styles, and even the precise words of writers not yet born. 
This idea turns Harold Bloom’s concept of the ‘anxiety of influence’ 
on its head: instead of worrying about the originality of their creative 
ideas, writers should evidently be anxious to ring-fence their copyright 
from predatory predecessors. A latter-day Oulipian, the writer Jacques 
Jouet, claimed to have exposed the Romantic poet Alfred de Musset as 
a proto-Oulipian—in effect, a plagiarist of the group—because Musset 
allegedly practices an Oulipian contrainte in his 1832 poem, ‘A mon ami 
Édouard B’. Here the poet enjoins his aspiring poet friend to discover 
genuine inspiration in his own heart (‘frappe-toi le coeur’) rather than 
by reading others’ verse (here, Lamartine—the hint of plagiarism 
may have drawn Jouet to this particular poem by Musset). But, as 
Jouet points out, Musset’s instructions to his friend are composed in 
alexandrines, which function as a hidden contrainte.7 Musset explicitly 
instructs his friend to find poetry in his heart; yet, by delivering this 
advice in a specific metre, he implicitly suggests that metre, not 
chest-beating, is the key to creativity. Or further still, that the heart 
itself—manifestly governed as it is by its own metre—demonstrates 
the inextricability of expression from constraint. The use of concealed 
constraint like this appealed to the paradox-loving Oulipian mind. 
Whether or not Musset had plagiarized one of their methods, Jouet and 
his fellow Oulipians elaborated that any literary or stylistic technique, 
whether unintentionally deployed (like our lipogram above), or used 
without formal acknowledgement (like Musset’s alexandrines), can be 
classified as anticipatory plagiarism if it is later more fully and explicitly 
expressed in the work of a different author. Instead of suggesting that 
the successor writer had committed conventional plagiarism of the first, 
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the Oulipo authors read this connection backwards as evidence that the 
earlier writer had plagiarized his or her descendant—by anticipating 
them. Like the lipogram, anticipatory plagiarism is of potentially 
universal application: La Bibliothèque oulipienne reminds us, ‘Tout texte 
est un plagiat par anticipation d’une contrainte inconnue’ (‘Every text is 
an anticipatory plagiarism of an unknown constraint’).8 
The notion that every text may have multiple, recognized literary 
offspring suited the provocative Oulipo aesthetic. In a 1979 short story, 
Perec traded the paradoxical notion of anticipatory plagiarism for the 
even more radically unbelievable suggestion that the entire cohort of 
French Symbolist authors had collectively suppressed all traces of a 
precursor whom they had plagiarized in the conventional manner, by 
stealing from his published work. The crime comes to light when a young 
literary historian chances upon an obscure 1864 novel by the unknown 
Hugo Vernier. After originally accepting the novel’s evocations of 
Verlaine, Rimbaud, Lautréamont, Huysmans and others, even reading 
a direct quote from Mallarmé as contemporary pastiche, he suddenly 
realizes that the novel’s publication pre-dates all of these writers and 
that they must, therefore, have plagiarized Vernier. But all attempts to 
research Vernier’s life or even to preserve the last remaining copy of his 
book fail, forcing the scholar to conclude that most of the print run ‘had 
been intentionally destroyed by the very people who had been directly 
inspired by it’.9 Unlikely as it is that France’s leading writers would 
club together to suppress evidence of a shared crime of plagiarism, 
even this audaciously paranoid idea may just be more rational than the 
basic paradox defining anticipatory plagiarism. After all, the notion that 
every text is a plagiarism of another not yet written (where both employ 
the same contrainte, implicitly or explicitly) threatens to shift the entire 
concept of plagiarism towards something like existential guilt. How, 
then, is it possible to argue meaningfully that specific writers plagiarize 
their posterity, and how can any such argument hold academic or 
methodological value?
___
It is our contention in this collection, as our contributors elegantly 
prove, that anticipatory plagiarism has in fact many insights to offer 
to scholars, and to readers, and not only in the fields of French—or 
indeed Russian—literature. We propose that the apparently nonsensical 
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‘advance retrospective’ approach provides a new way of understanding 
reception studies, cultural translation, and even our most hallowed 
classics. It is what we might call countersensical, in that it runs against 
the patterns of normal experience but reveals new patterns of surprising 
coherence and scope. It crosses languages, cultures, and genres as 
readily as it does time. While we do not seriously suggest (nor did the 
Oulipians) that past authors plagiarized their descendants, the task of 
thinking about our cultural heritage in this upside-down way forces us 
to realize that patterns of inspiration are cyclical; that no idea is ever 
completely original; and that influence flows in many directions (even 
if not, actually, backwards). In his monograph Anticipatory Plagiarism 
(Le Plagiat par anticipation, 2009), the contemporary French philosopher 
Pierre Bayard has modified the radical Oulipo notion to filter out 
some of its most marked absurdities, and to leave us with arresting 
new insights into the continuity of technical and aesthetic constraints 
between generations and literary epochs. He tames the chronological 
paradox by setting textual parameters for anticipatory plagiarism and 
thus eliminating the problem of ubiquity. Anticipatory plagiarism is not, 
according to Bayard, a process; it is a question of perspective, a way of 
re-evaluating the influences between writers. By assuming that influence 
is one-directional, we can fail to see the more subtle connections linking 
the same idea in different generations. When we reverse the direction of 
influence, we learn more about the overlap between past and present—
which is often a valuable lesson for the future. It is just such an inventive, 
even Borgesian, and intellectually rewarding interplay of ideas that 
readers of this volume will find in such essays as Shankman’s study 
of proto-Levinasian ideas in Tolstoy, Langen’s suggestion that Gogol 
borrowed ideas from both Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky and the Irish 
satirist Flann O’Brien, Vinitsky’s deliberately absurdist investigation 
of the artist Raphael’s plagiarism of Gogol, or Bowden’s re-reading 
of Dostoevsky through the lens of Coetzee. Beyond this volume, our 
analyses find an echo (unsurprisingly, in the field of Nabokov studies), 
in the work of Eric Naiman, a champion of ‘reading preposterously’; in 
previous articles, he argues for reading Nabokov’s Lolita ‘as if it were as 
intricate as a Shakespeare sonnet’ and even more counter-intuitively, for 
Dostoevsky as a pupil or epigone of Nabokov.10 Naiman argues forcefully 
for a rejection of linearity in our approach to literary criticism: ‘Every 
understanding of a particular work of fiction is somewhat preposterous, 
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coloured by works written after it but which its readers have already 
read. Why not make aggressive, productive use of our inescapably 
contaminated sense of temporality? Can’t we read and write history 
from our own, disciplinary position of strength?’.11 In his afterword to 
the present volume, Naiman explores just what such a position might 
offer, and look like, from a Bayardian perspective.
The Oulipian approach extends to authors the holiday from linear 
temporality which Naiman recommends for scholars. ‘On ne cesse 
d’évoquer l’influence des écrivains et des artistes sur leurs successeurs, 
sans jamais envisager que l’inverse soit possible et que Sophocle ait plagié 
Freud, Voltaire Conan Doyle, ou Fra Angelico Jackson Pollock,’ writes 
Bayard (‘We never stop invoking the influence of writers and artists 
upon their successors, without ever imagining that the reverse might 
be possible and that Sophocles might have plagiarized Freud, Voltaire 
Conan Doyle, or Fra Angelico Jackson Pollock’).12 While one might object 
that Voltaire did not literally plagiarize Arthur Conan Doyle’s famous 
Sherlock Holmes, Bayard demonstrates through close reading that the 
eponymous hero of Voltaire’s Zadig undeniably anticipated (in 1747) 
the deductive techniques of Doyle’s detective in the short stories ‘The 
Adventure of Silver Blaze’ (1892) and ‘The Hound of the Baskervilles’ 
(1901).13 Bayard is not alone in connecting Holmes and Zadig; but he 
may be the first scholar to plot this genealogy in reverse. He makes a 
similar, textually supported argument that Maupassant plagiarized 
Proust’s celebrated reminiscent, multi-clause style before Proust had 
even commenced writing the Remembrance of Things Past (À la recherche 
du temps perdu, 1913–1927) heptalogy.14 In an effort to make anticipatory 
plagiarism less arbitrary, Bayard’s book isolates four criteria that must be 
fulfilled: similarity (the original and the plagiarism must resemble each 
other), dissimulation (the plagiarist must not acknowledge the theft—a 
condition presumably easily fulfilled if the plagiarist predeceases the 
birth of his victim), temporal inversion (the plagiarism must pre-date 
the original, sometimes by decades or centuries), and dissonance (the 
plagiarism must appear distinct, in style or content, from the context of 
the work in which it appears—as, for example, the eponymous Zadig’s 
deductive episodes clash stylistically with the remainder of Voltaire’s 
novella). 
An Oulipian, countersensical reading can be understood more 
generally as a kind of play—specifically, the playing of a game with 
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explicitly formalized rules. Apart from whatever pleasurable (or 
annoying) properties they may have, such games are a valuable and 
perhaps in some sense unavoidable component of interpretation. A 
New Critical reading, at least in its archetypical or stereotypical form, 
proceeds as if the text itself could have an intelligible existence outside 
its context. A Russian Formalist reading, again in its most extreme 
form, operates on the manifestly unsustainable assumption that a 
text’s literary elements could be separated from its non-literary ones. A 
psychoanalytic reading may adopt the premise that a text or story could 
itself experience something like desire. While in polemical contexts these 
games may appear or claim to be self-justifying (structuralism therefore 
structuralism), they justify themselves to outsiders by the insight—close 
enough to the intellectual equivalent of ‘fun’—that they yield. 
Insight and understanding are of course the aim of the humanistic 
tradition of interpretation represented by Mikhail Bakhtin and Hans-
Georg Gadamer, both of whom argued for a conception of understanding 
based in some essential way on dialogue. And in this way the hyper-
formalism of the Oulipo-game, seemingly so alien in spirit, proves itself 
to be perfectly suited to the humanistic project. Here the game involves 
supposing there could be a fully dialogic relation between texts from 
different eras, such that the earlier and later ones could both read each 
other. This interpretive game, then, is not only (or even mainly) an 
exercise in paradox; it is also a game designed to exercise, perhaps to 
exhaustion, a foundational assumption of dialogical hermeneutics itself, 
unconstrained by any preemptive commonsensical timekeeper. There 
is no thought without constraint, any more than there can be vision 
without perspective: this is the common ground of our thinkers, and 
it means that interpretation must remain open to the possibility of new 
perspectives, new constraints, new thought experiments.
Before and after the French theoreticians, there exist alternative and 
relatively pragmatic ways of conceptualizing anticipatory plagiarism, 
which this volume will also explore. Perhaps the foundation-stone of 
anticipatory plagiarism was its use as a defence of true religion by the 
early Christian philosopher, Justin Martyr. Early Christian thinkers 
thus attempted to anchor their faith in God to reality by insisting 
on its miraculous proofs, while struggling to retain the intellectual 
achievements of their pagan predecessors. When Justin admits in his 
First Apology (AD 155–57) that the miracles associated with Christ 
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offer ‘nothing new or different’ from Roman mythology, he could do 
so because he had found an ‘out’ that excused the New Testament’s 
apparent lack of originality while definitively humbling all previous 
faiths.15 Elsewhere in the First Apology, Justin appeared to concede:
If we state that He [Christ] was born of a Virgin, this may be comparable 
to what you admit of Perseus. When we say that He cured the lame, 
the paralytics, and those blind from birth, and raised the dead to life, 
we seem to attribute to Him actions similar to those said to have been 
performed by Aesculapius.16 
Some writers ventured on logistically improbable terrain to resist this 
charge, proposing that Platonic thought might have developed along 
proto-Christian lines because Plato visited Egypt, where he read (and 
plagiarized) the Mosaic Pentateuch.17 Almost two millennia later Lev 
Tolstoy would, in his letters and in the 1885 biography of Socrates which 
he co-wrote with Aleksandra Kalmykova, deliberately depict the Greek 
thinker as a lesser forerunner, although not a plagiarist, of Christ.18
Justin’s solution, in his Dialogue with Trypho (AD 160), is bolder still:
...[W]hen they say that Dionysus was born of Zeus’s union with Semele, 
and narrate that he was the discoverer of the vine, and that after he was 
torn to pieces and died, he arose again and ascended into heaven, and 
when they use wine in his mysteries, is it not evident that the Devil 
has imitated the previously quoted prophecy of the patriarch Jacob, as 
recorded by Moses?19
Here Justin defends the primacy of Christian miracle through a theodicy 
strangely akin to album or video piracy. According to this view, the 
Devil exploited his pre-lapsarian VIP access to divine revelation to pre-
release a sort of mix-tape of God’s teachings: slightly distorted, pagan 
copies of Christian figures. Thus Aesculapius pre-empted Christ’s 
miracles of healing, Hercules his strength, Perseus his virgin birth, 
because ‘some, namely those previously mentioned demons, foretold 
through the poets as if already accomplished those things which they 
invented’.20 By extension, all the pagan sages’ writings were effectively 
pirate copies of the apologia of future Church fathers; their insights, 
while not intrinsically sinful, were incomplete or deluded because 
they were founded on revelations leaked by Satan. Genuine revelation 
could only come through Christ. This was anticipatory plagiarism by 
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demonic intervention, and it allowed Justin Martyr to argue that the 
legends of the Christian Church were not, as they might appear to the 
unenlightened, merely the latest accretion on an intellectual stalagmite 
of mortal accomplishment: in fact, they were the first correct expression 
of God’s divine insight; effectively, the director’s cut.
Justin’s method would be followed by a succession of later writers keen 
to identify their work as the only true expression of an underlying truth 
or the core aesthetic of a genre; while they acknowledge the existence of 
predecessors, these are redefined as mere advance plagiarists who try to 
pre-empt the true word, but get it slightly wrong. In this way, Soviet-era 
socialist realism might be read (and to a certain degree scripted itself) 
as the authentic fulfilment of the critical tenets of the radical naturalism 
first expounded by Belinskii in the early-nineteenth century. Dostoevsky, 
Belinskii’s first and most significant protegé, was simply a false prophet 
along this path, misled by bourgeois ambition and naïve psychology. 
Perhaps even the superfluous man, that archetype so beloved of Russian 
literature courses on Pushkin’s Evgenii Onegin (1833) and Lermontov’s 
A Hero of Our Time (Geroi nashego vremeni, 1840), is superfluous because 
he is an incomplete and therefore aberrant forerunner of the human 
ideal fully expressed by Pavel Korchagin in Ostrovskii’s How the Steel 
Was Tempered (Kak zakalialas’ stal’, 1934). Analogously, in this volume, 
Inna Tigountsova suggests that Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s female 
protagonists may be a fuller expression of the Underground Man trope 
than Dostoevsky’s original disenchanted narrator; the latter is merely an 
advance plagiarism of the Underground Woman. David Gillespie and 
Marina Korneeva question whether it is possible to plagiarize an entire 
genre, examining whether Dostoevsky’s Notes from the House of the Dead 
(Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, 1862) is merely a foreshadowing of Guzel’ 
Yakhina’s immensely popular 2015 novel of the Soviet criminal justice 
system, Zuleikha Opens Her Eyes (Zuleikha otkryvaet glaza). In all these 
cases, the early Christian philosophers’ argument for the originality of 
their own faith makes a useful analogy for how contemporary writers 
have chosen to deny or qualify the influence of certain predecessors. In 
different ways, they each present their work as the only true fulfilment 
of their chosen aesthetic, or genre, thus relegating their forerunners to 
the status of proleptic copycats.
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After the Oulipian and Justinian systems, there exists a third kind 
of anticipatory plagiarism, perhaps the one most readily adaptable 
for the literature classroom. This system is outlined in David Lodge’s 
instructive satire about academic ambition, Small World (1984). The naïve 
protagonist, annoyed that his thesis on Shakespeare’s influence on T. S. 
Eliot is considered too pedestrian, ad-libs that his real topic is T. S. Eliot’s 
influence on Shakespeare. ‘“...[W]e can’t avoid reading Shakespeare 
through the lens of T. S. Eliot’s poetry. I mean, who can read Hamlet today 
without thinking of Prufrock?”’.21 His reward for ‘thinking in reverse’ is a 
publisher’s instant invitation to submit his manuscript for review. Lodge 
may have crafted this anecdote as a satire on the cynicism of publishers, 
but it confirms the fact that modern writers ineluctably influence our 
perception of their predecessors; or, to misquote a favourite phrase of 
Lodge’s, every reading is another re-writing. Hence, when we read 
Voltaire’s Zadig, we recognize its foreshadowing of nineteenth-century 
detective fiction; yet instead of reading the Voltairean text by its own 
standards, we now judge it by our aesthetic reaction to a chronologically 
later genre. We read Zadig post-Sherlock, as a variant of Doyle, rather 
than the other way round. Must we accept that Shklovsky wrote War and 
Peace, or that Nabokov penned The Double (pace Naiman), because we 
inevitably read Tolstoy and Dostoevsky today through a hermeneutic 
filter of later critical impositions?
Considered more generally, our reception of the classics is clouded 
and complicated by the layers of derived texts and subtexts, critical 
commentaries, and even translations which interpose between their 
original publication and our reading and reception of them. By 
‘reading backwards’, ‘reading upside-down’, or by positing anticipatory 
plagiarism, we re-start the hermeneutic timer; we consciously strip the 
original text of its interpretative accretions. This kind of reading may 
teach us that great minds think alike and that particular ideas (and 
aesthetic notions) recur cyclically; but even these simple lessons are 
important today, when the news headlines remind us constantly of the 
recurrence of dangerous historical trends. If writers can independently 
develop the same idea at widely separated points in time, so can 
politicians. The value of a critique based on anticipatory plagiarism 
is that it teaches us to read these ideas contextually: why did Doyle’s 
Sherlock become a global cult figure (not least as interpreted on-screen in 
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Soviet Russia), while the detective capabilities of Voltaire’s Zadig remain 
known to relatively few French literature specialists? In this volume, 
several essays engage with the cultural hermeneutics of influential texts. 
Maguire’s chapter re-reads novels by the forgotten Victorian novelist 
Hall Caine as aspirational Tolstoyan philosophy, while re-evaluating 
Tolstoy’s Resurrection (Voskresenie, 1899) as a melodrama in the spirit 
of one of Caine’s bestsellers. Caine’s unrequited admiration for Tolstoy 
justifies these overlapping values. Yefimenko uses analytic techniques 
from contemporary critical readings of Tolstoy’s War and Peace (Voina 
i mir, 1869) to study the moral inadequacy of molodechestvo, or male 
heroism, in Homer’s Iliad (8th Century BC), and to reveal what Achilles 
can learn from Tolstoy’s warrior-prince Andrei Bolkonskii.
This anthology focusses on Gogol, Dostoevsky and Tolstoy, three 
great Russian writers interpreted here—in three discrete sections—as 
both victims and perpetrators of anticipatory plagiarism. We open with 
Gogol, who is both sinner (as Timothy Langen’s chapter argues, he 
steals from the Irish writer Flann O’Brien and the little-known Russian 
experimentalist Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky) and sinned against (the 
distorted physiognomy of Gogol’s nose was illegally scanned by Raphael 
and other portraitists, as Ilya Vinitsky alleges). 
Three chapters are devoted to Dostoevsky, whose well-known moral 
weakness has evolved from gambling to copyright infringement. Inna 
Tigountsova argues that Dostoevsky’s notion of the Underground 
Man was filched from Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s contemporary female 
embodiment of this narrative archetype in her novel The Time: Night 
(Vremia: Noch’, 1992). Michael Bowden explores Dostoevsky’s debt to 
Coetzee and also to Kurt Vonnegut Jr; while David Gillespie and Marina 
Korneeva return to Dostoevsky’s supposedly least-read book, The House 
of the Dead, in order to evaluate its thefts from a contemporary novel 
recently released in English translation and also set in a Siberian prison, 
Yakhina’s Zuleikha Opens Her Eyes. 
The book’s next-to-final section looks at thefts from and by Tolstoy. 
Muireann Maguire’s chapter studies the paradox of how Tolstoy stole 
the plot of Resurrection from the bestselling British romance novelist 
Hall Caine (remembered today, when recalled at all, primarily as the 
dedicatee of Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897)). Her essay analyses the 
critical interactions between Tolstoy and the popular Western writer he 
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famously despised, exploring both Tolstoy’s reception in late nineteenth-
century Britain and the reception of socially tendentious bestsellers at 
the time. Svetlana Yefimenko examines Homer’s debt to Tolstoy—the 
overlap in style, plot, and characterization between War and Peace and 
the Iliad—in the context of a detailed study of Tolstoy’s knowledge of 
the Greek classics. Steven Shankman performs a Levinasian reading 
of the last sentence of Anna Karenina (1878), interpreting the latter as 
an anticipation of the radical philosophical speculations of the French 
Jewish philosopher and also as a means of connecting Anna Karenina 
conceptually with Resurrection. In his witty and discursive ‘Afterword’ to 
the present volume, Eric Naiman ranges from Bayard to Bakhtin, Gogol 
to Freud, Proust to Tolstoy, and, of course, back again, to contend that 
anticipatory plagiarism not only illuminates past literature for present-
day readers, but may amount to an art form in itself.
Our focus on Gogol, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy provides a much-
needed contrainte on the wide-ranging, speculative critical operations 
with which we are experimenting. An even wider-ranging experiment, 
from which most of the essays in this volume emerged, occurred in 
2018 at the University of Exeter during a conference called ‘Plagiarizing 
Posterity: Reading the 19th Century Backwards’, organized by Muireann 
Maguire, one of the present co-editors.22 We therefore want to take this 
opportunity to renew our thanks to all participants and in particular 
to acknowledge the stimulating papers read by Roger Cockrell, Anna 
Ponamareva, Olga Soboleva, Elena Tchougounova-Paulson, and 
Margarita Vaysman—papers which, though their topics lie outside the 
constraints of the present volume, helped to shape our understanding of 
its underlying conception. 
This anthology is aimed at scholars and students of literature and 
culture alike. Our dynamic and challenging system of re-readings and 
cross-readings of canonical and other texts constitutes a fresh assessment 
of Russian literary influences, but could be applied to any other national 
(or indeed global) literature with equally stimulating results. And of 
course, ‘anticipatory plagiarism’ is entirely our own original notion—
albeit, unfortunately for us, already plagiarized by David Lodge, Pierre 
Bayard, Georges Perec and other ‘ancestors’.
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1. Something for Nothing: 
Imagination and Collapse in 
O’Brien, Krzhizhanovsky,  
and Gogol1
Timothy Langen
But the other thing—his having been born on the 1st of April—is true.
Vladimir Nabokov, on Nikolai Gogol2
He died, aged fifty-four, on April Fool’s Day, 1966.
Hugh Kenner, on Flann O’Brien3
This essay explores several connections among the imaginary worlds of 
Flann O’Brien (pseudonym of Brian O’Nolan, 1911–1966), Sigizmund 
Krzhizhanovsky (1887–1950), and Nikolai Gogol (1809–1852). For 
each writer, the imagination offers the possibility not just of inventing 
people, things, and events, but also, and more fundamentally, of 
altering the basic properties of causation, temporality, and proportion 
that govern existence. This much puts them in the company of a great 
many other ‘experimental’ writers, such as Borges, Beckett, or, to take 
an earlier example, Laurence Sterne, but I will try to use Pierre Bayard’s 
notion of ‘anticipatory plagiarism’ to show some closer, more specific 
connections. My conceit will be that Krzhizhanovsky interpreted certain 
key ideas of O’Brien’s, and that Gogol took some of these ideas and 
adapted them to the concerns of his age. The most important of these 
ideas is that imaginary worlds can function as a sort of force-multiplier 
with powerful but destabilizing effects on the real world.
© 2021 Timothy Langen, CC BY 4.0  https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0241.01
2 Reading Backwards: An Advance Retrospective on Russian Literature
Ibid.
The premise of anticipatory plagiarism is particularly attractive in the 
case of O’Brien, of whom it has been observed that the sources he could 
be imagined to have read are more instructive than the sources he is likely 
to have read. J. C. C. Mays writes that 
Brian O’Nolan’s art lives in a literary area of his own invention to the 
extent that, while he never read more than a fraction of the writers he 
might be compared to, comparisons to these same writers are more 
illuminating than to the sources of his writing in his own life […]. The 
list of parallels and antecedents could be extended, and they would be 
no less illuminating because Brian O’Nolan was most likely unaware of 
them.4 
If ever there were a place to try out the idea of anticipatory plagiarism, 
this must surely be it: for if O’Brien was unaware of his antecedents, 
perhaps they were aware of him.5
We might start with O’Brien’s novel The Third Policeman, written in 
1939–1940. ‘Not only did he not publish it’, writes Hugh Kenner; ‘he 
spent the rest of his life going back from it, not forward’.6 It eventually 
came out in 1967, a year after Brian O’Nolan’s death, seventeen years 
after Krzhizhanovsky’s, and a hundred and fifteen after Gogol’s. The 
narrator of The Third Policeman commits murder so he can acquire the 
funds to publish a definitive treatise on the works of a certain de Selby, 
and the novel is full of footnotes reporting the latter’s various obscure 
opinions and attempting to track down their origin and veracity. As M. 
Keith Booker points out, though, ‘the narrator seems to have spent a 
great deal more time reading de Selby’s critics than reading de Selby 
himself’. Further, ‘De Selby’s commentators seem to spend more time 
commentating on (and generally reviling) each other than on explicating 
the works of de Selby. And the depths of this cross-examination are as 
bottomless as those presented by de Selby’s own texts’.7
The meta-commentary extends even further, for the footnotes have 
proliferated into the world of books about Flann O’Brien. One thing 
O’Brien scholars like to debate is where the name and character of de 
Selby come from. In Looking for De Selby, Conan Kennedy proposes 
that the name derives from the De Selby quarries, source of the stones 
used for roads in Blackrock, County Dublin, around 1912. As for the 
character de Selby, he may, Kennedy argues, have been based on one 
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Walter Conan, a tailor, inventor, chairman of the De Selby company … 
and Kennedy’s own great-uncle.8 The weight of scholarly speculation, 
though, seems to lie neither with the De Selby quarries, nor with Walter 
Conan, nor, for that matter, with the English town of Selby in North 
Yorkshire, but rather with the German Selbst, or self. Keith Hopper 
offers the following in a footnote to his own discussion of de Selby’s 
name, which he associates with the concept of ‘self’, while scrupulously 
noting a critique by Rüdiger Imhof, all in response to an idea proposed 
by Mays.
In more recent correspondence with the present author (8 December 
2006), Prof. Imhof elaborated further:
‘Selby’ may indeed be derived from the Old High German pronoun 
‘selb,’ which seems to have the same root as the English ‘self’ (the exact 
etymological determination is unclear). The substantive of the pronoun 
is ‘Selbst,’ which corresponds to the English ‘self.’ So, J. C. C. Mays may 
have been partly right, after all.
Where Mays is wrong is to suggest that ‘de Selby’ is a variation of ‘der 
Selbe.’ As far as ‘der Selbe’ is concerned, my critical remark still stands: 
it can only mean ‘the same person.’ It would seem that either Mays or 
Flann, or indeed both of them made a mistake, namely this: that in order 
to derive ‘the self’ from a German expression to do with ‘selb,’ ‘Selbe’ or 
‘Selbst,’ this expression would have to be ‘das Selbst’ and not ‘der Selbe.’ 
If Flann meant us to see the connection between ‘de Selby’ and ‘the self,’ 
he got his German derivation in a twist.
I am grateful to Prof. Imhof for his gracious and erudite scholarship (and 
apologise for co-opting him into such a de Selbian-style commentary).9
Here writing itself, nearly unmoored from any particular reference or 
source because it grazes lightly against so many of them, achieves an 
almost Nirvanic state of self(Selbst)lessness in the recursive comments 
and meta-comments of real and fictional scholars. For as Imhof points 
out, the Selbe that can be inferred from de Selby cannot without lexical 
violence be made to mean ‘the self’. A name derived from der Selbe must 
mean not ‘the self’ but rather ‘the same one’, a reference hardly less 
opaque than the name itself.
As strange as it may seem, though, the reference is in fact perfectly 
clear; it merely took a Krzhizhanovsky, the equal of Flann O’Brien in both 
fantasy and pedantry, to point it out. ‘Known for being unknown’, as he 
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said about himself, Krzhizhanovsky remained so for two decades after 
his death, until his work was tracked down and championed by Vadim 
Perel’muter. Following a posthumous trajectory familiar to readers of 
Mikhail Bulgakov or Mikhail Bakhtin, Krzhizhanovsky is among the 
last of his generation to be “rediscovered” at home and then discovered 
abroad.10 What has not yet been discovered, though, is that some ten years 
before O’Brien wrote The Third Policeman, Krzhizhanovsky produced 
not just a reworking of, but rather the most brilliant commentary on, 
the later work. The explication came in a story called ‘Materials for a 
Biography of Gorgis Katafalaki’ (‘Materialy k biografii Gorgisa Katafalaki’, 
1929). Like O’Brien’s narrator, Katafalaki is an intellectual searcher, and 
he pores through bibliographic material hoping to find a universal mind 
comparable to Aristotle, Descartes, or Leibniz. Before long he comes 
across a certain Derselbe, who seems to have published major works 
in every field, and part of the story concerns his misguided attempts 
to track down this improbably erudite person. The search can never 
succeed because its object is not a person at all: Derselbe is, after all, 
‘the same one’, referring in German footnotes to the most recently cited 
source. Herr Derselbe is Mr Ibid.
After reading Krzhizhanovsky’s story, it becomes clear that this is the 
origin of de Selby’s name as well. Derselbe, a verbal shifter in a language 
foreign to the characters, is mistaken for a name, and thus for a real 
person to be found or researched, a nothing imaginatively transformed 
into a something, even a someone. The Katafalaki story, then, is what 
we could call an ‘anticipatory gloss’ by Krzhizhanovsky, and the most 
acute commentary on O’Brien’s character of de Selby, but in the form 
of a story written a decade earlier. It would seem that Krzhizhanovsky 
read O’Brien’s Third Policeman and, frustrated that no one else got the de 
Selby joke, retold it with a more explicit backstory. If on the other hand 
we preclude the possibility of some sort of backwards-reaching action 
in the universe of literary texts, we will be forced to assume (keeping 
in mind that Flann O’Brien seems to have had no Russian) that our two 
authors independently came up with exactly the same trick, to turn 
a bibliographic term in a different language into a proper name, as a 
pretext for a wild goose chase. Moreover, they chose the same different 
language, German. What are the odds of that?11
The covert, backwards-reaching significance of O’Brien’s and 
Krzhizhanovsky’s de Selby/Derselbe does not stop there. For Gogol 
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too is an artist of linguistic shifters—one thinks here of the ‘words 
with no particular meaning at all’ that comprise so much of Akaky 
Akakievich’s speech in Gogol’s story ‘The Overcoat’ (‘Shinel’’, 1842), 
or of Khlestakov in The Government Inspector (Revizor, 1836), a human 
cipher onto whom others project their own ambitions, anxieties, and 
preoccupations. And if O’Brien and Krzhizhanovsky turn a convention 
of writing into a character, Gogol gives the complementary gesture 
when the postmaster stands in the pose of a question mark during 
the famous mute scene at the end of the play, a character transformed 
into a specimen of punctuation. For all three writers, then, the means 
of depiction and reference (bibliographic terms, letters, punctuation) 
become thematized elements within the depicted world.12
Spacetimes of Reading 
The premise that earlier texts may borrow or steal from later ones, 
or—as we might add, somewhat less drastically, that they may interpret 
them—rests on what Pierre Bayard calls a dual chronology. ‘While 
full-fledged citizens of their age, creators are equally participants 
in another temporality, that of literature or art, which obeys its own 
rhythms’.13 Indeed, literary texts could hardly function without 
complex rhythmic and temporal interactions. For example, the reader 
of a text may, more or less at will, arrest forward progress and move 
back to review earlier material—or even look ahead to find particularly 
informative or juicy parts, only to circle back once again. Separate from 
the reader, the text itself can enact retrograde motion relative to any 
posited unidirectional sequence of events depicted within it. This is 
part of the work of what Russian Formalists called ‘siuzhet’, the artistic 
manipulation and distortion of the pre-existing narrative substrate, or 
‘fabula’, that can be imagined to proceed evenly from A to B to C and 
onward. Siuzhet, by contrast, can accelerate, skip ahead, slow down, 
and even go backwards, before resuming its progress. Even at the most 
elementary, phenomenological level of reading, then, literature operates 
in a universe with spatio-temporal properties different from our own 
ordinary entropic universe.
Texts encode other texts, of course, and if we want to conceptualize 
the universe of texts, we must do so in a way that accommodates 
the sort of retrograde motion I have been describing. T. S. Eliot, for 
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example, suggested that each new addition to the canon subtly changes 
the relations among all the other texts. ‘Events’ in this universe, the 
universe of what Eliot called ‘tradition’,14 would appear to move not 
only in the direction Pushkin→Tolstoy→Nabokov, but also the reverse, 
from Nabokov→Tolstoy→Pushkin. Or, in our case, from the twentieth-
century writers Flann O’Brien and Sigizmund Krzhizhanovsky to the 
nineteenth-century Nikolai Gogol. This is the universe in which Bayard’s 
‘anticipatory plagiarism’ may be imagined to operate.
Our authors were all interested in this broader question: the 
properties of imaginative space-time itself, of which the notion of 
anticipatory plagiarism describes only a subset. To posit a phenomenon 
of retrograde influence, interpretation, and even plagiarism means to 
imagine a world that functions in a way that is radically different from 
the paradigms and models that (tacitly or explicitly) shape ordinary 
discourse. A glance at the history of astronomy may be useful here. 
Retrograde motion (albeit through space rather than time) was first 
observed by the ancients in the wandering of the planets, which did not 
follow the steady fabula-like course of stars across the sky but seemed 
to mark out their own individual siuzhets, moving forwards and then 
pausing, moving backwards for a bit, and then resuming their forward 
progress. The eventual solution to this puzzle was to reimagine the 
underlying geometry: the motion of those planets makes sense if we 
imagine them to be circling something, and after centuries of mutually 
refining observation and imagination (contending, of course, with social, 
political, religious, and other forces), the solar system was eventually 
conceived to have the shape we now ascribe to it. As new physical 
problems arose, scientists began to posit new shapes and dimensions, 
not just for things within the universe, but for the universe itself. If we 
are to entertain the idea of retrograde action among our three authors, 
then, we ought to ask what sorts of universe-geometries they construct.
Sausage, Crack, Egg
With O’Brien, the answer is explicit and easy to find. The earth is shaped 
like a sausage, according to de Selby, who ‘likens the position of a human 
on earth to that of a man on a tight-wire who must continue walking 
along the wire or perish, being, however, free in all other respects’. 
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Movement in this restricted orbit results in the permanent hallucination 
known conventionally as ‘life’ with its innumerable concomitant 
limitations, afflictions and anomalies. If a way can be found, says de 
Selby, of discovering the ‘second direction’, i.e., along the ‘barrel’ of 
the sausage, a world of entirely new sensation and experience will be 
open to humanity. New and unimaginable dimensions will supersede 
the present order and the manifold ‘unnecessaries’ of ‘one-directional’ 
existence will disappear. (pp. 94–95)
‘I would have given much for a glimpse of the signpost showing the way 
along the “barrel” of the sausage’ (p. 95), the narrator goes on to remark, 
unaware that he is travelling around the barrel of the sausage that very 
moment. For The Third Policeman itself is a sausage-shaped imaginary 
universe, full of what its author called ‘back-chat and funny cracks’.15 
The funniest and most horrifying is that the narrator turns out to have 
been dead all along, the weird disorienting story being his special form 
or experience of perdition. Thus the strange, looping chronology of this 
story engulfs the very teller, who continuously tries and fails to chart 
a rectilinear path out of the perverse curvatures of his sausage-shaped 
text and universe, a universe where the very atoms of bicycles and their 
riders intermingle and merge, like sausage ingredients passing through 
a meat grinder. De Selby seeks a way to the ‘second’ dimension; the 
narrator finds only death and damnation.
It is tempting to suppose that Krzhizhanovsky, polyglot in abilities 
and sensibilities, picked up on O’Brien’s ‘back-chat and funny cracks’ and 
re-interpreted them in his early story ‘The Collector of Cracks’ (‘Sobiratel’ 
Shchelei’, 1922). The inter-lingual pun would have appealed to both 
writers: O’Brien’s ‘Chapman and Keats’ series is unimaginable without 
puns, and Krzhizhanovsky attributed great theoretical significance 
to wordplay.16 Krzhizhanovsky’s main character in ‘The Collector of 
Cracks’, Lövenix, describes to the narrator how he became interested 
in the little bits of nothing all around us. He appeals, for example, to 
the physiology of vision when one watches a film, and through various 
experiments, manipulating the length of intervals between frames, he 
trains (in himself and in one other gifted subject) the ability to perceive 
the interstices through the apparent continuity of motion. Alas, he gets 
too close to the void, steps on a shadow on his way to meet his beloved, 
and suffers the loss of his capacity to feel. He believes (referring here 
to Descartes) that existence itself flickers into and out of being, and he 
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wants to find a way to persist through the blank spots where everything 
else disappears. Instead the narrator finds Lövenix dead at his desk and 
throws his manuscript into the fire—negating nothingness, or at least 
one dangerous way of flirting with it. If in O’Brien’s sausage-verse every 
path leads to the same place, in Krzhizhanovsky’s crack-verse every 
instant conceals a trap-door to infinite loss. In both cases a character 
suspects that his universe contains ubiquitous unperceived domains, 
and he discovers them, and he experiences not liberation but doom.
Combining O’Brien’s characteristically terse figure of the sausage 
with Krzhizhanovsky’s characteristically expansive figure of the crack, 
Gogol arrived at an even richer analogy for the space-time of the 
imagination. It comes near the end of Dead Souls (Mertvye dushi, 1842), 
when Gogol is trying to explain how people should read his novel. In 
the course of his explanations, he invents a certain Kifa Mokiyevich and 
gives a sort of transcript of the latter’s speculative musings. ‘Well then’, 
Kifa Mokieyvich thinks, ‘what if an elephant were to be born in an egg, 
then the shell, I guess, would be so strong and thick that you couldn’t 
break through it with a cannon-ball; some new firearm would have to 
be invented’.17 ‘Don’t be like Kifa Mokievich’, seems to be what Gogol 
may be saying: tend to your responsibilities and use stories like Dead 
Souls as an instrument to examine yourself critically, rather than as an 
occasion for idle fantasy about elephant eggs and similar nonsense. 
Here the ontology of the text is something like that of the mirror, an 
analogy Gogol had used explicitly in his epigraph to The Government 
Inspector: don’t blame the mirror if your face is crooked.
Taken another way, though, the imaginary elephant egg is a 
microcosm of the whole novel. Eggs have come up before—the 
governor’s daughter’s pretty face that so captivates Chichikov, for 
example, is compared to an egg—and once we allow that Gogol 
may have been thinking of O’Brien and Krzhizhanovsky, it becomes 
apparent that this egg is the shape of space-time in Dead Souls. For 
hell really is sausage-shaped in The Third Policeman, the narrator given 
just enough of a hint of linearity that he feels things might be moving 
somewhere, when really he keeps traversing the same topoi over and 
over again. And hell really is a collection of cracks for Krzhizhanovsky, 
each interpersonal or existential void threatening infinite expansion at 
every instant.18 Likewise, hell in Dead Souls is really an egg that never 
hatches, promising no progress in any direction either along the surface, 
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or from the inside out, or from the outside in. In Gogol’s world every 
Kifa Mokievich will beget a Moka Kifevich, every Nozdryov adventure 
will lead to another Nozdryov adventure, and no one will ever learn 
anything. The necessity of inventing new firearms to pierce the elephant-
egg space-time is, as Gogol suggests, idle fantasy—but in his world it is 
desperately necessary idle fantasy. Sensible carriages that could get to 
Moscow but not Kazan’ will never be able to leave this dreary hellish 
chronotope, and it is dubious whether even the wild Russia-troika at 
the very end of the novel can reach escape velocity. But the combination 
of Krzhizhanovsky’s analogy with O’Brien’s allows Gogol to imply a 
solution: crack the egg, cut the sausage, change the very topology of 
space and time. And in each case it is the imagination that must lead 
the way.
Inception19
For all three writers, the creation of spaces by and for the imagination is 
itself a major and explicit preoccupation, and one that requires effort and 
risk. Krzhizhanovsky’s short novel The Letter Killers’ Club (Klub ubiistv 
bukv, 1926) devotes a good deal of space to the preparatory work that 
goes into telling a story, and the reason why that work is necessary. The 
narrator meets a former writer who has discovered that committing his 
conceptions to writing uses up his imagination. He has gathered a group 
of like-minded ‘conceivers’ to meet on Saturday nights. Each meeting 
is devoted to one member’s conception, described to his listeners as 
something like a plan for a story or a play but never written down by any 
of the members nor disclosed to anyone in the outside world. The ‘letter 
killers’ are anonymous and referred to by made-up syllables like Zez, Fev, 
and Rar. The talk-about-talk or story-about-story structure penetrates 
the work of the individual tellers as well; most of them describe their 
work—what it is, or, more precisely, what it would or could or perhaps 
will be—either before or interspersed throughout the telling. What we 
might think of as the ‘content’ becomes a kind of shimmering possibility 
whose existence seems ideal and only provisionally incarnated in the 
actual telling. It is this ephemerality that the president tries to preserve 
by ‘killing’ letters, with the goal of protecting the conceptions from 
exhaustion by narrating only the possibility of each future could-be text. 
It is as if the space of imagination can be approached only obliquely (just 
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as de Selby’s work can be apprehended only via its deflections through 
the critical scholarship)—the thing itself is too delicate to touch. 
Or too dangerous. A similar predilection for hypotheticals can 
be observed on the level of rhetorical diction when the narrator of 
O’Brien’s The Third Policeman asks the policeman MacCruiskeen, ‘before 
I go back to the day room […], would it be right to ask what you were 
performing with that small little piano instrument, the article with the 
knobs, and the brass pins?’20 This is a question asked by asking whether 
the question could rightly be asked, a nervous recursive space-clearing 
that Krzhizhanovsky’s ‘conceivers’ re-enact week after week with their 
stories about the stories one might imagine telling.
Gogol’s treatment of the theme, of course, is the most familiar and 
fully developed.
In the department of... but it would be better not to say in which 
department. There is nothing more irascible than all these departments, 
regiments, offices—in short, all this officialdom. Nowadays every private 
individual considers the whole of society insulted in his person. They say 
a petition came quite recently from some police chief, I don’t remember 
of what town, in which he states clearly that the government’s decrees 
are perishing and his own sacred name is decidedly being taken in 
vain. And as proof he attached to his petition a most enormous tome 
of some novelistic work in which a police chief appears on every page, 
in some places even in a totally drunken state. And so, to avoid any 
unpleasantness, it would be better to call the department in question a 
certain department.21 
Here Gogol replicates the same thematic-stylistic cluster that O’Brien 
hinted at and Krzhizhanovsky elaborated: profuse discussion of the 
terms and conditions of discourse; indirect, hypothetical, or vague 
discussion of the content of discourse; and reference (only implied, 
in Krzhizhanovsky’s case) to political/legal authority as a context for 
verbal nervousness. Here, at the beginning of ‘The Overcoat’, Gogol 
self-consciously and explicitly marks out space where his imaginary 
creations can operate without getting tugged downward (and getting the 
speaker/narrator/author into trouble) by excessively literal connection 
with the real world.
It is not only social-rhetorical space that writers have to clear for 
themselves; they must also find a way to suspend the demands of the 
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physical world so they can launch their fantasies. Characteristic here is 
the beginning of O’Brien’s novel At Swim-Two-Birds (1939):
Having placed in my mouth sufficient bread for three minutes’ chewing, 
I withdrew my powers of sensual perception and retired into the privacy 
of my mind, my eyes and face assuming a vacant and preoccupied 
expression. I reflected on the subject of my spare-time literary activities. 
One beginning and one ending for a book was a thing I did not agree 
with. A good book may have three openings entirely dissimilar and 
inter-related only in the prescience of the author, or for that matter one 
hundred times as many endings.22
The narrator, a college student who applies himself sparingly at best 
to his studies, is negotiating something like a rate of exchange between 
the temporality of ordinary life and that of the world of his stories. 
The former is sequential and governed by time’s arrow in the ordinary 
entropic world. Here bodily needs must be satisfied according to their 
own schedule, and when they are, the resulting imaginative freedom 
can be measured in minutes or mouthfuls. Mental escape is from this 
perspective necessarily temporary: the organism will reassert its needs 
again and again, like clockwork. Each time those needs are placated, 
though, another temporality can take over, a kind of lateral arrangement 
that begins with the narrator’s mental ‘withdrawal’ while his mouth 
keeps on chewing. Consciously or not, he is invoking something like 
Bayard’s dual chronology. 
Force Multipliers
In each of the passages above, the writer’s project can be conceived as 
an optimization exercise in which the objective is to minimize input (ink 
on the page, hours writing or reading, bread in the narrator’s mouth) 
and risk (from readers who might get offended) while maximizing 
signification and narrative potential. The recursive structure of talking 
about talking or writing about writing, in turn, operates as a kind of 
force multiplier in the universe of literary imagination. By discussing 
the supposed hazards of specific reference, for example, Gogol can 
expand his realm of signification from the characters’ world to a world 
which also includes writers and readers. Moreover, the arithmetic is 
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not merely additive but rather compounding, since any event in one 
world may reverberate in the other, perhaps oscillating between the two 
and accreting volume with each pass. O’Brien is more explicit about 
the phenomenon. We might return here to de Selby/Derselbe. The 
special merit of a footnote reference (of which the shorthand derselbe 
is only the most concentrated example) is that it compresses entire 
passages, arguments, even whole works into a compact form that can be 
incorporated in a new text. The implication, that a text may encompass 
indefinitely many other texts, had already gripped Flann O’Brien in At 
Swim-Two-Birds:
The entire corpus of existing literature should be regarded as a limbo 
from which discerning authors could draw their characters as required, 
creating only when they failed to find a suitable existing puppet. The 
modern novel should be largely a work of reference. Most authors spend 
their time saying what has been said before—usually said much better. 
A wealth of references to existing works would acquaint the reader 
instantaneously with the nature of each character, would obviate tiresome 
explanations and would effectively preclude mountebanks, upstarts, 
thimbleriggers and persons of inferior education from an understanding 
of contemporary literature.23
The ‘wealth of references’ made possible by literary recursiveness is by 
no means limited to footnote citation, but instead extends to allusions, 
imitation, and perhaps outright theft. If Krzhizhanovsky and Gogol 
were looking for an excuse to plagiarize, they could surely have found 
it here.
There is an unmistakably utopian aspect to the ‘modern novel’ as 
conceived by the narrator of At Swim-Two-Birds: characters can be invoked, 
explanations implied, audiences purified, and all ‘instantaneously’, with 
the use of a few well-chosen references. By this means, the signifying 
power of the literary work expands far beyond what might have seemed 
possible in earlier times. Indeed, the narrator’s conception of modernity 
seems imbued with early-mid twentieth-century utopianism. For if this 
was the epoch of world wars, totalized oppression, and triumphant 
vulgarity (according to an impressive variety of cultural critics who 
agreed on this much and little else), it was also the age of the Olympic 
movement and of theories of liberation in nearly every sphere of human 
experience.24 The USSR itself, in its early years, witnessed—and tried to 
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harness—many expressions of this expansive utopianism. At the end of 
his 1924 book Literature and Revolution, for example, Leon Trotsky, not 
yet exiled and anathematized, argued that the new social arrangement 
of communism would boost the creative powers of each individual to 
unheard-of levels.
Man will become immeasurably stronger, wiser and subtler; his body 
will become more harmonized, his movements more rhythmic, his voice 
more musical. The forms of life will become dynamically dramatic. The 
average human type will rise to the heights of an Aristotle, a Goethe, or a 
Marx. And above this ridge new peaks will rise.25
Key to Trotsky’s image is the fact that the new ‘peaks’ of human 
excellence are not at present visible to us. It is only the imagination, 
nudged in an alpine direction, that can enlist those peaks into a present-
day discussion. And even so, what we can imagine in the present is 
not the substance of those future peaks; if we could do that, we would 
already have been transformed. Rather, we can evoke the motion from 
our present cultural position to the ‘ridge’ of famous names, and then 
imagine continuing the trajectory. 
Similarly giddy claims were made on behalf of various 
transformational artistic or meditative disciplines. The individual was 
understood to possess enormous untapped inner resources, and one 
common way to express this idea was to claim that people typically 
use only ten percent of the brainpower available to them, and that 
the proper mental, physical, or social adjustment could liberate the 
remaining ninety.26 In this context it would have been easy to conceive 
of the imagination itself as a kind of force-multiplier, something that can 
take the paltry present and transform it into the magnificence it always 
had in potential; it can be a device for stealing a glimpse of the peaks 
that rise beyond the ridge, or of the potential of creative minds boosted, 
as it were, from ten to one hundred percent of capacity. Typical here are 
the musings of the narrator of The Third Policeman about a mysterious 
substance called ‘omnium’.
Sitting at home with my box of omnium I could do anything, see 
anything and know anything with no limit to my powers save that of my 
own imagination. Perhaps I could use it even to extend my imagination. 
I could destroy, alter and improve the universe at will.27
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In this sort of work, to imagine an imagination-extending substance 
is to imagine the removal of any and all limitations. ‘Omnium’ is in 
this sense the ultimate force-multiplier, potentially generative, with 
any imaginative input, of any output. In a 1987 essay called ‘Quantum 
Physics and Thought’, Roger Penrose observes that ‘the totality of all 
possible universes may be thought of as a single structure’, a structure he 
proposes calling the omnium (a name suggested to him by the classicist 
Peter Darow). It may strain credulity to claim that O’Brien plagiarize the 
term (anticipatorily) from Penrose and Darow, but the superposition of 
possible worlds is in any case crucial to the imagination of all three of 
our writers.
They were aware, too, that their imaginary chronotopes encompassed 
at least as many dystopian potentials as utopian ones. An important 
point of entry to the hyper-world of At Swim-Two-Birds is the story of 
Dermot Trellis, a preternaturally lazy writer producing a morality tale 
full of licentious characters and acts, the better to sell the product. His 
characters, drawn from various sources, are put through a number of 
torments and can do nothing about it until he falls asleep, at which point 
they highjack the story and subject him to a range of hideous tortures 
inflicted by a demon called Fergus MacPhellimey, or ‘The Pooka’. 
Narrative has become nearly detached from the world that generated it; 
it is almost free of the need for an author, Flann O’Brien or anyone else, 
to keep himself fed and able to work. But the potentials liberated by this 
narrative table-turning are frankly demonic and horrifying. O’Brien’s 
light tone, and that of the Pooka, serve only to intensify the ghoulishness.
It is my mission here this morning [says the Pooka] to introduce you to 
a wide variety of physical scourges, torments, and piteous blood-sweats. 
The fullness of your suffering, that will be the measure of my personal 
perfection.28
The Pooka proceeds to detail the woes that betide poor Trellis, 
admonishing him all along to put on his coat because it’s cold outside. 
The room starts rearranging itself phantasmically, and in the course of 
Trellis’s appalling bodily torment he flies out of the window and falls on 
the cobblestone street.
To inquire as to the gravity of your sore fall, would that be 
inopportune?
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You black bastard, said Trellis.
The character of your colloquy is not harmonious, rejoined the Pooka, 
and makes for barriers between the classes. Honey-words in torment, 
a growing urbanity against the sad extremities of human woe, that is 
the further injunction I place upon your head; and for the avoidance of 
opprobrious oddity as to numerals, I add this, a sickly suppuration at the 
base of the left breast.
I find your last utterance preoccupying to my intellect, said Trellis, 
and I am at the same time not unmindful of that last hurt upon my 
person.29 
Honey-words are the torturer’s artistic flourish, a utopianism of form 
wedded with power to maximize the experience of suffering.
In this connection we might think of Das’s story in The Letter Killers 
Club, where the mechanism of control is not recursive narrative but 
technological refinement. A machine is built to control the actions of 
human beings, who become automatons, save for the agony that we 
know their spirit—whatever that vanishing entity might really be—is 
experiencing as their bodies move independent of their will. As with 
O’Brien’s Dermott Trellis, they are all forced to suffer, do, speak, and feel 
without having any say in the matter. 
The technology of control in Das’s story depends on the action of 
microscopic vibrophages that enter the body of every person, and there 
is something about fineness itself that evokes nauseating terror in our 
authors. O’Brien’s The Third Policeman gives a kind of emblem for the 
horrors of artistic overreach when Officer MacCruiskeen shows the 
narrator an exquisite box he has made. ‘I do not often look at boxes or 
chests’, says the narrator, ‘but this is the most beautiful box I have ever 
seen and I will always remember it. There might be something inside 
it?’ ‘There might be’, answers MacCruiskeen,30 and shows him a smaller 
version of the same box inside the first one. This second one has another 
inside it, and so on past twenty-nine of them.
At this point I became afraid. What he was doing was no longer 
wonderful but terrible. I shut my eyes and prayed that he would stop 
while still doing things that were at least possible for a man to do. When 
I looked again I was happy that there was nothing to see and that he had 
put no more of the chests prominently on the table but he was working 
to the left with the invisible thing in his hand on a bit of the table itself. 
When he felt my look he came over to me and gave me an enormous 
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magnifying-glass which looked like a basin fixed to a handle. I felt the 
muscles around my heart tighten as I took the instrument.31
More boxes follow, inevitably, so small that the very tools needed to 
make them are invisible. The scene suggests something like a craftsman’s 
utopian dream, the production of a thing so fine that it shades from 
the improbable to the impossible to the inconceivable, and O’Brien’s 
increasingly horrified narrator feels physically ill as MacCruiskeen 
moves to open the smallest of them. 
The demonic potential of art is a major theme of Gogol’s story ‘The 
Portrait’ (‘Portret’) as well, a work written under the unmistakable 
influence of German Romanticism and appearing in a collection of essays 
and stories, Arabesques (Arabeski, 1835), with no shortage of breathless, 
one might say utopian, claims on behalf of art (as well as history, 
geography, and other concerns). A whisper of the twentieth century 
might come through when the artist and main character Chertkov first 
begins to betray his talent and is rewarded with a stream of wealthy 
visitors, ‘all wishing to see their likenesses doubled or, if possible, 
increased tenfold’.32 The tenfold increase is, of course, not an exclusive 
property of twentieth-century dreams, but it may sensitize readers to 
other parallels with O’Brien and Krzhizhanovsky: the extraordinary 
fineness of detail in a depicted artwork, the story that eventually moves 
to an explanation of its own origins, the main character whose very 
passion—philosophical in ‘The Collector of Cracks’, scholarly in The 
Third Policeman, artistic in ‘The Portrait’—damns him.
In ‘The Overcoat,’ Gogol takes the theme still further, adding 
conceptual nuance to what he might have found in his own earlier work 
or in his later sources. Much of the story is taken up not just with Akaky 
Akakievich’s dream of a new overcoat, but with the process of planning 
and making it. It is thus another story concerned with making, both 
its own making and the making of its eponymous garment (a point 
elaborated in Boris Eikhenbaum’s 1919 essay ‘How Gogol’s Overcoat 
Is Made’, or ‘Kak sdelana Shinel’ Gogolia’). Akaky Akakievich does 
not have the money to replace his threadbare overcoat, which is itself 
beyond repair. By dint of heroic economizing and the mobilization of 
the tailor Petrovich’s full range of skill and imagination, though, a near-
nothing set of resources is mobilized to produce something really nice, 
an overcoat that immediately raises Akaky Akakievich in the eyes of his 
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co-workers and, perhaps, in his own eyes as well. Once again, a story of 
improbable leverage gained by craftsmanship.
In another unmistakable echo of O’Brien and Krzhizhanovsky, the 
craftsman himself is depicted in subtly demonic terms.33 But here we 
can see that Gogol distributes his themes among many characters: 
Akaky Akakievich himself, after all, is an intricate craftsman, a copy 
clerk who forms letters at home for the sheer joy of it, perhaps the one 
character in literature equipped to appreciate MacCruiskeen’s miniscule 
inventions. The latter is also refracted in the important person whose 
virtuosic tongue-lashing scares Akaky Akakievich to a feverish death. 
Yet this important person himself suffers in the larger social-narrative 
mechanism where he plays his oppressive part. Among subordinates 
and inferiors ‘he kept silent, and his position was pitiable […] in his eyes 
there could sometimes be seen a strong desire to join in some interesting 
conversation and circle, but he was stopped by the thought: Would it 
not be excessive on his part, would it not be familiar, would it not be 
descending beneath his importance?’34 
It is the important person’s lot to oppress others, or so he understands 
it (his motto is ‘strictness, strictness—and strictness’),35 but in so doing 
he oppresses himself in a more dialectical, less sequential way than a 
character like O’Brien’s Dermott Trellis, who abuses and then suffers 
abuse. Likewise, the nominal enforcer of order in ‘The Overcoat’—the 
policeman described near the end of the story—is subject to the same 
fear and confusion as any other character. Finally, the hypothetical police 
chief in Gogol’s famous digressive opening is yet another refracted image 
of O’Brien’s MacCruiskeen, this time lodging a petition of complaint 
against his depiction in The Third Policeman. By distributing the themes 
and qualities of craftsmanship, generative potential, oppressive capacity, 
and terror more broadly among his characters, Gogol deconstructs, as it 
were, the polarized artistic worlds of O’Brien and Krzhizhanovsky.
Collapse
Apart from the fear that artistic powers may have demonic origins or 
intentions, our three authors share another anxiety as well: that the 
gains may be lost at any moment. In ‘The Portrait’, Gogol gives Chertkov 
a prodigious force-multiplier in the form of inauthentic, uninspired art, 
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the kind of art that makes him rich—and in the end, Chertkov uses 
all his money to buy up and destroy real art. Some irresistible law of 
ethical or aesthetic symmetry converts rapid, unearned gains into 
catastrophic destruction. There are other ways for the whole thing to 
crash as, for example, Das’s dystopian world eventually falls apart in 
apparent obedience to some accelerated entropic principle. In O’Brien’s 
work the prospect of imminent collapse often becomes apparent with 
the humorous reassertion of the physical, as when the narrator of At 
Swim-Two-Birds comes to suffer the predictable consequences of his 
slothfulness.
It was in the New Year, in February, I think, that I discovered that my 
person was verminous. A growing irritation in various parts of my 
body led me to examine my bedclothes and the discovery of lice in large 
numbers was the result of my researches.36 
The author’s imaginative constructs avail him nothing against the 
indignities of the real world; the dream of bootstrapping one’s way to 
an artistic paradise, or even some sort of oasis, is subject to refutation by 
lice at any time. 
The theme of collapse is more complex and total in Krzhizhanovsky’s 
story ‘The Unbitten Elbow’ (‘Neukushennyi lokot’’, 1940), which 
recounts the attempts of an unnamed protagonist to bite his own elbow. 
The treatment is frankly philosophical, with direct references to Kant as 
well as to a philosopher called Kint and a columnist named Tnik. Biting 
one’s own elbow is to be taken as a physical version of the more general 
and abstract notion of doing what can’t be done. And the story itself is 
part of this project, as is clear from the very beginning. 
This whole story would have remained hidden inside the sleeve and 
starched cuff of a jacket, if not for the Weekly Review. The Weekly Review 
came up with a questionnaire (Your favorite writer? Your average weekly 
earnings? Your goal in life?) and sent it out to all subscribers. Among 
the thousands of completed forms (the Review had a huge circulation) 
the sorters found one, Form No. 11,111, which, wander as it would 
from sorter to sorter, could not be sorted: On Form No. 11,111, opposite 
‘Average Earnings’, the respondent had written ‘0’, and opposite ‘Goal in 
Life’, in clear round letters, ‘To bite my elbow’.37
We thus start at zero in both story (which would never have been told) 
and money (zero earnings). Subsequent narration is as much about 
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how the events were reported and discussed as about the elbow-biting 
quest itself. ‘The Unbitten Elbow’ is therefore in large part a story about 
a story, where words chase the possibility of something new and end 
up chasing each other, destined for collapse like O’Brien’s circular Third 
Policeman, the hypothetical construction of a deceased narrator.
Near the end of the story, Krzhizhanovsky offers an image that might 
reasonably be understood as a parable within a parable about force-
multipliers and collapse.
An avalanche, they say, may begin like this: A raven, perched high on 
a mountain peak, beats its wing against the snow, a clump of which 
goes sliding down the slope, gathering more and more snow as it goes; 
rocks and earth go crashing after it—debris and more debris—until the 
avalanche, goring and gouging the mountainside, has engulfed and 
flattened everything in its path.38 
The raven has attained the unattainable, altering the landscape out of 
any proportion to its physical capabilities. A miniscule input can, under 
the right conditions, turn into a huge commotion—as happens with the 
story of the elbow itself. 
Speculative economies are especially vulnerable to avalanche-
like crashes. In ‘The Unbitten Elbow’, a bankers’ trust, including both 
government officials and leading capitalists, uses the spectacle of No. 
11,111 (as the protagonist is known in the story) trying to bite his elbow 
as a way to raise money. Citizens can buy a ticket and get a huge payout 
if he ever does get to the elbow.
One day the fractions of an inch separating mouth from elbow so 
diminished (triggering yet another surge in ticket sales) that at a secret 
government meeting the ministers began to fret: What if the impossible 
were to happen and the elbow were to be bitten? To redeem even a 
tenth of all the tickets at the advertised rate of 11,111 to one, the finance 
minister warned, would leave the treasury in tatters.39
Here again, the essential dynamic is a form of leverage, involving a 
tiny input to gain a colossal output. In the financial world as well as the 
world of narrative, speculation carries the potential for freakish growth 
and the danger of sudden collapse. 
Recursive financial speculation, moreover, recapitulates the same 
kind of problem we saw with narrative recursiveness in At Swim-Two-
Birds: it brackets the material world from consciousness and encourages 
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a forgetting of the fact that materiality—whether in the form of lice or 
debt collectors—will inevitably return and demand its own compound 
interest. In ‘The Unbitten Elbow’, the speculative and enabling functions 
of investment are cut off from one another: buying a ticket does not help 
No. 11,111 get to the elbow the way that buying a share in a bakery 
helps the oven get bought in a simplified version of capitalism. Even 
buying shares in the banks that buy those bakery shares can be said to 
enable construction. But with each layer of speculation the connection 
becomes more dubious, until the main things getting constructed are 
the instruments of financial leverage themselves. The stock market 
becomes a complex lottery drawing resources from the world of human 
values and returning only the whiff of hope that a given individual 
might profit fabulously. While the most obvious context for the lottery 
episode is the early Soviet campaign against speculation and economic 
‘parasitism’,40 the theme was spread as wide as modern economic life 
itself. One thinks here of the particularly fraught case of Ezra Pound’s 
obsession with banking.41 More recently, in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis of 2007–2008, John Lanchester argued that finance,
like other forms of human behavior, underwent a change in the 
twentieth century, a shift equivalent to the emergence of modernism in 
the arts—a break with common sense, a turn toward self-referentiality 
and abstraction and notions that couldn’t be explained in workaday 
English. In poetry, this moment took place with the publication of ‘The 
Waste Land’. In classical music, it was, perhaps, the première of ‘The 
Rite of Spring’. Jazz, dance, architecture, painting—all had comparable 
moments. 
For Lanchester the ‘modernist’ moment in finance came in 1973 with 
Fischer Black and Myron Scholes’s groundbreaking paper on the pricing 
of derivatives. But derivatives themselves, which had been around 
long before the paper, already imply something like the alienation of 
discourse from its referent.
With derivatives, we seem to enter a modernist world in which risk no 
longer means what it means in plain English, and in which there is a 
profound break between the language of finance and that of common 
sense. It is difficult for civilians to understand a derivatives contract, 
or any of a range of closely related instruments, such as credit-default 
swaps. These are all products that were designed initially to transfer 
or hedge risks—to purchase some insurance against the prospect of a 
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price going down, when your main bet was that the price would go up. 
The farmer selling his next season’s crop might not have understood a 
modern financial derivative, but he would have recognized that use of it. 
The trouble is that derivatives are so powerful that—human nature being 
what it is—people could not resist using them as a form of leveraged bet.42
The underlying objection to financial leverage in this sense is that 
it becomes functionally disconnected from any productive activity 
or meaningful discourse: it’s just money talking to money. From this 
perspective, the lottery is simply the realization of the recursive 
utopianism of financial markets, their desire to liberate themselves from 
the friction of reference and materiality, to inhabit a realm as ‘pure’ as 
that of the imagined imaginary—and as unsustainable.
Here it becomes easy, perhaps irresistible, to see Gogol’s Dead Souls 
as something of a compendium of Krzhizhanovskiana and O’Brien 
leavings. Chichikov is one more in a line of people, characters, writers, 
ideas, trying to make something out of nothing, trying to make themselves 
out of nothing, using the special metachronotope of paper—the de Selby 
codex in The Third Policeman, the lottery slips in ‘The Unbitten Elbow’, the 
deeds for dead serfs in Dead Souls. Chichikov’s scheme is to utilize the 
instruments of mortgage and the census to get papers to talk to papers 
in a way that can eventually generate an actual, material estate. Gogol’s 
stated intention was to build the narrative itself into something positive, 
to turn the spiritual emptiness of the first volume into substance—just as 
he wanted the products of his pen to be of positive use to the fatherland. 
But the second volume collapsed under the weight of these expectations, 
never escaping its origin in Gogol’s fantasy or its destiny in his fireplace. 
The hellish expanding and collapsing geometry of such speculative 
places, whether generated by stories about stories or by analogous 
financial meta-processes, had been O’Brien’s and Krzhizhanovsky’s 
great theme, and in Dead Souls Gogol brought that part of the tradition 
to its culminating annihilation. 
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Nikolai Vasil’evich Gogol1
Ilya Vinitsky
What we need be sensitive to are those traces of the future, learning how 
to listen to texts differently, while recalling that they are not inscribed 
in a single linear temporality, moving in a straight line from the past to 
the future, but rather within the movement of a dual chronology whose 
different temporal strata encounter and traverse each other.
 Pierre Bayard, ‘Anticipatory Plagiarism’2
‘When we look back, all we see is ruins.’ 
A barbarian perspective, though a true one.
 Joseph Brodsky, ‘Letters to a Roman Friend’3
Sherlock Holmes was right to note a striking similarity between 
the appearance of the naturalist Stapleton and the portrait of Hugo 
Baskerville which hung in Baskerville Hall. Stapleton, as Sherlock 
determined, was actually a Baskerville, ‘and hence has the motive 
for murder: the naturalist wants to eliminate everyone who stands 
between him and the succession to title and estate’.4 Although Pierre 
Bayard wittily debunks this solution in his provocative book on The 
Hound of the Baskervilles (in his interpretation, the real criminal in the 
story is Stapleton’s wife), Holmes’ “gallery revelation” may serve as 
a fascinating metaphor for the deductive method exemplified by the 
famous detective. It is also helpful for the interpretative experiment 
conducted in the present essay. 
This chapter considers a paradoxical connection between the literary 
word (text) and the visual image (a painting) presented not by means 
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of ekphrasis (the verbal description of an artwork), but rather by 
spontaneous ‘translation’ of the written text into the visual image, which 
serves as a key to the text’s enigma. In other words, I will examine a case 
of a certain old artwork which, like Baskerville’s portrait, reveals the 
mystery of a (bizarre) literary work written by a very unusual author 
who lived many years after the artwork had been created.
In what follows, I will focus on the striking final request made in 
Gogol’s (in)famous ‘Testament’ (‘Zaveshchanie’, 1845) , which opens 
his Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends (Vybrannye mesta iz 
perepiski s druz’iami, 1847), and which concerns the writer’s prohibition 
of the reproduction and distribution of his portrait and expresses 
his passionate commandment that those who really love him should 
instead buy an engraving of Raphael’s Transfiguration (1516–20) made 
by one of his friends. The request produced a huge scandal. Gogol was 
accused of blasphemy, enormous arrogance, madness and complete lack 
of taste. In this paper I offer an alternative, Bayardian, interpretation of 
his undoubtedly peculiar request, based on inner, counter-chronological 
relationships between the two testaments—Raphael’s last painting, 
which, according to Giorgio Vasari, foretold the future development of 
western art, and Gogol’s last will, which effectively ruined his reputation 
as a writer. 
Fooling Everyone Around
Nikolai Gogol’s controversial Selected Passages from Correspondence with 
Friends opens with his ‘Testament’—one of the strangest and most 
scandalous works ever written in the Russian language. Every aspect of 
this text challenges the reader: it manifests as a last will published during 
the writer’s lifetime, and as an introduction to this collection of edifying 
letters and articles conceived as a redemptive replacement of all the 
author’s previous works.5 This ‘Testament’ is addressed to ‘all Russia’ 
in general and to every single compatriot in particular and it includes 
some extraordinary, practically unrealizable, immodest, blasphemous, 
and paranoid requests. 
Thus, in the ‘Testament’ Gogol demands that his body not be buried 
‘until such time as clear signs of decomposition have appeared’.6 On the 
other hand, should his death have been established without doubt, no 
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monument is to be raised to him, either, except indirectly through the 
reader’s transformation into a better person. Nor should anyone weep for 
him, since to see his death as a loss would be a sin. Gogol also bequeaths 
to his friends a short work of his own, which he calls ‘The Farewell Tale’ 
(‘Proshchal’naia povest’’), intended to explain the reasons behind his 
mysteries (characteristically, there is no trace among Gogol’s papers of 
its ever having been written). The final request (which I will expand 
on below) deals with Gogol’s prohibition of the reproduction and 
distribution of his portrait and his suggestion that instead, one should 
buy an engraving of Raphael’s Transfiguration. The final sentence of this 
‘Testament’ is a sombre warning: ‘My testament must be published 
immediately after my death in all the newspapers and reviews, so that 
no one may, in ignorance, be innocently guilty towards me and bring 
reproaches down upon his soul’.7
The general reaction of the Russian public to Gogol’s ‘Testament’ 
might be described by one word: shock. Critics of various convictions 
tried to guess what had led Gogol to write this weird text: a morbid 
fear of death? Religious mania? Catholic influence (a kind of ‘preacher’s 
narcissism’)? ‘If it was a joke on your part’, Sergei Aksakov wrote to 
Gogol in January 1847, ‘its success exceeded the most ambitious 
expectations: you made fools of everyone (vse oduracheno)!’.8
Gogol himself provided his readers with two contradictory 
explanations for the publication of his last will. In a ‘Preface’ to his 
Correspondence, he points out that the ‘Testament’ is to be published 
in order to apprise ‘all Russia’ of what people should do in case of 
his sudden death. At the same time, he confesses to his mother, who 
was frightened by her dear son’s ‘Testament’, that he merely wished to 
remind his readers of the existence of death, which threatens everyone 
in our world in every single moment.
On the one hand, the ‘Testament’ should be considered literally—as 
Gogol’s real last will, the strict execution of which was just postponed 
for a while: until his demise. On the other hand, the ‘Testament’ has an 
allegorical sense (‘memento mori’; or, to be sure, ‘remember about my, 
Gogol’s, not-yet-happened death’). Yet it is noteworthy that in the very 
same letter to his mother, Gogol hints that he has other numerous reasons 
for announcing his last will to the world during his lifetime. 
What are these reasons?
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The Secretics
As is well known, contradictory and vague explanations for his own plots 
and plans constitute one of Gogol’s most frequent rhetorical devices.9 
These vague explanations help him to create an aura of impenetrable 
enigma around his texts and authorial persona. Unfortunately, Gogol’s 
rhetoric of secrecy has not been studied adequately yet. 
I would highlight the following as typical Gogolian devices: frequent 
usage of aposiopesis (the rhetorical figure of omission or silence); 
intended unreliability of the source of information; sudden, unmotivated 
mood shifts by a narrator, or shifts in narration from accounts of heroes to 
lyrical digression and, especially, to reminiscences; mocking or edifying 
appeals to the reader; profane, false hints and pseudo-resolutions, which 
replace each other as fast as thoughts in Khlestakov’s head in Gogol’s 
play The Government Inspector (Revizor, 1836); all taken together with 
obtrusive suggestions by the narrator or implied author of numerous 
contradictory interpretative ‘keys’ to his own texts, and so on.
Many years ago I suggested for future (never realized) elaboration 
the term ‘the secretics’ of Gogol, which is both analogous and opposite 
to a traditional poetics and a relatively young ‘prosaics’.10 Thus, from 
the ‘secretics’ point of view, Gogol’s hermeneutic traps such as The 
Government Inspector (followed by a cycle of short plays and essays 
which ‘reveal’ its hidden meaning),11 the short story ‘The Portrait’ 
(‘Portret’, 1835 and 1842; both versions), and—especially—the story 
‘The Nose’ (Nos, 1836) appear to be powerful means of kindling the 
reader’s interest in the author’s persona. Gogol does not quite parody 
the various authoritative hermeneutical systems. Instead he univocally 
collapses them in such a way that they annihilate each other in order 
to assert either directly (as in the unfinished 1842 novel Dead Souls 
(Mertvye dushi)) or implicitly (as in ‘The Nose’) his own privileged 
position in the text as the absolutely incomprehensible Master of Meaning. 
If anything can oppose ‘semiotic totalitarianism’ (Gary Saul Morson’s 
term)12 in Gogol’s texts, it is his ‘totalitarian secretics’, which implies 
a concentrated, eternal, and always unsuccessful readers’ search for 
a solution to the riddle of the text, or intention, or indeed the earthly 
mission of the person known as ‘Nikolai Gogol’. This quest is not a 
hoax or a fraud, but a special aesthetic system facilitated by the author’s 
post-factum ‘revelations’ of mutually exclusive keys to his writings. 
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As a result, there are ‘not secrets to be found out here one by one, but 
Secrecy’.13 
Characteristically, one of Gogol’s trademark devices deals with 
offering or hinting at a visual key (or ‘pictorial metanarrative’) to his a 
priori enigmatic writing. Judith Robey observes that ‘moments featuring 
viewers looking at paintings can be found throughout Gogol’s fiction 
and essays, whether or not they are works explicitly about artists or the 
arts’ (she cites ‘The Portrait’ among other stories and essays). ‘Taken as 
a whole,’ the critic argues, ‘these moments correspond to the stages in a 
metanarrative in Gogol’s works’, which she defines as ‘a conversion tale 
in which reading is portrayed as a process that can lead to redemption 
and salvation’.14 
Possibly the most famous and telling example of Gogol’s usage of 
visual mysteries encrypted into his works is the final ‘Silent Scene’ in 
his play The Government Inspector, in which all the comic and corrupt 
bureaucrats of the town stand as if frozen in place for more than a 
minute. At different stages of his literary career, Gogol offered several 
(sometimes mutually exclusive) keys to this scene, but, as Iurii Mann 
convincingly showed many years ago, the famous tableau has its 
pictorial metanarrative. Mann argued that it was designed to make the 
audience perceive the image of the Last Judgement as portrayed by Karl 
Briullov’s Romantic canvas The Last Day of Pompeii (Poslednii den’ Pompei, 
1833), lauded by Gogol elsewhere.15 
Fig. 1. Karl Briullov, The Last Day of Pompeii (1830–33),  State Russian Museum, St 
Petersburg. Photograph by Dcoetzee (2012), Wikimedia, Public domain, https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl_Bryullov#/media/File:Karl_Brullov_-_The_Last_
Day_of_Pompeii_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg
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While Mann’s assertion is certainly plausible, I would argue that the 
silent scene, which took its final shape in 1840, contains another visual 
reference, intentionally concealed by the author in order to keep his 
lofty and incomprehensible status. 
Let me quote the playwright’s ‘instructions’ (a kind of secret ekphrasis 
of an unnamed image) replacing the names of comic bureaucrats with 
X, Y, Z, etc.:
X stands in the center rigid as a post, with outstretched hands and head thrown 
backward. On his right are [two women] Y and Z straining toward him with 
every movement of their whole bodies. Behind them M, turned toward the 
audience, metamorphosed into a question mark. […]. To the left of X is N, his 
head to one side as if listening. Behind him is O with outspread hands 
almost crouching on the ground and pursing his lips as if to whistle or 
say: ‘A nice pickle we’re in!’. Next to him is P, turned toward the audience, 
with eyes screwed up and making a venomous gesture at X. Next to him, 
at the edge of the group, are Q and R, gesticulating at each other, open-
mouthed and wide-eyed. The other guests remain standing stiff. The 
whole group retain the same position of rigidity for almost a minute and a half. 
The curtain falls [italics added].16
According to Gogol’s plan, the Silent Scene, which had originally been 
introduced as the final part of the play’s Easter performance in 1836, was 
supposed to last for several minutes, giving the audience enough time 
not only to recognize but also to comprehend the profoundly serious 
secret message it comically mimicked and camouflaged. Eventually, 
Gogol shortened the time for the action of this scene. The well-known 
drawing which usually accompanies Gogol’s editions of the comedy 
(see below), is utterly misleading if compared with the author’s detailed 
description of the scene. According to A. Nekrasov, the drawing was 
done by the playwright’s friend Aleksandr Ivanov.17
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Fig. 2. Aleksandr Ivanov, The Final Scene of Revizor (1836), a drawing wrongly 
attributed to Gogol. Public domain, http://n-v-gogol.ru/books/item/f00/s00/
z0000002/pic/000005.jpg.
The verbal description of the last moment of the play reveals that with 
their names and ranks silenced, one can easily recognize what the “late” 
Gogol may have hinted at and who stands behind this comic scene of 
judgement with outstretched hands. I will refrain from naming this 
powerful proto-image and invite the readers of this essay to guess and 
interpret it as a part of Gogol’s secretive message by themselves (please 
focus on the italicized words of the description above).18 All in all, I 
would like to stress here that Gogol’s visual secretics works as a kind of 
reading or seeing backwards, as if what we read or see now had been 
already foretold and foreseen by other artists.
Rhetoric of the Testament
Let us return to Gogol’s secretive antemortem publication of his last 
will (Andrei Siniavskii ironically dubbed this work a ‘poster for one’s 
own death’).19 Although Gogol’s contemporaries were shocked by its 
publication, throughout antiquity the composition of a testament was 
regarded as a solemn act, proclaimed publicly (‘Testamenti factio non 
privati sed publici juris est’).20 Deeply concerned about the fate of his own 
(and indeed all Russia’s) spiritual housekeeping, Gogol demonstratively 
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returns to the testament the character of a public exhortation—its 
primordial form (this device is, of course, Romantic in character: consider 
the numerous attempts by the Romantics to resurrect those archaic 
discourses, which represented, in the estimation of Romantic theorists, 
the collective consciousness of a nation). In short, the form of the public 
testament turned out to be aesthetically appropriate for an authorial 
manifesto addressed to ‘all Russia’.
In fact, Gogol’s ‘Testament’ is the testament of a writer. It expresses 
his new authorial creed, but it is addressed to his old readers. Its aim 
is to persuade the latter of the truth of his new views and to prepare 
the way for their perception of the important and uneasy message of 
his ground-breaking book. Old ideas concerning the role of literature in 
society appear unsuitable for his new missionary goal to help people’s 
suffering souls to return to Christ (Dead Souls’ arch-plot). Here originates 
his rejection of his previous, ‘useless’, literary works—the ones which 
brought him glory—in favour of his new, useful, non-literary (and 
sometimes never written!) writings. In this sense, Gogol’s ‘Testament’ 
constitutes a deliberate literary action in his struggle with the traditional 
(here: secular) vision of literature. It is conceived and constructed as 
a reevaluation and transfiguration of these views in accordance with 
his new authorial self-conception. Of course, one may find here the 
influence of a religious, edifying, literature, but we must not forget to 
be aware of the messianic literature-centrism of his thinking during this 
period of his life.
First of all, there was nothing unusual in the very form of the 
author’s testament for Gogol’s contemporaries. This was a traditional 
literary genre with its respectable genealogy and canonical examples—
both serious and mock ones (Villon, Shakespeare, Donne). Literary 
testaments in verse and prose were very popular in Russian Romantic 
literature (Pushkin, Venevitinov, Lermontov, Shevchenko). These 
poetical testaments usually included sentimental appeals to friends, 
the indication of the site where a writer wished to be buried, farewell 
advice, instructions, and, sometimes, threats. Logically, one of the 
central motifs of a literary testament was that of the responsibility of the 
testator’s friends towards him.
However, these were conventional, allegorical, sometimes playful 
testaments, which required an aesthetic, rather than a literal response 
from the readers. It seems that in his Correspondence, Gogol strove to 
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oppose a real, unconventional testament to the literary, conventional 
genre—that is, his own (not a lyrical ego’s) will, a legal rather than a 
literary document.
I say ‘it seems’ because in reality we see an extremely interesting case 
of usage of the semantic possibilities of a legal document for aesthetic 
purposes. Indeed, within Correspondence, the ‘Testament’ introduces the 
author’s ‘real’ voice and establishes a peculiar relationship between the 
author and his readers. The form of the last will and testament allows 
the author to present these relations as judicially and mystically ‘fixed’. 
They are formulated in terms of unilateral will rather than as a traditional 
treaty (you must not erect, not cry, not buy, etc.) The realization of this 
juridical metaphor provides the author’s word (at least, in Gogol’s 
view) with an unconditional character—this is his legal demand, and 
the addressees’ duty is to fulfill this will strictly. Moreover, this device 
creates an illusion that the author himself will oversee the execution of 
the will!
In other words, the Testament presents a legalized request of the 
dead (as it were) Author, addressed to ‘all Russia’ (remember that the 
living Gogol wrote the words ‘perhaps my posthumous voice will be a 
general reminder of caution’).21 This is nothing less than a sort of public 
posthumous speech (‘the fiction of the voice-from-beyond-the-grave,’ 
in Paul de Man’s terms),22 which strives to immortalize, to imprint the 
image (or, to be specific, the voice) of the author in his compatriots’ 
hearts, or, speaking in Gogolian terms, to set an indestructible and 
eternal link between his soul and Russia, meaning the Russian nation. 
This might be called a rhetorical attempt to conquer death by means of 
a printed text: a simulation of an afterlife being, a realized prosopopeia of the 
scale of Russia itself. Paradoxically, with each utterance it announces that 
its author is neither properly dead nor alive but somewhere between 
the two. In Pierre Bayard’s terms, this strange text might also be called 
Gogol’s attempt to plagiarize his own forthcoming death, such that ‘the 
after may be situated before the before’.23
The Spiritual Monument
Let me now consider how Gogol’s ‘Testament’ is made. It consists of seven 
items, connected both functionally (the testator’s will) and thematically 
(the individual faced with death). Each item of the testament begins 
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with the words ‘I hereby bequeath (zaveshchaiu)...’ (not to bury my body; 
not to erect a memorial; not to weep; the best of everything written; not 
to hasten to praise or condemn). This formal structure (motivated 
by the format of the ‘last will and testament’) creates a very palpable 
rhythmical effect, a kind of ‘stanzaic’ organization. 
In an earlier version of this chapter, ‘Exegi Testamentum’, I suggested 
that the implicit addressee of Gogol’s provocative last will was Pushkin’s 
1841 poem ‘Exegi Monumentum’—the summa summarum of the 
classical (secular) conception of poetic self-awareness. I argued that 
Gogol’s text was a polemical translation of Pushkin’s proud poem and the 
authoritative tradition that stands behind it into the language of humble 
sentimental pietism that dwells amidst ruins and graveyard memorials. 
So, what kind of spiritual monument, capable of further growth, 
does Gogol feel to be worthy of a Christian writer? We find the answer 
in the final, most passionate and mysterious, seventh item (‘stanza’) of 
his memorial poem in prose, which contains instructions concerning his 
portrait: ‘I bequeath—but I remind myself that I cannot dispose of some 
things.’ The request stems from Gogol’s prohibition of the reproduction 
and distribution of his portrait, which against his will and without his 
permission was ‘published abroad’. Instead, he suggests that another 
portrait be substituted, and sold for profit, the one engraved by a fellow 
artist in Rome, Fedor Ivanovich Iordanov (Iordan). Let us quote this 
request in full: 
I bequeath—but I remind myself that I cannot dispose of some things. 
Because of my impudence, my proprietary rights have been stolen 
from me: against my will and without my permission my portrait has 
been published abroad. For many reasons that I need not declare, I did 
not want this; I have not sold anyone the right to publish it and I have 
refused all the bookstores that have assailed me with their offers. I would 
contemplate permitting it only in the case that God would help me to 
accomplish that labor with which my thought has been occupied all 
my life, and besides, accomplish it so that all my compatriots would say 
with one voice that I have honestly fulfilled my task and would even 
wish to learn the lineaments of the man who worked in silence for a 
long time and did not want to profit from underserved fame. Another 
circumstance is joined to this one: my portrait could be sold immediately 
in a great number of copies, which would bring considerable profit to 
the artist who had engraved it. There is an artist who has labored in 
Rome for some years engraving the immortal picture of Raphael, ‘The 
Transfiguration of the Lord’ [sic]. He has sacrificed everything for his 
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labor—a labor destroying, devouring years and health, and he has 
accomplished it with a perfection (it is now approaching the end) that 
no other engraver has attained. But by reason of his high price and the 
small number of experts, this print cannot be distributed in sufficient 
quantities to pay him back for everything. My portrait would help him. 
Now my plans wrecked: once the image of anyone is published abroad, 
it is anyone’s property, taken up by the publishers of engravings and 
lithographs. But if it should happen that my posthumously published 
letters are of some general benefit (even if it be only by their sincere effort 
to furnish it), and if my compatriots should also want to see my portrait, 
then I ask all those publishers generously to renounce their rights; those 
of my readers who, by a vain fancy for things that have enjoyed a certain 
fame, will have acquire some portrait of me, I ask to destroy it forthwith 
upon reading these lines, especially since it was badly done and bears 
no resemblance to me, and to buy only the one on which will appear 
‘Engraved by Yordanov’. This at least will be a just act. And it will be 
still more just if those persons who have the means buy, instead of my 
portrait, the engraving of ‘The Transfiguration of the Lord’, which, 
even in the opinion of foreigners, is the crown of the engraver’s art and 
constitutes a Russian glory.24
Fig. 3. F. I. Iordan, Engraving (1857) of F. A. Moller, Portrait of Nikolai Gogol (1841). 
Public domain, http://gogol-lit.ru/images/pisma-gogolyu-1397/1397-151_0.jpg.
What does this confusing narrative mean? Why Raphael’s 
Transfiguration? Why should Gogol’s portrait be engraved by Iordan? 
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In 1997, Vladimir Paperny suggested an interesting interpretation of 
Gogol’s choice for his memorial painting: ‘Raphael’s Transfiguration 
offered a sort of model, based upon which Gogol sketched his own 
“painting,” in which he tried to depict himself, and Russia, and also 
“everything that there is upon earth”, depicting this, moreover, by 
means of an “intellectually glimpsed” incorporation of his own portrait 
within Raphael’s painting’.25
Fig. 4. F. I. Iordan, Engraving (1835–50) of Raphael, Transfiguration (1516–20). 
Public domain, http://www.artsait.ru/foto.php?art=i/iordan/img/1.
Simply put, where is Gogol in this engraving?
The Transfiguration
Surely we can argue that Gogol’s reference to Raphael’s Transfiguration 
transposes the theme of artistic and spiritual metamorphosis, central to 
his Correspondence as a whole, onto the Christological plane as we recall 
in the last scene of this comedy. Indeed, Gogol was very familiar with 
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Vasari’s description of this last unfinished painting by Raphael as the 
latter’s supreme achievement and artistic testament. Vasari wrote: 
He finished the course of his life on the day of his birth, Good Friday, 
aged thirty-seven [Gogol’s age at that point! – I. V.]. We may believe 
that his soul adorns heaven as his talent has embellished the earth. At 
the head of the dead man, in the room where he worked, they put the 
Transfiguration, which he had done for the Cardinal de Medici. The sight 
of the dead and of this living work filled all who saw them with poignant 
sorrow.26 
Lastly, Iordan, this Pierre Menard of Russian painting, kept working 
on this engraving for many years (like Gogol on his Dead Souls!—a 
typically Romantic dolgostroi, or lengthy project). In Gogol’s eyes, as 
Paperny noted, Iordan’s engraving presented a true monument to the 
artist’s self-sacrifice, as well as to the artistic and spiritual maturity of 
the Russian nation.
Still, one might suspect some sort of personal connections between the 
writer’s true monument and the engraving of Raphael’s masterpiece. 
It actually sounds like the depiction of Christ at the moment of his 
Transfiguration should take the place of the deceased writer’s portrait. 
Paperny states that ‘Gogol “made himself at home”, spiritually, in 
Raphael’s painting, “spiritually” exchanging the head of Christ for his 
own’.27 No wonder Gogol’s Orthodox readers were outraged. With an 
ill-concealed feeling of anger Aksakov wrote: 
I could not read without revulsion the published testament of a man 
still alive and well, in which each word smacks of incredible pride [...] 
where the engraving of The Transfiguration of Christ hangs alongside his 
own portrait. 28 
But was Gogol so grandiosely overconfident that he identified himself 
with Christ on the painting? I suspect that he meant something very 
different, but that he nevertheless became a victim of his own secretics 
as well as of an odd anxiety of prophetic plagiarism. As is well known, 
Raphael did not paint the standard interpretation of the story of the 
Transfiguration, as seen in other works from the period. Instead, he 
created a work of extraordinary complexity and strangeness, combining 
in it two closely related, yet distinct, episodes from the Gospel: the 
Transfiguration of Christ (as seen in the upper part of the canvas) and 
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the Healing of the Lunatic Child (from the lower part, and as described 
in Matthew 17.1–20). 
In Vasari’s description, this ‘most famous, most beautiful and most 
divine’ work of the artist 
represents Christ transfigured on Mount Tabor with the eleven disciples 
at the foot, awaiting their Master. A boy possessed by a devil is brought 
so that Christ when he has come down from the mount may release him. 
[…] An old man is embracing and supporting him, his eyes shining, his 
brows raised, and his forehead knit, showing at once his resolution and 
fear. He steadily regards the Apostles, as if to derive courage from them.29 
According to Vasari, Raphael, portraying the transfigured Christ, is 
himself transfigured. When Vasari adds that Raphael gave up his last 
breath after painting Christ’s face, he further invokes Saint Paul’s 
words in Corinthians, since the painter now saw Christ ‘face to 
face’.30 Moreover, Vasari argues that the painting foretells the future 
development of sixteenth-century art. 
Raphael’s Transfiguration has always been considered a mysterious 
piece: ‘Combining two distinct narrative subjects with anachronistic 
witnesses in a single setting, it had few equivalents for sheer complexity 
among altar-places of its period, being marvelous not only for its diversity 
of elements but also the harmony of their integration’.31 A contemporary 
critic interprets the meaning of Raphael’s painting as follows: ‘Christ is 
the savior of man; only he can heal the pains of this life. The father of the 
possessed boy performs a function similar to that of God’.32 Those who 
have faith will be saved. The curing of the boy echoes the words of God: 
believe in Christ’s power.
In the 1970s, Dr Gordon Bendersky offered a provocative 
interpretation of the painting based on medical observations of the 
boy’s figure: 
instead of depicting the boy in the midst of an actual epileptic attack, 
he is coming out of his convulsion. This focus on the postictal image is 
consistent with the interpretation that ‘God heals.’ It also suggests that 
Raphael depicted the boy as cured, in which case the open mouth is the 
organ through which the devil issues rather than the site of the boy’s cry 
during the epileptic seizure. [...] Therefore, contrary to the opinion that 
Raphael primarily shows the apostles failing in the attempt to heal the 
boy, my neuroiconographical interpretation supports the contention that 
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Raphael intentionally linked the divine revelation directly with the cured 
boy in a causal relation.
In other words, in The Transfiguration, 
Raphael functioned as though he were an angelic intercessor. Empowered 
by his name [which means in the original Hebrew, ‘God heals’ – I. V.], he 
facilitated a conjunction between the healer and the healed. For Raphael, 
life’s final irony lay in his theophoric name. It gave him the power to 
integrate two disparate Biblical sequences in the painting that would be 
his last.33
What was Gogol’s secretive take on this painting?
The Likeness
Let us undertake a visual experiment. Look at the face and pose of the 
sick child’s father in Raphael’s painting. 
Fig. 5. Raphael, Transfiguration (1516–20), fragment (a lunatic boy), Pinacoteca 
Vaticana, Vatican City. Taken from photograph by Alvesgaspar (2015), CC BY-SA 
4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Transfigurazione_(Raffaello)_
September_2015-1a.jpg.
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And now turn to the famous ‘shivering’ group of a father and a son in 
the lower right of Aleksandr Ivanov’s painting The Appearance of Christ 
to the People (Iavlenie Khrista narodu, 1857)—another important ‘pictorial 
metanarrative’ used by Gogol. 
Fig. 6. Aleksandr Ivanov, The Appearance of Christ to the People (1857), fragment 
(a father and a shivering boy), Tretyakov Gallery, Moscow. Taken from photo by 
DCoetzee (2012), Wikimedia, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Александр_Андреевич_Иванов_-_Явление_Христа_народу_(Явление_
Мессии)_-_Google_Art_Project.jpg.
I believe that the scene in Raphael served as a symbolic prototype for 
Ivanov’s group. Furthermore, as is known, Gogol persuaded Ivanov 
to portray in this ‘shivering’ group himself and his young friend Iosif 
Vielgorskii (the death of the latter in 1840 deeply affected Gogol and led 
to his conversion to religious mysticism).
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Fig. 7. Left: Aleksandr Ivanov’s portrait of Iosif Vielgorskii (1817–1839), Nashe 
nasledie, 1998, No. 46. Photograph by Triumphato (2015), Wikimedia, Public domain, 
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fb/ВиельгорскийИМ.jpg. 
Right: Close-up detail of Figure 6.
Scholars argue that in this group Gogol wanted to personify his 
spiritual guidance of, and fraternal friendship with, Vielgorskii.34 
Since Gogol’s own position in the foreground as the ‘shivering’ figure 
was too prominent and very likely to reveal his identity, Gogol and 
Ivanov eventually decided to create a ‘spiritual portrait’ of Gogol in 
the figure of the ‘sinner’ closest to the Messiah… in the background of 
the painting.
In the seventh request made in his Testament, Gogol complains that 
his secret plans were wrecked when Aleksandr Ivanov published his 
portrait. 
Fig. 8. Aleksandr Ivanov, Portrait of N. V. Gogol (1847). Photograph by xennex (2013), 
WikiArt.org, Public domain, https://www.wikiart.org/en/alexander-ivanov/
nikolai-gogol-1847.
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However, if my hypothesis is correct, Gogol does not discard his former 
plan, for he secretly names (at the end of his testament) the precise 
source of Ivanov’s and his own mystical and artistic project. Indeed, with 
some exaggeration and through the ‘visual’ intermediacy of Ivanov’s 
sketches, one may recognize typical Gogolian features in the image of 
the father in the Transfiguration, as if divine Raphael had prefigured 
(or plagiarized by anticipation) the physical appearance (and religious/
artistic ideas) of the great Russian writer.
I suspect that Gogol might have ‘read’ this ‘likeness’ as a symbolic 
(déjà vu) confirmation of the legitimacy of his own self-imposed mission 
of bringing sick souls back to Christ, for only Christ can heal them! In 
this case, the possessed boy may represent his suffering compatriots (the 
addressees of his Book), as well as his deceased dear friend (the object 
of his reminiscences and religious aspirations). With an understanding 
of himself as a healer performing God’s work, Gogol assumed a role 
greater than that of an artist. It is quite understandable now why Iordan’s 
engraving of Raphael’s Transfiguration remained among Gogol’s very 
few belongings at the author’s real death in March of 1852.
Once again, it seems that Gogol was far from identifying himself 
with Christ. Most likely, he wanted to transform the Horatian tomb of 
Pushkin’s secular interpretation into a spiritual monument to the Lord; 
and to ‘reserve’ for himself an honourable place on its pedestal. Through 
the agency of a Russian artist, he probably hoped to conquer death by 
being literally en-graved into a sacral scene, portrayed by the divine 
Italian Master. Or, in Pierre Bayard’s words, Gogol—as interpreter of 
art—by recognizing in Raphael’s painting ‘those traces of [his own] 
future [image]’, makes the case for the construction of a new art and 
literary history, which reverses ‘traditional chronology by restoring to 
authors their true [cultural] place in time [and ...] acknowledging that 
some are occasionally posterior to writers whom they appear to precede’, 
while ‘modifying their biographies’ by turning them into ‘participants 
in another temporality, that of literature or art, which obeys its own 
rhythms’.35
Alas, Gogol was misunderstood and condemned by his 
contemporaries as an arrogant impostor. How could this have 
happened? I think he fell into his own rhetorical trap. Indeed, the 
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writer’s real behest could be considered a further demonstration of his 
humility (as if he were to state that he devoted his life and oeuvre to 
God), if not for its Horatian foundation. Characteristically, at the very 
end of his testament, Gogol calls Iordan’s engraving of Raphael’s 
Transfiguration ‘the crown (venets) of art’ which will further Russia’s 
glory. Gogol’s words thus transform the well-known motif of the 
national poet’s crown which Pushkin demonstratively refuses by ‘not 
demanding a wreath’ (‘ne trebuia ventsa’) in the concluding stanza of 
his poem ‘Exegi Monumentum’, a poem which marks Pushkin’s own 
transposition of Horace. 
This led to an unforeseen consequence: the Horatian subject (the 
proud poet), which Gogol hoped to transform into a Christlike figure, 
took the place of the humble and righteous father. That is, the Horatian 
poet-demiurge ‘objectively’ turned into Christ himself, and Gogol’s last 
will was textually transformed (if we follow this argument to its logical 
conclusion) into an equivalent of a Holy Testament. Such a monument, of 
course, rises even higher than Pushkin’s unruly head. But it does sound 
like unspeakable immodesty no matter what Gogol actually wanted to say or 
to conceal by it. Indeed, in his readers’ comprehension, his weird request 
did not sound as a manifesto of the Christian continuity of art (moving 
back and forth in time), but rather as a self-parody of the author.36 
It is precisely this linguistic pose by Gogol which Dostoevsky, as 
Tynianov convincingly demonstrated and interpreted in his theory of 
parody as the vehicle of literary evolution, ridiculed in the ‘humble’ 
appeal uttered by the pompous windbag Foma Fomich Opiskin in his 
1859 novella The Village of Stepanchikovo (Selo Stepanchikovo i ego obitateli): 
‘“Oh, don’t build me a monument! I don’t need a monument! In your 
hearts erect me a monument, and nothing else is necessary, nothing, 
nothing!”’.37 
From the Bayardian perspective, a parody precedes the object of its 
mockery, making the history of literature flow backwards and leaving, 
to paraphrase Gogol’s description of the bird-troika at the end of Dead 
Souls, everything in front. Scholarly spectators, meanwhile, are ‘struck 
with the portent’, observing the ‘awe-inspiring’ movement of a bizarre 
chronology whose different temporal strata, according to the French 
theorist, encounter and traverse each other.
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Conclusion
In struggling for the encoded restoration of his true spiritual likeness 
as if anticipated by Raphael, Gogol erected himself a testament. Having 
read this text, his compatriots decided that the author of The Inspector 
General and Dead Souls had indeed died (obviously, as a writer!). None 
of them saw in this text a hint that he had already been envisioned and 
immortalized by the divine sixteenth-century artist. What a spectacular 
failure for the bizarre experiment of inviting the readers to see backwards 
in order to resolve the author’s impenetrable mystery!
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II. DOSTOEVSKY

3. The Voice of Ivan: Ethical 
Plagiarism in Dostoevsky  
and Coetzee
Michael Bowden
Rosewater said an interesting thing to Billy one time […]. He said 
that everything there was to be known about life was in The Brothers 
Karamazov, by Feodor Dostoevsky. ‘But that isn’t enough any more,’ said 
Rosewater.
 Kurt Vonnegut, Slaughterhouse-Five, or The Children’s Crusade1
The lines above, from Kurt Vonnegut Jr’s Slaughterhouse-Five (1969), 
illustrate the chronological tension inherent in the concept of anticipatory 
plagiarism. Rosewater, portrayed in the novel as an enlightened sage 
and authority on life, establishes Dostoevsky as a progenitor of that 
portrayal. In doing so, he allows readers to identify Vonnegut as one of 
the many authors influenced by Dostoevsky; or, in the parlance of the 
current collection, as one of the innumerable victims of Dostoevsky’s 
considerable literary theft. By mentioning The Brothers Karamazov (Brat’ia 
Karamazovy, 1881), Vonnegut reinforces the chronological continuity 
between his literary forbear and the publication of his own novel in 1969. 
Anticipatory plagiarism inverts linear chronology without abandoning 
it: the shock of reading ‘backwards’ is found in its perversion of the 
convention of forward reading. Acknowledging Dostoevsky’s influence 
on Slaughterhouse-Five allows the reader to interrogate Dostoevsky’s 
anticipation, and subsequent plagiarism, of Vonnegut. It is an allowance 
likewise offered by J. M. Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year (2007), which the 
main part of this paper will explore. 
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However, I turn first to the temporal convolutions of Slaughterhouse 
Five and their extreme illustration of Bayard’s theme. Rosewater’s 
remarks on The Brothers Karamazov establish a chronological break 
between Dostoevsky’s and Vonnegut’s respective contexts by calling 
attention to the transformation of axiological frameworks that correspond 
with the linear chronology that anticipatory plagiarism claims to 
subvert. Vonnegut’s lines are axiological in nature: the implication is that 
‘everything to be known about life’ refers to the values and principles 
by and through which an individual and/or a society can focalize its 
existence—values and principles that a society, as a prerequisite for 
further cultural discourse, accepts as incontestable. That Slaughterhouse-
Five, underneath the complexity of its plot, is a denunciation of the 1945 
firebombing of Dresden thus frames the axiological rupture in terms 
that are both chronological and ethical. By suggesting that the wisdom 
of The Brothers Karamazov ‘isn’t enough any more’, Rosewater is claiming 
that the values and principles of ‘life’ in Dostoevsky’s last novel are not 
only outdated but alien to a world that can destroy a city as a gesture 
against the threat of evil. Rosewater’s words, and the context of their 
utterance, place Dostoevsky within an ethical tradition and then claim 
that the tradition has since collapsed. If Dostoevsky, as noted by Daphna 
Erdinast-Vulcan, wrote at an historical moment coinciding with ‘the 
awakening of the modernist consciousness, the consciousness of an 
essentially secular world […] without recourse to some metaphysical 
foundational premises’, then this now-collapsed ethical tradition is 
readily identifiable as based within religious or philosophical absolutes, 
premised on either divine providence or the universalist claim of a 
moral tradition that reached its apotheosis in Kantian deontology.2 
Anticipatory plagiarism’s inherent tension evolves from this contrast 
between the chronological continuity necessary for its premise and 
the axiological permutations contained within that chronology. This 
essay will attempt to work through such tension by contending that 
Dostoevsky’s own historical context stimulated his plagiarism of Coetzee, 
thereby consolidating Coetzee’s invocation of Dostoevsky as an ethical 
authority with his recognition, in the manner of Rosewater, that the 
concept of an ethical authority is no longer ‘enough’ for a twenty-first-
century context which has eschewed monologic authority in general. 
This consolidation thus allows for an interrogation of Dostoevsky’s 
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plagiarism of Coetzee, exploring the ways in which Dostoevsky 
‘answers’ the ethical crises portrayed in Diary of a Bad Year. Setting the 
Bayardian notion of anticipatory plagiarism in dynamic tension with 
the principle of historical specificity, I argue that Dostoevsky foresaw 
in his own era the dissolution of religious and philosophical absolutes 
that offered universalizing ethical edicts. His recognition of this trend, 
and his anticipation of its consequences, prompted his innovation of 
the ‘polyphonic’ novel (as later defined by Mikhail Bakhtin), a form 
which addresses the requirement for an ethics not dependent upon 
totalizing absolutes. Building upon the correlation between Bakhtin’s 
study of Dostoevsky and his early ethical writings, I will argue that 
the polyphonic novel epitomizes the practice of ‘answerability’. It thus 
exemplifies the intersubjective ethics called for by Bakhtin in response 
to the collapse of absolutist values. Dostoevsky anticipated the twenty-
first century’s demand for a dialogical understanding of ethics and 
addressed it through the polyphonic structure of his novels. Thus, 
Dostoevsky’s plagiarism of Coetzee is contingent upon Coetzee’s own 
historically immanent reading of Dostoevsky.
Literary Ahistory
Rosewater’s brief reference to Dostoevsky serves as a paradigm 
for Slaughterhouse-Five’s treatment of the interchange between 
chronological history and ethics. The novel abandons any semblance of 
linear progression, revealing its last line at the end of its first chapter 
(Slaughterhouse, p. 16). Instead, it conducts a dissection of the concept of 
linear time by using the horrors of Dresden as its axiological anchor. Its 
protagonist, Billy Pilgrim, is himself a time-traveller: it is suggested he has 
become ‘unstuck in time’ (Slaughterhouse, p. 17) as a result of psychosis 
brought about by his participation in the Dresden firebombing. As part 
of his pilgrimage between history and science fiction, Billy encounters 
an alien race, the Tralfamadorians, who perceive time as a static entity 
rather than a sequence of moments: for the Tralfamadorians, ‘all 
moments, past, present, and future, always have existed, always will 
exist’ (Slaughterhouse, p. 19).
The effect is to isolate and contrast a sense of temporal development 
with the stagnation of human development, particularly with regards 
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to the continued permittance and acceptance of atrocity on both an 
individual and global scale. Smaller moments of human vengeance and 
violence permeating the book function as microcosms of Dresden, and 
to each, as to Dresden, Billy offers the same absentminded aphorism: ‘So 
it goes’ (Slaughterhouse, p. 16). It is a statement shorn of ethical scrutiny, 
emphasized by the fact that Billy learns it from the Tralfamadorians, 
whose view of human life as ‘bugs in amber’ (Slaughterhouse, p. 62) 
means that they cannot mark the axiological shift engendered by an 
event such as Dresden.
As a counterweight to the Tralfamadorian perspective, Slaughterhouse-
Five offers the biblical parable of Lot’s wife, punished for refusing to 
obey a divine injunction not to look back on the destruction of Sodom. 
Yet for the unnamed narrator of the novel’s opening chapter, which 
poses as a kind of author’s introduction, it was precisely her need to 
look back that made her ‘so human’ (Slaughterhouse, p. 16). Vonnegut 
thus characterizes the ability to contain within oneself the simultaneous 
commitment to an ideology of progress and the refusal for ethical 
retrospection as archetypically inhuman. One would have to be an 
alien, or live in a fiction far removed from reality, to be so unable to 
look back. Yet Slaughterhouse-Five goes further than the condemnation 
of an incontestable ideal of progress. Its meandering plot, fantastical 
elements and frequent cartoonish illustrations signify not merely a shift 
of ethical perspective but the dead end of all axiological judgements in 
a manner akin to Adorno’s infamous dictum on the barbarity of poetry 
after Auschwitz.3 Slaughterhouse-Five, displaying a typically postmodern 
‘incredulity towards metanarratives’, suggests that traditional, pre-
Dresden novel forms and the axiological contexts they consummated 
are incompatible with a post-Dresden reality.4 The ‘introduction’ itself 
admits that the novel is ‘jumbled and jangled’ because ‘there is nothing 
intelligent to say about a massacre […]. Everything is supposed to be 
very quiet after a massacre’ (Slaughterhouse, p. 14). The criteria for 
ethical judgement have not been relocated but abolished.
The cumulative effect of Slaughterhouse-Five’s treatment of time is 
to destabilize the opposition between chronological progression and 
atemporal values. Typified by Rosewater’s authoritative denunciation 
of axiological authority, the novel works to disorient the applicability 
of a set of values and principles, ethical or otherwise, divorced from 
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their historical context. And the reference to The Brothers Karamazov 
in particular strips Dostoevsky’s final novel of its axiological weight. 
Whether it be the universally applicable ethical precepts threatened by 
the relativism of ‘everything is permitted’, or the faith that the Elder 
Zosima and Alesha offer as a counterweight to Ivan’s Grand Inquisitor, 
Slaughterhouse-Five uses Dostoevsky to query the validity of any ethical 
standard independent of its history. If the passage of time from pre- 
to post-Dresden changes Dostoevsky from an emblem of absolute 
plenitude to an inadequate partiality, the question is raised as to which 
other values, if any, can resist similar erosion.
In this respect, Rosewater’s renunciation of The Brothers Karamazov 
as an absolute ethical measure stands in contrast with Bayard’s 
investigation of the plagiarism of ‘aesthetic territories’.5 Bayard, taking 
his cue from earlier Oulipo theorists who see literature in terms of its 
mathematical potential, expands upon their initial analyses of formal 
and structural plagiarism by proposing that authors can reach forward 
in time to plagiarize cultural relevance. In doing so, he confronts 
the temporal aporia of anticipatory plagiarism, the simultaneous 
reliance on and subversion of linear chronology, more directly that 
his predecessors. He offers Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex (429 BC) as an 
example of the plagiarism of an aesthetic territory: both the investigative 
structure and the psychoanalytic implications of the plot, rarely found 
in contemporaneous Greek theatre, serve as Bayard’s evidence that 
Sophocles intuited both Freud and the modern detective novel. The 
‘twofold modernity’ of Oedipus Rex can only mean ‘that it is also 
posterior’ to psychoanalysis and detective fiction. The creative force of 
the play suggests that Sophocles ‘was already aware of both and knew 
how to take adroit advantage of each of them’.6
To overcome this tension, Bayard proposes two concurrent 
understandings of history, one chronological and the other literary. 
Literary history, where writers are based on formal, cultural or thematic 
similarities, disregards the linearity of chronological history and so 
allows for anticipatory plagiarism by displacing the ‘overly rigid 
conception of time’ that dominates literary studies.7 This subsequently 
situates authors ‘at the crux of a dual temporality’.8 Yet Bayard, with 
the provocativeness characteristic of his Oulipo antecedents, calls for 
the abandonment of the chronological in favour of the literary. He even 
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alleges that ‘situating a writer historically’ is ‘fundamentally useless’ 
for literary understanding.9 Literary understanding need touch ‘only 
lightly on historical reality’.10 The extreme implication of this theory, 
as Bayard admits, is that an author’s true place in literary history can 
never be comprehensively known because the necessarily uncharted 
chronological future does not impinge upon the atemporality of literary 
history.11 
It is this atemporality which marks Bayard’s literary time as distinctly 
Tralfamadorian and so in conflict with Rosewater’s disinheritance 
of Dostoevsky as an axiological forbear. Literary time rendered (and 
isolated) thus would be unable to reflect upon the axiological shifts 
that run concurrent with the overt rigidity of chronological time, and 
so Rosewater’s comments would impede Dostoevsky’s capacity to 
‘respond’ to post-Dresden writers such as Vonnegut and, even later, 
Coetzee. This difficulty plays into the significant flaw in Bayard’s 
proposal: the fact that literary history is necessarily maintained by the 
chronological history it seeks to replace. This flaw is most evident when 
reading the influence of one author on another over an historical period 
in which momentous shifts in socio-cultural values occur. To claim, as 
Bayard does, that Sophocles plagiarized Freud is to identify implicitly 
the vast socio-cultural differences between Greece in BCE 400 and 
Vienna at the turn of the nineteenth century. The theory of anticipatory 
plagiarism implies the plagiarist has an extraordinary ability to reach 
across not only time but also over the socio-cultural values of different 
eras. To define chronological history as fundamentally useless to 
literary studies, as in the most provocative formulation of anticipatory 
plagiarism, robs this feat of important context. A fuller appreciation of 
anticipatory plagiarism takes into account the ways in which an author’s 
place in an era outside of his or her own biographical history depends 
on its contrast with the era in which they actually lived. This element of 
contrast is vital to understanding Dostoevsky’s plagiarism of Coetzee 
because it demands that Coetzee’s historically immanent reading of 
Dostoevsky be recognized. Coetzee’s explicit acknowledgement of 
Dostoevsky’s influence over Diary of a Bad Year must be set against the 
novel’s portrayal of a political and ethical crisis deeply rooted in the 
particularities of the early twenty-first century.
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Learn to Speak Without Authority
Coetzee’s most notable homage to Dostoevsky is his 1994 novel The 
Master of Petersburg, which uses a fictional version of the Russian writer 
as its protagonist to intensify the ideological conflict of Demons (Besy, 
1872) (Coetzee’s ‘Dostoevsky’ encounters and debates with Sergei 
Nechaev, the real-life prototype for Petr Verkhovenskii), and then uses 
this conflict as a metaphor for the transgressive role of authors and 
artists. Though perhaps less known than The Master of Petersburg, Diary 
of a Bad Year, published thirteen years later, is an equally nuanced (albeit 
more subtle) tribute to Dostoevsky. Set in the early twenty-first century, 
like Slaughterhouse-Five it depicts a world suffering from a moral crisis 
following the collapse of absolute metaphysical/ethical foundations. 
Yet unlike Rosewater, Diary’s protagonist, an elderly writer named 
‘C’ who shares many biographical details with Coetzee, claims that 
Dostoevsky remains a source of ethical erudition for the present day: 
reading Dostoevsky, asserts C, makes him ‘a better artist; and by better 
I do not mean more skilful but ethically better’.12 As such, Coetzee’s 
novella offers a staging ground for the investigation into Dostoevsky’s 
anticipatory response to twenty-first-century ethics. 
Diary combines a fictional plotline containing two narrative voices 
with a series of short essays on a range of topics such as politics, religion, 
art and language. Each page is split into two or three sections. The top 
section of the pages contains the essays, while the fictional narratives 
run underneath. For the first five essays there is only the first underlying 
narrative; from essay six onwards the pages are (for the most part) split 
into three. Moreover, the book as a whole is split into two parts: the 
dated ‘Strong Opinions’ and the undated ‘Second Diary’. 
The plot unfolds as an intertwining of the second and third narrative: 
it is revealed that C is the author of the second narrative, and that the 
third is voiced by Anya, a Filipina resident of C’s building whom he hires 
as a typist in a covert attempt to seduce her. Anya is Diary’s first, indirect 
allusion to Dostoevsky. Though uncommon in the Philippines, ‘Anya’ is 
a common Russian diminutive of ‘Anna’, the forename of Dostoevsky’s 
second wife, who was originally his stenographer. In this respect, C’s 
depiction as a writer in search of a stenographer suggests the historical 
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Dostoevsky even as the initial C evokes Coetzee, and this suggestion is 
reinforced by the final essay of the novella, ‘On Dostoevsky’, in which C 
discusses Book V, Chapter IV of The Brothers Karamazov. 
C’s essays offer Diary’s most direct depiction of the political/
ethical crises that afflict the twenty-first century. His opening essay, 
‘On the origins of the state’, sets their dominant tone, premising that 
a democratic state, by imposing the necessity of political choice, at the 
outset undermines the very freedom it champions. Through similar 
lines of enquiry, C establishes a narrative role as a social diagnostician, 
lamenting the absence of a ‘moral nobility’ (Diary, p. 131) in the world 
as he sees it. Yet his inability to remedy societal ignobleness generates 
a sense of exasperated ire that extends through later essays such as ‘On 
national shame’, ‘On Guantanamo Bay’ and ‘On the slaughter of animals’. 
These essays are direct criticisms of Western politics, principally of the 
Bush/Cheney administration and its allies in the Afghanistan and Iraq 
wars, although less overtly political essays still maintain the overarching 
tirade against twenty-first-century Western civilization. Even the more 
personal Second Diary maintains the ‘pessimistic anarchistic quietism’ 
of C’s ‘brand of political thought’ (Diary, p. 203).
While establishing the tone of socio-political disparagement that 
characterizes the novel, ‘On the origins of the state’ also introduces 
another of Diary’s significant themes: the recognition that striving for 
a ‘supra-political discourse about politics’ is ‘futile’ (Diary, p. 9). C’s 
political despondency is augmented by the unfeasibility of a definitive 
political condemnation that is not in itself political, to such an extent 
that an embittered withdrawal from politics, his ‘pessimistic quietism’, 
becomes the only viable solution to his incapacity to critique the system 
without being complicit in its functioning. This discrepancy runs 
parallel with the political critique of the essays: throughout, C’s desire 
to write on any subject is tempered by a scepticism that his writings 
can effect change, or that his position can be anything but hypocritical. 
He fears his ‘lofty judgements’ will always be ‘spurned as idealistic’ and 
‘unrealistic’ [italics in the original] (Diary, p. 126) by those whom he 
judges, and he often expresses doubts in the validity of his own essays, 
even admitting that he was only seduced to publish by the ‘opportunity 
to grumble in public’ (Diary, p. 23). 
Diary’s consistent tension, therefore, is between C’s desire, as an 
author, for his words to effect meaningful socio-political change, 
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and his scepticism about the possibility of such change. This tension 
is most clearly manifested as suspicion of authoritative narratives. 
Several critical responses to Diary have noted its uncertain stance 
with regards to an authoritative narrative voice: David Atwell’s essay 
on Diary goes as far as to claim that the ‘practice of authorship’ is the 
novel’s ‘overriding subject’.13 Johan Geertsema highlights the subtle 
biographical heterogeneity between C and Coetzee to claim that Diary 
deliberately undercuts any political position it attempts to take, forging 
for itself ‘an ironic nonposition’ that would allow it to be politically 
critical without being political.14 Along similar lines, Peter McDonald 
characterizes the essays, in particular the more distinctly critical ‘Strong 
Opinions’ that form the first half of the novel, as ‘semiparodic’ and full 
of ‘relentless equivocations’. Like Geertsema, McDonald builds upon 
the metafictional effect of Coetzee’s avatar C to suggest that Diary 
distances itself from its own socio-political perspective, undermining its 
own narrative authority. McDonald concludes that Diary is ‘Coetzee’s 
most elaborate working out of his own discomfort with the expectations 
and anachronistic forms of authority thrust on him as a writer’.15
McDonald’s use of ‘anachronistic’ illuminates Coetzee’s literary 
influences because it reiterates the chronological tension of anticipatory 
plagiarism. The penultimate ‘Strong Opinions’ essay, ‘On authority in 
fiction’, discusses Tolstoy, thus counterpointing the final essay in the 
Second Diary on Dostoevsky. It contrasts Tolstoy’s ‘exemplary’ skill ‘at 
building authority’ with a Barthesian/Foucauldian discussion ‘of the 
death of the author and of authorship’ (Diary, p. 149). Paraphrasing 
post-structuralist literary theory as ‘the claim that the authority of the 
author has never amounted to anything more than a bagful of rhetorical 
tricks’ (ibid.), C expresses the specific challenge faced by twenty-first-
century writers with a maxim cited from Kierkegaard, ‘Learn to speak 
without authority’ (Diary, p. 151). Tolstoy is offered as an example of a 
‘great author’ whose rhetorical ability was powerful enough to engender 
a sense that he was ‘an authority on life, a wise man, a sage’; whereas 
the post-structural interrogation of rhetorically manufactured authority 
exposed great authors as ‘otherwise ordinary men with ordinary, fallible 
opinions’ (ibid.). In the manner of Rosewater’s reading of The Brothers 
Karamazov, the sense of an historical transition between a bygone era 
and the present day is framed in terms of declining trust in authoritative 
narratives.
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 C’s remarks on Tolstoy echo an interview with Atwell that Coetzee 
made over fifteen years earlier. Looking back on his 1985 study 
‘Confession and Double Thoughts’, Coetzee said that the essay ‘came 
out of a rereading of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, two novelists for whom 
my admiration remains undimmed’.16 Coetzee’s acclaim for both writers 
in a 1990 interview and C’s reverence for ‘the master Tolstoy on the one 
hand and […] the master Dostoevsky on the other’ (Diary, p. 227) make 
a notable parallel, especially when examined in the light of Coetzee’s 
further clarification:
I read them on what I take to be their own terms, that is, in terms of their 
power to tell the truth as well as to subvert secular skepticism about truth 
[…]. If there is a sense in which my reading of them ‘on their own terms’ 
is not simply a repeat of the reading they were accorded in the West 
during their own day […] it lies in treating them as men who not only 
lived through the philosophical debates of their day […], but also were 
heirs of a Christian tradition more vital, in some respects, than Western 
Christianity.17
Coetzee expresses concern that reading Dostoevsky and Tolstoy in 
order to subvert scepticism about ‘truth’ is merely to revert to a late 
nineteenth-century context, one in which such scepticism is a distinct, 
but not dominant, ideological position. This concern implies that the 
‘terms’ of authors like Tolstoy and Dostoevsky are not necessarily 
applicable outside of their contextual value system. Contrary to the 
divorce of text and context implicit in Bayard’s ‘literary time’, Coetzee’s 
concern is centred upon the distinct socio-cultural diversities at play 
during the period in which Dostoevsky and Tolstoy wrote and were 
read. If their power to ‘tell the truth’ were somehow diminished, or 
alternatively if they were simply unable to subvert cynical attitudes 
towards ‘truth’, particularly religious truth, the ‘terms’ of Dostoevsky 
or Tolstoy would be drained of semantic value. Coetzee’s response 
thus reiterates Rosewater’s claim that Dostoevsky, post-Dresden, is not 
‘enough any more’.
It is precisely this sense of scepticism towards the ‘truth’ of a bygone 
era that drives both C’s ire, his so-called ‘Strong Opinions’ offered 
from the perspective of ‘old people’ who recognize that the ‘animating 
principles’ of the nineteenth century are ‘dead and cannot be revived’ 
(Diary, p. 134), and the textual relationship between C, Anya and 
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Anya’s partner, a neoliberal investment consultant named Alan. The 
most prominent example of this ethical-temporal linkage appears 
in the essay ‘On Machiavelli’ (Diary, pp. 17–18), which most clearly 
delineates an historical transition between an ‘old, pre-Machiavellian 
position’ and ‘the modern state’ in moral/ethical terms. C asserts that 
the pre-Machiavellian position is the supremacy of moral absolutes, 
something he conflates with ‘the absolute claims of the Christian 
ethic’. The Machiavellian position, whilst not denying moral absolutes, 
simultaneously upholds moral relativism. It is analogous (both 
chronologically and ideologically) to the moral dualism of the Grand 
Inquisitor. When C claims, therefore, that ‘the quintessence of the 
Machiavellian’ is now the quintessence of the modern state, he depicts 
a world in which Dostoevsky’s ideological opposition to the Grand 
Inquisitor’s moral casuistry has lost its capacity to influence ‘the man 
on the street’. ‘If you wish to counter the man on the street’, writes C, ‘it 
cannot be by appeal to moral principles’ (Diary, p. 18).
Anya and Alan thus come to represent the people ‘on the street’ at odds 
with C’s outdated worldviews and cynical of his despair for the decline 
of his authorial authority. The contrast is developed through Anya’s role 
as C’s typist and eventual confidante: it is through her persuasion that he 
reflects upon how ‘alien and antiquated’ his views appear to ‘thoroughly 
modern’ (Diary, p. 137) readers and so begins his Second Diary. Yet the 
more significant antagonism is established between C and Alan. Alan’s 
neoliberal outlook sees the world as consisting of ‘two dimensions’: an 
‘individual dimension’ and an ‘economic dimension’ (Diary, p. 79) that 
transcends the individual. He believes in a type of ‘[n]atural justice’, in 
which the individual must ‘balance the pluses against the minuses and 
decide’ (Diary, p. 91) on a course of action.18 Reinforcing the sense of 
historical distance between C and himself, he ridicules C’s world view 
as a ‘morality play’, with the battle of ‘good versus evil’ at the centre. The 
market, however, ‘transcends individual motives, transcends good and 
evil’ (Diary, p. 97). C’s moral understanding thus ‘comes from another 
world, another era. The modern world is beyond him’. Even if in the 
individual dimension maliciousness is the primary catalyst for action, 
individual motives are just ‘vectors of the matrix’ that are ‘evened out in 
the long run’. The market Alan believes in ‘is beyond good and evil, like 
Nietzsche said’ (Diary, p. 98).
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At the Crux of a Dual Temporality
Alan’s allusion to Nietzsche thus reinforces the sense of an historical 
transition between adherence to the authority of absolute principles 
and the collapse of such principles that epitomizes the modern world. It 
effectively establishes a timeline from the 1880s, when both The Brothers 
Karamazov (1881) and Beyond Good and Evil (Jenseits von Gut und Böse, 
1886) were published, to the novel’s present day, which includes the 
disintegration of C’s ‘old world’ (Diary, p. 20) and the amoral egoism 
typified by Alan’s neoliberal convictions. Nietzsche’s critique of both 
religion and Kantian deontology in Beyond Good and Evil represents for 
Alan the divorce from, or overcoming of, both the ‘absolute claims of a 
Christian ethic’ and the universality of rational moral law.19 Towards the 
end of the novel, Alan mockingly compares C with ‘sages with white 
beards’ (Diary, p. 207), reminding readers of C’s earlier description of 
Tolstoy. It also resembles remarks Coetzee made in an interview just 
after winning the 2003 Nobel Prize in Literature. Coetzee expressed his 
unease perceiving writers as people ‘who could offer an authoritative 
word on our times as well as on our moral life’. It was, claimed Coetzee, 
perhaps appropriate when the Nobel Prize for Literature was first 
inaugurated to perceive the writer as ‘a sage’, but the idea is ‘pretty 
much dead today’.20 In dismissing the authoritative sage as ‘pretty much 
dead today’ (just as the animating principles of the nineteenth century 
are dead), Coetzee aligns himself with Alan even whilst presenting a 
fictional variant of himself as Alan’s ideological opponent.
The interplay between C’s literary influences and his condemnation 
of the amorality of the twenty-first century positions the novel at the 
crux of a dual temporality, whereby chronological history cannot be 
abandoned in favour of literary history. On the one hand, C is employed 
as an authoritative narrative voice, in the manner of the ‘great authors’ 
of a prior generation, who upholds ‘the argument that the past was 
better than the present’ (Diary, p. 77). On the other, the present that C 
condemns is characterized by a cynicism towards authoritative narrative 
voices. C both is and is not part of Diary’s present day. He denounces the 
specificities of the twenty-first century, yet the axiological framework 
upon which his denunciation is built has grown redundant. He tries and 
fails to apply pre-Nietzschean judgements to a post-Dresden world: his 
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worldview represents everything that used to be known about life. Even 
as the novel reaches backwards towards the masters Dostoevsky and 
Tolstoy, even as transhistorical literary time is invoked, the phenomenon 
of declining or redundant values and principles suggests that a 
unidirectional temporality is a fundamental aspect of the novel.
An analysis of the ways in which Dostoevsky can be said to respond to 
Coetzee must be filtered through ways in which chronological time and 
literary time affect each other. It must, like Slaughterhouse-Five, contain 
within itself both the Tralfamadorian and generational experiences 
of time, must hold itself at the crux of a dual temporality in which 
looking back and looking forward are equivalent. A Tralfamadorian 
perspective on time would see both The Brothers Karamazov and Diary 
of a Bad Year as equally capable of responding to the crisis of valuation 
presented by Slaughterhouse-Five, and thus could seek to read the ways 
in which Dostoevsky and Coetzee react to the denunciation of authority 
mentioned by Rosewater and embodied by C. And if Diary portrays 
Tolstoy as the epitome of authorial authority, the way that Diary works 
to distinguish Tolstoy and Dostoevsky offers an avenue for reading 
Dostoevsky’s plagiarism of Coetzee.
The Voice of Ivan
Though Dostoevsky and Tolstoy are both hailed by C as ‘masters’, a 
term which evokes authoritative sages preaching now-redundant moral 
absolutes, the phrasing of C’s commendation, separating Tolstoy ‘on the 
one hand’ from Dostoevsky ‘on the other’, suggests that C understands 
them to be diametrically opposite even whilst identifying both as 
literary authorities. The suggestion is further reinforced by the way the 
respective essays on them are counterposed: if Tolstoy is the master at 
building ‘authority in fiction’, Dostoevsky’s mastery implicitly refers 
to something other than the rhetorical authoritativeness eschewed by 
the modern world. The biographical overlap between Dostoevsky and 
C, combined with the prominent positioning of ‘On Dostoevsky’, puts 
significant focus on Dostoevsky in relation to Diary’s impasse between 
literary influence and the historically effected axiological irrelevance of 
the influencers.
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‘On Dostoevsky’ confirms that Diary’s juxtaposition of Dostoevsky 
and Tolstoy is framed in terms of rhetorical authoritativeness. C relates 
how a rereading of the ‘Pro and Contra’ book of The Brothers Karamazov, 
specifically Ivan’s rejection of theodicy in Chapter IV, leaves him ‘sobbing 
uncontrollably’ (Diary, p. 223).21 Although C disagrees with ‘Ivan’s 
rather vengeful views’, arguing instead that the Sermon on the Mount’s 
entreaty to turn the other cheek is ‘the greatest of all contributions to 
political ethics’, he is nevertheless reduced to tears by Ivan’s argument 
‘in spite of myself’ (Diary, p. 224). The reason, C writes, is ‘nothing to 
do with ethics or politics, everything to do with rhetoric’ (Diary, p. 225).
Though C’s argument echoes his praise for Tolstoy’s rhetorical 
tricks, ‘On Dostoevsky’ indicates an evolution in Diary’s use of the term 
‘rhetoric’. The authority Tolstoy was so adept at building was embedded 
in the seemingly ‘natural’ quality of his prose, in the way it ‘concealed 
its rhetorical artistry so well’ (Diary, p. 150). Dostoevsky lacks such 
artistry: C derides Ivan for the way he ‘shamelessly uses sentiment 
(martyred children) and caricature (cruel landowners) to advance his 
ends’ (Diary, p. 225). Dostoevsky’s literary mastery is not based upon the 
effectiveness of his rhetorical artistry, the kind of artistry characterized 
by Tolstoy’s authorial authority. Dostoevsky’s skill lies in, for example, 
the effectiveness of Ivan’s rhetorical passion. The tendency of Ivan’s 
‘Euclidean mind’ (BK, p. 235) towards rationalization (prompting 
his notion of the Grand Inquisitor) is in many ways a chronological 
precursor to Alan’s market-driven amorality.22 That C focuses his essay 
on Ivan thus exemplifies how Dostoevsky’s mastery is diametrically 
opposed to the narrative authority of Tolstoy: C’s ethical position is 
antithetical to the specious arguments of the Grand Inquisitor. Indeed, 
it is not Ivan’s ‘reasoning’ that moves C: the ‘substance of his argument 
[…] is not strong’. It is instead the ‘accents of anguish’ in Ivan’s argument 
that affect C. It is ‘the voice of Ivan, as realized by Dostoevsky […], that 
sweeps me along’ (Diary, p. 225).
‘Reasoning’ in this respect can be said to represent the authoritativeness 
of a solitary ideological truth. It is tantamount to the ‘absolute claims’ 
of divine providence or Kantian deontology. The juxtaposition of 
‘reasoning’ and ‘voice’ suggests that Dostoevsky’s value to Diary’s 
historically immanent ethical position, the focal point of his ethical 
influence, is located in his renunciation of absolute narrative authority. 
 673. The Voice of Ivan: Ethical Plagiarism in Dostoevsky and Coetzee 
In his interview with Atwell, Coetzee offered a twofold methodology to 
avoid repeating the reading Dostoevsky was afforded in his own day: to 
treat him as an author who lived through the philosophical debates of 
his day, and as an heir to a vital Christian tradition. Both ‘lived through’ 
and ‘vital’ insinuate that the tradition, as Coetzee understands it, is not 
based upon a rigorous adherence to absolute dictates. It is instead one 
that engages in debate, that allows itself to influence and be influenced 
by the context of its practice. C expresses his ‘shock’ that ‘Dostoevsky, 
a follower of Christ, could allow Ivan such powerful words’ (Diary, p. 
226). The vitality of the Dostoevskian tradition that impresses upon 
Diary’s ethics, then, is one that shows responsibility for its antagonists. 
It allows for the articulation of antagonistic voices.
The use of the word ‘voice’ recalls Bakhtin’s theorization of the 
polyphonic (i.e. ‘many-voiced’) structure of Dostoevsky’s novels. C 
effectively reiterates Bakhtin’s seminal explication of Dostoevskian 
polyphony as ‘a plurality of independent and unmerged voices and 
consciousnesses’ that are ‘not only objects of authorial discourse but also 
subjects of their own directly signifying discourse’.23 Ivan’s atheism typifies 
him as one of Dostoevsky’s ‘free people, capable of standing alongside 
their creator, capable of not agreeing with him’. Conversely, the 
‘monologic’ novel articulates only ‘a single authorial consciousness’, 
wherein characters serve ‘as a vehicle for the author’s own ideological 
position’.24 
The polyphonic novel, then, is neither an exertion nor imposition of 
an authorial voice, but a renunciation of absolute narrative authority to 
allow for a multiplicity of co-existing and competing discourses. It exists 
as an event through the co-existence of heterogenous voices. Narrative 
authority can be equated with monologism: Diary lends weight to this 
equation by contrasting Dostoevsky with Tolstoy, the novelist most 
frequently offered by Bakhtin as the epitome of monologism.25 And 
Bakhtin likewise perceives the most precise expression of monologism to 
be ‘idealistic philosophy’, specifically the absolutism of German idealism 
directly influenced by Kantian deontology. Referencing the ‘absolute I’ 
or ‘normative consciousness’ of Hegelian philosophy, Bakhtin critiques 
the ‘monistic principle’ of idealism that, by converting the ‘monism of 
existence into the monologism of consciousness’, inevitably transforms 
existence ‘into the unity of a single consciousness’.26 
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Russia’s Crisis of Modernization
In Bakhtin’s view, philosophical or religious edicts based in universal 
absolutes are isolated by the ‘ethical solipsism’ of monologic authority.27 
The polyphony of Dostoevsky’s later novels overcomes monologic 
solipsism by basing its ethics in the event of being that can only ever 
be an event of co-being (Bakhtin’s sobytie).28 This is what makes C an 
‘ethically better’ artist by reading Dostoevsky: the polyphonic novel 
offers a prototype for overcoming the incompatibility of universally 
applicable ethical absolutes in a twenty-first-century context. Moreover, 
the disposition to understand polyphony in ethical terms is a 
consequence of Dostoevsky’s own particular historical era, something 
Coetzee elaborates on in a 1995 review of Joseph Frank’s Dostoevsky: 
The Miraculous Years. This review offers evidence for the conflation 
of a dual temporality when reading for ways in which Dostoevsky 
responds to Coetzee, in that it identifies how Dostoevskian ethics were 
formed in reaction to his historical context. In it, Coetzee diagnoses a 
common theme of Dostoevsky’s late novels: they conduct ‘a searching 
interrogation of Reason – the Reason of the Enlightenment – as the basis 
for a good society’. Coetzee claims the reason for the intensity of this 
interrogation was Dostoevsky’s unique position ‘at the very center of an 
historical crisis, Russia’s crisis of modernization’, and the consequence 
of this crisis was the emergence of the ‘amoral egoism and proto-
Nietzschean self-deification’ of Russian nihilism.29
Although Coetzee borrows ‘proto-Nietzschean’ from Frank’s 
biography, the association he makes between the historical crisis of 
Dostoevsky’s era and, through Alan, the amoral egoism of the ‘modern 
state’ (Diary, p. 99) seems too methodical to be mere coincidence.30 
Coetzee’s accusation is that Alan’s renunciation of individual morality 
(tantamount to ‘self-deification’, the belief that one may with impunity 
benefit one’s own interests to the detriment of others) has its roots in 
the axiological shift typified by Nietzsche’s critique of Enlightenment 
Reason: it was this shift, coterminous with Dostoevsky’s later writing, 
that allowed for the amalgamation of Machiavellian and modern 
quintessence. 
Dostoevsky’s anticipation of the post-Nietzschean amorality of 
the modern world, as Coetzee relates it, came from his engagement 
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with the ideological conflicts of his own era. He perceived traditional 
ethical absolutes as constraints on moral egoism, and his ‘eschatological 
imagination’ foresaw that declining belief in both divine providence and 
Enlightenment Reason would lead to Nietzschean self-aggrandizement 
(and its correlate forsaking of others) that ‘would culminate in the 
Bolshevik takeover of 1917’.31 A section of Coetzee’s review laments 
Frank’s sparse discussion of Bakhtin because it ‘loses an opportunity’ 
to compare the polyphonic structure with Dostoevsky’s ‘most radical 
intellectual and even spiritual courage’.32 It is precisely such courage 
that shocks C: the courage to give ‘fully valid voices’ to his ideological 
antagonists.33 ‘Dostoevskian dialogism’, writes Coetzee, ‘grows out 
of Dostoevsky’s own moral character’.34 Dostoevsky’s development 
of the polyphonic novel structure can therefore be seen as an ethical 
response to the amoral egoism emerging from the decline of monistic 
ethical principles.35 Coetzee’s subsequent claim that Bakhtin ‘leaves out’ 
the ethical implications of the polyphonic structure must accordingly 
be modified through a comparison of Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics 
(Problemi poetiki Dostoevskogo, 1963) with Bakhtin’s ethical writings, in 
particular, the notion of ‘answerability’ proposed in the early fragments 
known collectively as Towards a Philosophy of the Act.36 The compatibility 
of Bakhtinian answerability and the multivocality of Dostoevsky’s novels 
elucidates the ethical dynamic of the polyphonic narrative structure.37
Bakhtin’s ethics in Philosophy of the Act, like his theorization of 
narrative polyphony, was established in opposition to ‘formal ethics of 
Kant and the Kantians’: as such, it proposes the kind of ethical response 
to the historical crisis of modernization that is missing from proto-
Nietzschean amorality.38 Stating that Kantian formal ethical principles 
offered ‘no approach to a living act performed in the real world’, his 
aim was to reconcile an ethical ‘ought’ with what he termed the ‘once 
occurrent-moment in Being-as-event’, the actuality of a subject in an 
isolated moment of space and time.39 The ethical ought of Kantian 
deontology abstracts individuals into ‘autonomous laws’, thus negating 
them ‘as individually and answerably active human beings’.40 
Answerability is, then, a fundamental component of co-being. It is 
inherent in the ‘central emotional-volitional moments’ that constitute 
the subject’s once-occurrent moment of Being: ‘I, the other, and I-for-
the-other’.41 In the event of co-being, answerability arises as a faculty 
70 Reading Backwards: An Advance Retrospective on Russian Literature
of the subject’s capacity to answer. The cognitive function of language 
thus presupposes its discursive function. Subjectivity originates from 
discursive interaction with others. As a consequence, therefore, of their 
directly signifying subjectivity, characters in a polyphonic novel are 
imbued with an answerability to others.
Bakhtin’s theorization of deontological ethics as an abstraction of 
the individual’s once-occurrent moment of Being, and his resultant 
venture to source such ethics in the once-occurrent moment of Being 
(which can only ever be an event of co-being), has its parallel in the 
ethics of Dostoevsky’s late novels, if such ethics can be divorced from 
their affiliation with a metaphysical presence. In The Brothers Karamazov, 
for example, the distinction between Madame Khokhlakov’s theoretical 
love for ‘mankind in general’ (BK, p. 57) and the ‘active love’ (BK, p. 56) 
of intersubjective relations advocated by Zosima testifies precisely to the 
capacity of a speaking subject to breach ethical abstraction. Khokhlakov’s 
fantasy of renouncing her possessions and becoming a sister of mercy 
is sustained only by the promise of ‘a return of love for my love’ (BK, 
p. 57). It is sustained only within the confines of her cognition. The 
possibility of ingratitude on behalf of those she helps would breach 
the security of a subjective position that constitutes universal, ethical 
abstractions. The active answerability of ‘people in particular’ maintains 
the capacity to breach formal ethical principles applicable to ‘mankind 
in general’ (BK, p. 57). The speaking subject, as theorized by Bakhtin, 
is presupposed by the cognition of the words it speaks. It is never final, 
never complete. Its subjectivity is contingent on the emotional-volitional 
moments of its once-occurrent moment in Being (reconceiving ‘Being’ 
as a process of becoming rather than a cognized state). The character in 
a polyphonic novel that reveals ‘that internally unfinalizable something in 
man’ thus corresponds with the Bakhtinian theorization of subjectivity.42
The ethical dynamic of such subjectivity is contingent on its being 
subject to the call of the other. Bakhtin found in the very existence 
of the dialogic relation the ethical transcendence of monologic 
absolutism. He saw religious/philosophical edicts as impositions on 
the ‘unfinalizability’ of a subject in its once-occurrent moment of Being/
becoming. Consequently, he theorized an ethical relation consisting of 
once-occurrent answerability for the other, founded on the capacity to 
answer to the other. And this is an ethical theory made manifest by the 
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polyphonic novel structure. Any particular character in a polyphonic 
novel is presupposed by the event of co-being that comprises the 
novel form. For a ‘genuine polyphony of fully valid voices’ to emerge, an 
individual voice must always-already be in answer to other voices.43 
Therefore, each individual character is answerable for the existence of 
the polyphonic novel form (and thus the other characters within it), by 
virtue of its capacity to answer.
Ethically Better
The polyphonic novel form, in this sense, becomes an archetype for 
the ethical foundations of subjectivity: as subjects are constituted by 
and through language, so the polyphonic character transpires by and 
through dialogic relations with other polyphonic characters. This is the 
elemental trait of Dostoevskian polyphony. In The Brothers Karamazov, 
for instance, Alesha Karamazov’s dialogic interaction with his brother 
during the ‘Rebellion’ chapter plays out during a later scene with the 
cynical seminarian Rakitin, who torments Alesha following Zosima’s 
death and bodily corruption. Rakitin tells Alesha he has rebelled against 
God in his anger at his master’s death. Alesha responds, ‘I do not rebel 
against my God, I simply “do not accept his world”’ (BK, p. 341). 
His repetition of words previously said by Ivan (BK, p. 253) disrupts 
any attempt to monologize his character as the finalized articulation of 
an idea-consciousness. Rakitin himself cannot comprehend Ivan’s words 
in Alesha’s mouth. He claims them to be ‘gibberish’ (BK, p. 341) because 
his cognition of the world, with its resultant understanding of Alesha as 
a distinct and finalized being, is at this moment breached. Alesha here is 
in a period of transition, and that transition is wrought through dialogic 
encounters with others. Alesha’s words are on the threshold between his 
consciousness and Ivan’s. Each encounters the other in a once-occurrent 
event of Being, and so neither character’s thought is finalized, nor is 
their relationship reduced to one of dialectical opposition.
The dialogic interaction between Diary’s characters mirrors this type 
of relationship. It is through C’s dialogic interactions with Anya that he 
comes to write the Second Diary, and his underlying narrative even ends 
with a letter from her. Likewise, Anya is constituted by and through her 
interactions with C. As the novel progresses, she passes from feeling 
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‘crushed between [Alan] and Señor C, between hard certainties […] and 
hard opinions’ (Diary, p. 109) to a rejection of Alan’s egoism and a sense 
of responsibility for C’s wellbeing. Though Anya initially rejects dialogic 
engagement with either C or Alan, preferring instead to ‘withdraw 
and go off by myself’ (ibid.), by the end of the novel she has decidedly 
parted from Alan and plans to care for C during his final days. Her sense 
of responsibility for him grows from her initial commitment to respond 
to him. 
Furthermore, the fragmented structure of Diary of a Bad Year can 
be understood both as a challenge to a unifying, authorial authority, 
and, from a perspective based in chronological history, as a structural 
identification with (perhaps even homage to) the polyphonic novel 
form. C, who recognizes the death of the animating principles of 
monologic authority, also recognizes Dostoevsky as an ‘ethically better’ 
author because polyphony renounces such authority, precisely because 
the author of the polyphonic novel speaks as one voice amongst a 
plurality of independent and unmerged voices. The way Diary works 
to undercut C’s own narrative authority becomes testament to the way 
that the polyphonic structure befits the ethics of the modern age. This is 
further evidenced by the fact that the final essay of the ‘Strong Opinions’ 
series, following that on Tolstoy’s rhetorical mastery, is the sole essay 
in the entire novel unmatched by a counter-narrative. It is titled ‘On 
the afterlife’. While not announcing the ‘death of the author’, Diary 
does pronounce here the death of monologic authority, at least as an 
interrelationship of ideas that gravitate towards a single consciousness. 
Dostoevsky masters his ethical ‘authority’ only by renouncing his 
monologic authority, only by allowing Ivan such powerful words.
This renunciation of authorial authority in Dostoevskian polyphony 
forms the basis for an analysis of the interaction between Dostoevsky 
and Coetzee that occurs in literary time, and consequently offers 
evidence of Dostoevsky’s anticipatory plagiarism. Yet it is contingent 
upon Dostoevsky’s anticipation of an axiological deviation from 
stable metaphysical/ethical foundations that very much takes place in 
chronological history: both Dostoevsky and Coetzee are responding to 
the historical circumstances that led Rosewater to proclaim Dostoevsky 
not enough anymore. To make that claim is to invalidate Dostoevsky’s 
putative plagiarism: if Dostoevskian ethics are incompatible with the 
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world after Dresden, post-Dresden ethics are necessarily incompatible 
with a Dostoevskian context. One possible extension of the Oulipo 
theory of potential literature, on which Bayard’s anticipatory plagiarism 
is based, is that every text has already been written, and this potential 
would ultimately nullify the lament of chronological rupture made by 
Vonnegut’s Rosewater. It would be nonsensical to claim that The Brothers 
Karamazov is not enough anymore. It either will always be ‘enough’, or 
else it never has been.
Any theory of anticipatory plagiarism, in order to allow for 
axiological variations, must hold itself at the crux of Bayard’s dual 
temporality, accounting for both the chronological time of Lot’s wife and 
the simultaneity of the Tralfamadorians. Anticipating a future where 
universalizing moral edicts would no longer be enough, Dostoevsky 
plagiarized Vonnegut, Coetzee, and Bakthin in prose that foreshadowed 
the significance of ethical dialogism to the early twenty-first century. 
That act of plagiarism was dependent on Dostoevsky’s historical 
position: in the white heat of Russia’s crisis of modernization, he chose 
to relinquish monistic narrative authority for the ethical dynamic of 
narrative polyphony. He relinquished ‘reasoning’ for ‘voice’. Coetzee’s 
reception of Dostoevsky is likewise contingent on Coetzee’s own 
historical position. The ethical dynamic of the polyphonic narrative 
structure anticipates the specific moral issues of Western society at 
the beginning of the twenty-first century, as they are presented and 
addressed by Coetzee. It is the distinctiveness in chronological history 
between Dostoevsky and Coetzee that allows for each one’s plagiarism 
of the other in literary history. 
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4. Foretelling the Past: Fyodor 
Dostoevsky Follows Guzel’ 
Yakhina into the  
Heart of Darkness
David Gillespie and Marina Korneeva
Questions of crime and its punishment have exercised the minds and 
pens of Russian writers since the nineteenth century, and, indeed, some, 
such as Aleksandr Pushkin and Mikhail Lermontov, felt the wrath of 
Tsars Aleksandr I and Nikolai I and spent several years in exile (Pushkin 
in the south of Russia from 1820 to 1824, and at his mother’s estate in 
Mikhailovskoe from 1824 to 1826, and Lermontov twice in the Caucasus, 
from 1837 to 1838 and, fatefully, from 1840 to 1841). Both Anton Chekhov 
in Sakhalin Island (Ostrov Sakhalin, 1893) and Lev Tolstoy in his final 
novel Resurrection (Voskresenie, 1899), expressed outrage at prisoners’ 
living conditions in penal colonies, while also questioning the legal 
and moral bases of the concept of ‘justice’. In the twentieth century, the 
harrowing personal testimonies of the Gulag by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn 
and Varlam Shalamov have become celebrated works documenting the 
war waged by the Soviet state against its own citizens.
It is Fyodor Dostoevsky, however, who most consistently explored 
crime and its aftermath, not only the fact and practice of its punishment, 
but also its effects on the individual’s psyche and society’s collective 
conscience. The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship 
between two novels by Guzel’ Yakhina from 2015 and 2018, and their 
‘reimagining’ by Fyodor Dostoevsky, especially Notes from the House of 
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the Dead (Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, 1862). We posit the idea that Yakhina’s 
fiction forces us to vividly and directly confront the psychological and 
philosophical realities of Dostoevsky’s world. Looking through the lens 
of anticipatory plagiarism, we suggest that Dostoevsky’s works are, 
indeed, his response to the horror of twentieth-century totalitarianism.
On first reading, Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from the House of the 
Dead, published between 1860 and 1862, and Guzel’ Yakhina’s multi-
prize-winning debut novel about the Stalinist terror, Zuleikha Opens 
Her Eyes (Zuleikha otkryvaet glaza),1 first published in full in 2015, offer 
striking similarities, despite being written and set more than 150 years 
apart. Both concern the loss of freedom and the struggle to survive in 
the extremely harsh physical conditions of political exile in Siberia, and 
both are based on personal experience. Dostoevsky’s own exile near 
Omsk between 1849 and 1854 served as the basis for his novel, while 
Yakhina asserts that her story is based on the experiences of her own 
grandmother, who was exiled from Kazan’ to Siberia for sixteen years 
between 1930 and 1946.2
By retrospectively reading Zuleikha otkryvaet glaza we get a ‘new’ 
view of Dostoevsky’s work, whereby the modern reader can reinterpret 
Dostoevsky’s world of brutality and pain as a nineteenth-century 
analogue of Yakhina’s source text. Also relevant here is Yakhina’s second 
novel, Children of Mine (Deti moi, 2018), which extends the dialogue 
with Dostoevsky into metafiction and the postmodernist literary space. 
By juxtaposing these two writers we can integrate past and present 
literary and historical narratives, yielding significant insights into the 
key concepts of ‘survival’ in the narrative’s present, and its ‘progression’ 
into a literary and lived-in past. The representation of childhood, in 
particular the suffering of children, is germane to this argument, as it 
is a feature of both Dostoevsky’s other writings and those of Yakhina 
herself. Indeed, reference will be made to some of Yakhina’s published 
shorter fiction, some instances of which feature children as protagonists.3
Dostoevsky’s novel is now commonly considered to be a seminal 
influence on modern Russian interpretations of incarceration, especially 
in works by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Evgeniia Ginzburg and Varlam 
Shalamov, for instance. Like these authors, Dostoevsky was punished 
for his political opinions: in 1848, for the crime of belonging to a secret 
student society and reading proscribed literature, he was sentenced to 
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five years’ penal servitude in a Siberian prison camp, or katorga.4 Notes 
from the House of the Dead adapts Dostoevsky’s harrowing experiences in 
what his twentieth-century biographer Joseph Frank would call ‘a world 
of moral horror’ through a fictional protagonist, Aleksandr Petrovich 
Gorianchikov.5 Like Dostoevsky, Gorianchikov was a nobleman; unlike 
his creator, he was a convicted wife-murderer. Both Dostoevsky and 
Gorianchikov suffer (often brutal) resentment from their fellow 
prisoners, most of whom are hardened criminals; both endure hard 
labour, constant dread of corporal punishment, and exposure to the 
worst side of human nature before ultimately finding legal and (more 
importantly) spiritual redemption through renewed faith in God and 
humanity. Dostoevsky was already drafting what would become Notes in 
his so-called ‘Siberian notebook’ even before leaving the katorga; in 1854, 
he wrote to his brother: ‘How many folk personalities and characters 
have I taken with me from katorga! I grew to know them, and therefore, 
I would seem to understand them pretty well. So many tales of tramps 
and robbers and generally dark and wretched lives. What a miraculous 
people’.6 
Moral Horror and Living Hell: The Prison Camp 
Experience in Dostoevsky and Yakhina
Guzel’ Shamilevna Yakhina was born in 1977 in Kazan’, and since 1999 
has lived in Moscow. She was born into a middle-class family where her 
mother was a doctor and her father an engineer. She studied foreign 
languages (English and German) at the University of Kazan’, and 
subsequently completed a course in screenwriting at the Moscow Film 
School (Zuleikha was filmed by state television as an eight-part series, 
first broadcast in April 2020).7 Her first novel, Zuleikha, was published, 
rather surprisingly for a little-known writer, by AST, one of the major 
and most prestigious publishing outlets in Russia.8 It has since been 
reprinted several times, and translated into over thirty languages. She 
is the recipient of several international literary prizes (for instance, the 
‘Iasnaia Poliana’ and ‘Bol’shaia kniga’ awards, both in 2015, and the 
French journal Transfuge’s literary award, 2017). 
Zuleikha is set between 1930 and 1946, a period that coincides with 
the exile of Yakhina’s grandmother, which began when the latter was 
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only seven years old.9 The novel’s front matter announces that the book 
is dedicated to all those who were ‘dekulakized and deported’ (though 
this acknowledgement is not included in the 2019 English-language 
translation). It is based on the published memoirs of exiled victims of 
dekulakization whom Yakhina consulted online, as well as the personal 
testimony of her grandmother, Raisa Shakirovna Shakirova. The village 
of Semruk which the deportees build with their own hands in the 
novel is modelled on the actual village of Pit-Gorodok, which existed 
until 1994. Some of the characters were inspired by real people, most 
significantly the German doctor Vol’f Karlovich Leibe (based on the first 
Rector of Kazan’ University, Professor Karl Fuchs).
Zuleikha’s central character is Zuleikha Valieva, the devout and 
obedient wife of the much older peasant farmer Murtaza. They live 
in a village in Kazan’ district, following a pattern of everyday life that 
has existed for centuries. Their lifestyle is in no way glamorized or 
idealized. The reader forms the impression that Zuleikha’s existence is 
characterized by endless, physically excruciating drudgery, oppression 
and hopelessness, although borne with resilience by a woman who 
knows no other reality. Compared to her later circumstances, however, 
this life is a veritable haven of stability. She and Murtaza are childless, 
their four daughters all having died in infancy. Zuleikha regularly and 
devoutly visits their graves in the neighbouring forest. Her life is one 
of constant verbal and physical abuse, exacerbated by brutal, soulless 
sex with her husband and incessant psychological battering from 
her mother-in-law (whom Zuleikha privately nicknames ‘Upyrikha’, 
meaning ‘vampire’ or ‘bloodsucker’), with whom she and Murtaza live.
All this ends suddenly and violently with the arrival of a party 
of OGPU soldiers, precipitating the murder of her husband and her 
own arrest, deportation and exile to Siberia (Upyrikha is left behind, 
presumably to die alone). What follows is an unflinching and detailed 
account of the horrors of the transit prison in Kazan’, and of the even 
more harrowing six-month train journey from Kazan’ to Krasnoiarsk, 
including the death of hundreds of deportees, especially the young: ‘the 
first to begin dying were the children. One after the other, as if playing 
tag, the children of the large family of the unhappy peasant left this 
world: to begin with the two infants (both on the same day) and then 
the older ones’.10
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After this hellish train journey marked by physical privation, constant 
hunger and multiple deaths, the deportees are sent up the Angara river 
to their ‘colony’ on barges. Zuleikha’s barge capsizes, resulting in the 
drowning of hundreds of men, women and children. Only a few survive, 
including Zuleikha (this incident is modelled on an event Yakhina states 
that her grandmother witnessed).11 Zuleikha’s survival is purely down 
to sheer good fortune. The role of such good luck in physical survival 
is a repeated theme in Yakhina’s writing. In her 2015 short story ‘The 
Rifle’ (‘Vintovka’), Maia is a wartime medical orderly who hides from 
German soldiers in a bombed-out building. The parallel here with 
Dostoevsky’s prose lies in the desperate fate of children, for Maia shoots 
a German soldier who turns out to be a boy of fourteen, and who takes a 
long and agonizing time to die. Maia’s own survival is ensured by a Red 
Army officer who lies over her and covers her body to protect her from 
the blasts and the shrapnel during an aerial bombardment.12
Besides Zuleikha, a few survivors eventually reach their destination 
on the banks of the Angara, where they must manually construct their 
own ‘colony’ of robust and safe accommodation while foraging for food, 
both in the forest and the river, as winter approaches. This is another 
circle of hell, where death can come from the cold as well as bears and 
wolves in the forest, and where the odds in favour of survival, especially 
in the unforgiving cold of the Siberian winter, are very small. Yet the 
small band of deportees, including their supervising officer Ignatov, do 
survive, and, as the days, weeks, months and then years go by, they 
build a community, eventually including a school, hospital, canteen and 
suitable living accommodation. Indeed, their village of Semruk becomes 
a haven that is actually safer than the external world of arbitrary arrest 
and sudden disappearance. Moreover, relationships develop, especially 
between Zuleikha and her erstwhile captor Ignatov, the man who had 
killed her husband at the start of her journey.
Surviving extremity is not the plot’s main focus, however. People 
manage to survive physically in the face of the most debilitating and 
dehumanizing circumstances, but then they ultimately realize and 
articulate a still more vital need: hope for the future. This theme is 
conveyed not only through Zuleikha’s own experiences, but also 
through the perspective of various representatives of the intelligentsia, 
peasantry, and ordinary workers making up the population of the 
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settlement, as well as those who replenish its numbers with each new 
wave of deportee arrivals. A major theme of the novel is affirmation that 
a kernel of hope can survive and grow even in the worst time of sorrow. 
The seed of hope for Zuleikha is her son, Iuzuf, conceived just before 
her husband’s murder, whom she carries inside her throughout the 
debilitating journeys to Kazan’ and then to Krasnoiarsk, and who is born 
just after the deportees arrive at their destination on the desolate banks 
of the Angara river. Zuleikha’s early years in the exiles’ community are 
single-mindedly devoted to her son’s survival: when her milk dwindles, 
she feeds him on her own blood. The boy survives and grows, learning 
skills from the other exiles (such as painting), and even learning French 
from a former Petersburg bourgeoise. 
Zuleikha is the female alter ego of Dostoevsky’s Gorianchikov. He 
is a land-owning nobleman and a murderer, whereas Zuleikha is an 
uneducated, devout and at the same time superstitious peasant woman 
guilty simply of belonging to a land-owning social class outlawed by the 
state. The shift between female and male narration between these novels 
throws into relief the origins of Yakhina’s novel in her grandmother’s 
experiences, while intensifying reader empathy with an apparently 
more vulnerable heroine. Male perspectives are not lost in Zuleikha, 
however: Yakhina, unlike Dostoevsky, switches between different 
narrative viewpoints, including those of Dr Leibe and the OGPU officer 
Ignatov. The novel ends with the teenage Iuzuf’s departure from Semruk, 
hoping to make a future for himself as an artist in Leningrad. (Such an 
optimistic if unlikely outcome is foreshadowed in Yakhina’s short story 
‘The Butterfly’ (‘Motylek’, 2014), whose eight-year-old homodiegetic 
narrator improbably escapes to Kazan’ from an island used to forcibly 
incarcerate those deemed mentally ill, and their relatives.) 13
We can thus read Yakhina’s Zuleikha as a modern antecedent to 
Dostoevsky’s Notes from the House of the Dead, anticipating the former’s 
depiction of unimaginable living conditions and the daily struggle to 
survive. In both novels the leading characters are socially stigmatized: 
Dostoevsky’s protagonist Gorianchikov is outnumbered by peasants 
who resent his noble background, and Zuleikha is a Tartar woman (and 
a devout Moslem, at least at the start of the novel) surrounded almost 
exclusively by Orthodox Russians.14 Both novels’ main characters are 
united by their eventual successful adaptation to difficult circumstances: 
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despite their initial social (and in Zuleikha’s case, also ethnic) otherness, 
both become accepted by their fellow inmates after undergoing a moral 
evolution.
Equally, both novels are imbued with the narrator’s desire to retain 
humanity and moral values by forging individual identity through 
struggle and hardship. Thus, Dostoevsky’s narrative may be said to 
elaborate the idea, put forward in Zuleikha, that the place of confinement 
is a microcosm of society, where various social ranks and diverse 
nationalities are represented from across the entire expanse of the 
country. Significant passages from both works highlight this essential 
affinity. Yakhina describes the community of exiles who survive the 
journey up the Angara thus:
Looking into their faces, Ignatov remembers everyone who works in the 
camp. He finds them in the list, circles them with charcoal, counts them. 
Together with the Leningraders there are twenty-nine people. Russians, 
Tartars, a couple of Chuvash, three Mordovians, a Mari woman, a 
Ukrainian, a Georgian woman and a German who has taken leave of 
his senses with the high-sounding and affected name of Vol’f Karlovich 
Leibe. In a word, an entire international community.15
The social composition of Dostoevsky’s prison is remarkably similar:
In our prison there were about two hundred and fifty people, a figure that 
was more or less constant. Some arrived, others finished their sentences 
and left, while others died. And what a variety of men there was here! I 
think that each province and each zone of Russia had its representatives 
here. There were non-Russians as well, and there were even some 
exiles from among the mountain tribesmen of the Caucasus. They were 
all divided according to the degree of their crime and consequently 
according to the number of years determined by their sentence. It must 
be assumed that there was no crime that did not have its representative 
here.16
Dostoevsky’s prison offers a representative cross-section of trades and 
skills, providing the basis of a working community: ‘Here there were also 
boot-makers, shoe-makers, tailors, carpenters, metal-workers, engravers 
and goldsmiths. There was a Jew, Isai Bumshtein, a jeweller who was 
also a money-lender. All of them worked and earned their corn.’17 The 
colony of Semruk also contains an abundance of trades that enables it to 
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survive and then develop: Leibe the doctor, Lukka the fisherman, Bogar 
the builder, Ashkenazi the cook, and Ikonnikov the painter.
There is one major difference between Dostoevsky’s and Yakhina’s 
prisons, of course. Most if not all of the inmates of Dostoevsky’s prison are 
actual criminals, whereas the inhabitants of Yakhina’s colony are simply 
individuals unfortunate enough to be socially declassed. Dostoevsky’s 
characters have fallen foul of the criminal justice system, whereas 
Yakhina’s are the blameless victims of ideological rationalization.
 Moreover, the casual, animal-like cruelty of Dostoevsky’s imperial-
era prison guards is a feeble imitation of the ideology-driven malice of 
the twentieth-century OGPU guards. In his later novels, notably Demons 
(Besy, 1872), Dostoevsky shows how political radicals no longer see 
people as humans, but rather as raw material to be used in pursuance 
of political goals. 
The authorities in Yakhina’s work take sadistic pleasure in exploiting 
this inner cruelty. The suffering, repression and deaths of ‘enemies 
of the people’ are of no concern to the OGPU, who regard the loss of 
human life merely in terms of cold statistics. From the comfort of his 
own train compartment Ignatov occasionally thinks of the exiles in the 
overcrowded wagons: ‘They are not people, he corrects himself. They 
are enemies’.18 The huge number of deaths in the six-month transit from 
Kazan to Krasnoiarsk (nearly 400, of whom 150 perish from typhus) 
is considered simply inevitable ‘estestvennaia ubyl’’ (‘natural wastage’).19 
The deportees are stripped of their humanity and identity; those who 
survive the transit are then forced to pay for their ‘crimes’ through back-
breaking labour, and those who do not or cannot work are punished by 
receiving fewer food rations. 
There are subtleties in Yakhina’s presentation of the OGPU mentality, 
all of them insidious. Ignatov is betrayed by his superior Kuznets, left to 
die on the banks of the Angara together with his charges; the perfidious 
Kuznets expresses astonishment that Ignatov is still alive when he 
finally brings supplies several months later in the spring. Kuznets also 
visits the settlement in the expectation of receiving sexual favours from 
the female inhabitants. Early in the novel Ignatov is quick to distance 
himself from his former comrade and friend Bakiev when he learns that 
the latter has fallen out of political favour (he denies ever having known 
him). The camp informer Gorelov is keen to intimidate the other exiles 
not through class or ideological solidarity with his OGPU captors, but 
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simply to exercise power over them. Zuleikha Valieva has no hope of 
freedom or happiness for herself; she feels destined to end her days in 
Semruk, and her only ray of hope is the possibility of escape for her son 
(in reality, Yakhina’s grandmother was allowed to return home in 1946). 
In Notes, Dostoevsky’s insights into the dark areas of the human soul and 
the capacity for evil deeds among Gorianchikov’s fellow prisoners also 
echo the inherent evil of those representing the authorities in Yakhina’s 
work.
In Notes from the House of the Dead, too, some figures in authority 
revel in the cruelty they are able to inflict on their charges. Dostoevsky 
describes one particularly sadistic Major:
He was a terrible person exactly because he was a commandant with 
almost unlimited power over two hundred souls. As an individual he 
was merely ill-disposed and malicious, nothing more. He looked on the 
convicts as his own natural enemies, and that was his first and main 
error. He did actually possess some capabilities, but everything, even 
the good qualities, appeared in him in some twisted form. Unrestrained 
and malicious, he would burst into the jail even at night-times, and if he 
noticed a convict lying on his left side or on his back then the following 
morning he would have him punished. ‘Sleep on your right side, he 
would say, as I ordered.’ Inside the jail he was hated and feared like the 
plague.20 
Dostoevsky’s Major represents the evil in a man’s heart that can manifest 
itself when that man has the ultimate power of life and death over others. 
Gorianchikov’s account of this man’s sadism may be said to “echo” 
Zuleikha’s personal insight that the ideology fuelling so much cruelty 
is inherent in human nature. The seductiveness of rationalist ideas in 
Dostoevsky’s subsequent works paves the way for dehumanization and 
for a political credo where the end justifies the means.
Yet, over time, the settlement of Semruk becomes a refuge where a 
semblance of normal life is created by the inhabitants themselves. It is, 
additionally, relatively secure from the political repression continuing in 
the rest of the country; under such circumstances, the lack of any prospect 
of release is both welcome and reassuring. Moreover, the inhabitants 
of Semruk are isolated from the ravages of war in the European part 
of the country. Dostoevsky’s ‘house of the dead’ is more “humane” in 
a progressive sense because it does contain the possibility of freedom 
through eventual release, a metaphorical resurrection; externally 
88 Reading Backwards: An Advance Retrospective on Russian Literature
imposed rules ensure that prison conditions are never inhumane, an 
apparent positive development in penal conditions. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between incarceration and wider 
society in the two novels is existentially inverted. Zuleikha’s prison is 
virtually unregulated, every confinement is potentially a life sentence, 
and yet it is freer (for its surviving inmates) than the outside world. 
Semruk is, for its permanent residents, a strange kind of Paradise. On 
the other hand, whereas Dostoevsky’s katorga is governed by external 
regulations and the inmates serve fixed, finite terms, it remains 
uncompromisingly a place of punishment. 
Yakhina does not flinch from describing relentless and harrowing 
physical details of human suffering and endurance, including Zuleikha’s 
near-drowning under the capsized convict barge, or the deportees’ 
shared struggle when forced to forage for food in the taiga and the 
Angara river and construct accommodation fit to last the winter in 
the most challenging circumstances. The lot of Dostoevsky’s prisoners 
is comparatively lighter, as most of them will be released when they 
have completed their sentence, and there is still some compassion and 
tolerance by the criminal justice establishment; they are still regarded 
as human beings, although classified among the worst and most base 
individuals in their society. The exiles in Stalin’s Russia have no human 
worth, nobody cares if they live or die. Ignatov is the human face of this 
uncaring system, and he does not lack some redeeming human qualities. 
Though he fears retribution from his superiors when some prisoners 
escape from the train (rather than when they die), he does ensure that 
the exiles are sufficiently fed during their journey, even rejecting his own 
superior food. 
In other words, if we (re-)read Dostoevsky’s Notes from the House of the 
Dead as a successor text to Yakhina’s twenty-first-century narrative, our 
“new” treatise can reveal themes which transcend Dostoevsky’s 1862 
narrative, although they are characteristic of most of his work. We have 
already discussed the contrasting symbolism of the penal colonies in 
each book, the differing potential for redemption in each, and the ironic 
polarization of political radicalism—the radical politics persecuted 
by the authorities in Zuleikha’s case have become the orthodoxy of 
Dostoevsky’s era. In a sense, the chronological reversal imposed by 
backwards reading makes sense of Dostoevsky’s own sentencing as well 
as the fates of the few political prisoners in Gorianchikov’s katorga: they 
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are being punished for the sins of their figurative twentieth-century 
children, their political heirs.
Teardrops Unavenged: The Treatment of Children21 
We turn now to another theme common to Yakhina’s and Dostoevsky’s 
fiction: the suffering of children. The Soviet state terrorizes not only its 
adult ‘enemies’ but also their children. Yakhina’s child characters are 
deliberately targeted and subject to oppression and physical violence 
by adults who represent the state in its various forms. Nature can be 
equally cruel: Zuleikha loses her four daughters in infancy, and we learn 
that her mother-in-law, the ‘Upyrikha’, allowed her three older children 
to die of hunger so that only the fourth, Murtaza, would survive on her 
milk. The full horror of these times she conveys in a whisper to Murtaza: 
‘Do you hear, my son? We didn’t eat them. We buried them. Ourselves, 
without a mullah, at night. You were just young, you’ve forgotten it all. 
They don’t have any graves, I’ve told you this till I’m blue in the face, 
that in the summer of that year everyone was buried, but without graves. 
Cannibals were roaming the graveyards in hordes, and as soon as they 
saw a fresh grave they’d dig it up and eat the corpse’.22 
In the same breath Upyrikha goes on to deny neighbours’ rumours that 
she and Murtaza did in fact eat the other three children; her insistent 
refutation is a clear, if implicit, acknowledgement that she and her 
youngest son did commit cannibalism.
In Yakhina’s short story ‘The Butterfly’ the eight-year-old Mitia 
(known as Motylek, the titular butterfly) has to endure a relentless 
barrage of physical beatings by various authorities on the island 
where he is incarcerated, most savagely inflicted by his own sadistic 
and alcoholic grandfather, before escaping to Kazan’. This island has 
its own child population, regimented and repressed by both teachers 
and hospital personnel, who take a perverse and sadistic pleasure in 
hunting down children who try to escape. The gradations and intensity 
of torture and pain inflicted on the young boy are grisly and disturbing, 
as are the physical tribulations he faces in order to leave the island.
Moreover, if we take Yakhina’s text as primary and read Dostoevsky’s 
works as if refracted through it, we can put historical flesh on to the 
bones of an abstract philosophical thesis. The physicality of Yakhina’s 
90 Reading Backwards: An Advance Retrospective on Russian Literature
evocation of violence gives human meaning to Dostoevsky’s more 
metaphysical musings on suffering and redemption. Yakhina’s 
understanding of materialist reductionism removes any idealism, and 
thus any realistic hope for a happy end, in a society governed and 
enforced by an intolerant and murderous ideology. The individual 
survives only by chance. Solzhenitsyn insisted in his chronicles of 
the Gulag, both fictional and non-fictional, that physical survival is 
dependent on spiritual transformation (perhaps significantly, the first 
chapter of Zuleikha is called ‘One Day’). Zuleikha survives by physically 
withstanding and then spiritually transcending her brutal environment, 
focussing on her duty to bring up her son and help him to survive, and 
thus she can also be seen to symbolize a ‘feminization’ of the prison and 
exile experience that is absent in Solzhenitsyn (or Dostoevsky).
Yakhina’s novel shows that exile is mitigated by humanity, manifested 
as simple kindness and love between those abandoned by an uncaring 
state, with little hope for survival, never mind spiritual rebirth. They 
create their own community which is more or less unsupervised 
externally, and over the years all the deportees originally exiled to 
Semruk die there, as, the reader knows, eventually will Zuleikha. 
Yakhina’s child characters Iuzuf and Motylek also escape hell on earth, 
at great risk to their own lives, though there is no suggestion that their 
physical survival will guarantee a better quality of life: Iuzuf hopes to 
become an artist, Motylek in adult life is a casual labourer. 
Children in Dostoevsky’s works also suffer as innocent victims of 
adult weakness and/or cruelty. In Crime and Punishment’ (Prestuplenie 
i nakazanie, 1866) the younger children in Semen Marmeladov’s 
household go hungry because he drinks away the family income; his 
teenage daughter Sonia has to earn money as a prostitute to feed the 
family. In the same novel Arkadii Svidrigailov preys on young girls, 
sexually exploiting and abusing them, and only his dreams speak of 
an awakening consciousness. Stavrogin in Demons takes delight in 
humiliating and abusing eleven-year-old Matresha, who hangs herself 
in shame after he has raped her (Stavrogin willingly fails to prevent 
her suicide). In The Brothers Karamazov (Brat’ia Karamazovy, 1881) the 
schoolboy Il’iusha Snegirev dies, and at his funeral the novice monk 
Alesha Karamazov delivers a moving eulogy to the grieving schoolboys 
on the need for Christian love:
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My fine Sirs, all of you henceforth are dear to me, I shall enclose you 
all in my heart, and I ask you all to enclose me in yours! And who has 
brought us together in this fine and good feeling, of whom we shall now 
always, for our entire life, remember, and we intend to remember, it is 
Il’iushechka, of course, a kind boy, a nice boy, a boy who will be dear to 
us for ever and ever! We will never ever forget him, may his memory in 
our hearts be eternal and good, henceforth and for ever and ever!23
There is no more abhorrent example in Dostoevsky’s work of the 
suffering of innocent children than the tale told by Ivan Karamazov 
to his brother Alesha of the murder of an eight-year-old serf boy by a 
retired army general, who sets his hunting dogs on him. The hounds 
tear the boy apart in front of his mother. It is in the face of such cruelty 
that Ivan rejects ‘supreme harmony’ and God’s world: 
it is not worth the teardrop of even one tortured child who beat his chest 
with his tiny fist in his stinking dog kennel weeping his unexpiated 
tears and prayed to his Lordy-Lordy. It is not worth it because his tears 
remained unexpiated. They must be expiated, otherwise there can be no 
harmony.24
Yakhina’s children suffer because of the state’s ideology and its policy 
towards ‘enemies’. Dostoevsky mitigates official corporate responsibility 
through the suffering of his children simply as a result of human agency. 
However, Dostoevsky’s fears for the future replicate the fate of children 
in Yakhina’s second novel Deti moi, published in 2018. 
This novel again begins in a non-Russian community, this time 
among Volga Germans in the early 1920s. The village is Gnadental’ 
(‘Fertile Valley’, renamed ‘Gennad’ev’ after the mass deportation to 
Kazakhstan of the German population during the Great Patriotic War), 
and its inhabitants bear names from German and Austrian culture over 
years and genres: Bach, Grimm, Hoffman, Wagner, Handel, Dürer, 
Dietrich, Böll, Fromm, Brecht, Mann, Wenders, Grass, Lang.25 As with 
Dostoevsky’s characters Devushkin, Raskol’nikov, Razumikhin and 
Myshkin, names here have a symbolic function. If in Dostoevsky names 
suggest their owners’ psychological characteristics, in Children of Mine 
they possess an allegorical significance: the novel is not just about 
physical survival, but the fate of culture in a militant age.
This novel is fundamentally about an adult’s efforts to save and 
protect the life of a child. The hero is Iakov Ivanovich Bakh (Bach), a 
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teacher in the German colony of Gnadental’, who has to raise Anna 
alone as her mother, his wife Klara, dies in childbirth (the child is not 
his: Klara became pregnant after she was gang-raped by three itinerant 
brigands). He begins by stealing milk from the local farms, then, after 
he is discovered, “earns” milk rations for the baby by writing stories and 
later fairy tales (skazki) for a local newspaper, under the direction of the 
hunchbacked Party official Hoffman (Gofman):
He read through the text. Did he write this himself, or was someone 
moving his pen, suggesting les mots justes and weaving them into elegant 
and exact expressions? He couldn’t add anything to what had been 
written. It seemed in these last lines that he had poured out on to the 
paper all the remnants of what had built up inside him over these years 
of isolation and silence. Three months of constant feverish writing—
hundreds and hundreds of pages covered in writing: everything that 
Bach knew and remembered of his native colony and its inhabitants, 
what he surmised, doubted and managed to rethink—all of this was 
now cast in words and passed on to the voraciously reading hunchback. 
Gnadental’ appeared in these jottings as a motley, noisy place full of 
merry and brightly dressed people, the pealing of bells, the singing of 
women, the cries of children, the lowing of cows and the clucking of fowl, 
the splashing of oars on the Volga, the fluttering of sails and murmuring 
of waves, the smell of fresh wafers and watermelon honey—Gnadental’ 
as it used to be. Gnadental’ as it is.26
Hoffman is unable to contain his enthusiasm: ‘You have dug down to 
the truth, my bearded comrade! You have opened up the soul of this 
unsociable entity, the Volga German. You have opened it up like a tin 
of vegetables’.27 The role of literature, Hoffman tells him, is to ‘turn the 
soul inside out’ through tales and legends, as in children’s stories, the 
‘foundation of the soul’.28 Hoffman is delighted that Bach has turned 
real life into a fairy tale. For Bach the fairy tale is his only way to feed his 
adopted family.
Hoffman reveals the true function of art in this society, just as Bach 
had expressed it in his tales:
You’re a Shakespeare, a Schiller! What is created in that unkempt German 
head of yours, eh? What demons are lurking in there? […] Some spirited 
turns of phrase, however, I admit that. Here we have a fairy tale with the 
workers’ morality, and instructions on how to look after an apple-tree 
orchard: both the cultural revolution and the agrarian question, all in this 
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tiny text. And how beautifully you’ve phrased it: this shouldn’t just be 
read, it should be recited, as a poem. To be sung like a hymn!29
The novel is structured according to a timetable that does not follow 
calendar time, but major events, as in folklore. Thus, for example, the 
year 1918 is ‘the Year of Ransacked Houses’, 1921 is ‘the Year of the 
Hungry’, 1931 is ‘the Year of the Great Lie’ and 1933 ‘the Year of the 
Great Hunger’. Moreover, Bach knows perfectly well how the laying of 
the ‘foundation of the soul’ fits the new world order:
Bach had long since understood exactly what kind of fairy tales Hoffman 
expected of him. Stories of a religious nature—about the Virgin Mary, the 
apostles and the saints—were strictly forbidden; subjects with a mystical 
quality—about magicians, magical objects, unicorns and dead knights—
were also not particularly welcome; but stories about simple people—
weavers, cobblers, fishermen, peasants, old and young soldiers—were 
always needed. Surprisingly, witches and devils were also required, and 
wood demons with little devils, giants of all breeds and sizes, cannibals 
with robbers: sublime magic Hoffman did not favour, but ‘representatives 
of the people’s beliefs’ he certainly did. ‘All your magicians with their 
crystal balls and sorcerers with their staffs—all of them are former heroes, 
believe me,’ he would explain to Bach. ‘Let former people read about 
them: young grammar-school girls with their grubby army officers and 
ladies with an intellectual bent. But the people will understand about 
itself and about those it fears to meet in the granary or neighbouring 
forest.’ The involvement in fairy tales of representatives of the ruling 
class—of kings, barons and earls—was also welcomed as it ensured 
that each story had an ideologically correct ending. Also welcome were 
stories about animals: cowardly sheep, diligent bees, carefree larks, but 
Bach tackled similar subjects reluctantly as he couldn’t imagine himself 
as a hare or a seal.30
The degradation of literature for the purposes of political education 
and ideological propaganda is a far cry from Dostoevsky’s well-known 
1880 speech at the unveiling of Moscow’s Pushkin monument calling 
for writers to act as prophets for their people.31 Moreover, both in this 
address and in the journalism collected as Dnevnik pisatelia (Diary of a 
Writer, 1873–1881), Dostoevsky practised direct communication with 
his readers, openly engaging in polemics with fellow writers and 
intellectuals such as Nikolai Leskov, and not only on literary matters: he 
was also happy to discuss philosophy, history and politics. Though this 
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was not necessarily an ‘equal’ correspondence (there is ample evidence 
that Dostoevsky was not interested in argument or discussion, but 
simply in making points as forcefully as he could), it was a dialogue 
that assumed another’s participation and at least implied a response: 
Dostoevsky’s response to the call for the creation of the ‘engineer of 
human souls’ was to depict the offspring of such engineers. In terms 
of reading ‘backwards’, we can see Dostoevsky denouncing with 
increasing vehemence exactly the utilitarian use of literature postulated 
by Hoffman 150 years later in Children of Mine.32
Bach’s tales are not intended as explicit moral guides, but as parables, 
exercises in indirectly assimilating the ‘correct’ values. Yakhina’s Soviet-
era writers view production and reception as a top-down vertical process, 
negating the horizontal line of cultural communication envisaged by 
Dostoevsky, which would be both subverted and inverted by the radical 
characters Dostoevsky termed ‘devils’. The socialist fairy tales created 
by Yakhina’s character Bach were transformed by Dostoevsky into 
nightmares.
Bach’s lifelong mission is to provide and care for Anna, whom he 
cherishes as his personal responsibility although she is not his biological 
daughter. She serves as a constant reminder of her mother, the woman 
he came to love and revere. Bach takes a vow of silence for the rest of 
his life with Anna (whom he calls ‘Antje’), unwilling to communicate 
with the outside world after his literary ‘career’ and the debasement 
of his craft. Bach’s unwillingness to speak, and his success as a writer, 
provide an ironic commentary on the use (and abuse) of thought 
and communication by those who try to control them.33 They are 
joined by the homeless itinerant boy, Vasilii Volgin, known as Vas’ka. 
Anna and Vas’ka become Bach’s ‘children’, whom he guides through 
childhood until they leave together to join school in the neighbouring 
town of Pokrovsk. The novel’s epilogue confirms that we cannot expect 
a happy ending: Bach is arrested in 1938, sentenced to fifteen years’ 
imprisonment and in 1946 is killed in a mining accident in his place 
of internment in Kazakhstan. In 1948 the entire German population of 
the Volga region (438,000 people in all) is sent into exile in Kazakhstan. 
Anna Iakobovna Bach graduates from the Clara Zetkin school in the 
town of Engel’sk (formerly Pokrovsk); in 1941, as a person of German 
descent, she is deported to Kazakhstan where five years later she loses 
a leg as the result of an industrial accident. Vas’ka survives the war and 
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on 8 May 1945 is in the German village of Gnadenthal on the river Elbe 
(there is an actual German village called Gnadenthal, but it is not on 
the Elbe). He travels to Kazakhstan to find and marry Anna Bach, then 
settles down to become a schoolteacher of German. The novel ends with 
the announcement that Bach’s anthology Fairy Tales of Soviet Germans 
(Skazki sovetskikh nemtsev) appeared in 1933 and ran to six editions with 
over three hundred thousand copies, in addition to several successful 
theatrical adaptations. This collection, of course, is as fictional as its 
author.
Children of Mine, unlike Zuleikha, is occasionally enlivened by touches 
of humour, though with a dark edge. Several digressions feature Stalin; 
in the most notable of these, Stalin stops his personal motorcade to get 
out of his car and observe at close hand a wild dog. Soon an entire pack 
of dogs appears, and they begin moving threateningly towards him. As 
he moves away from his escort the dogs attack; in panic, Stalin rushes 
back to the safety of his car. The guard who kills the lead dog is later 
investigated for having waited too long before shooting, thereby possibly 
putting the Leader’s life in danger. Clearly, the author’s sympathies lie 
with the dogs. Ivan Karamazov’s story of the serf boy set upon by his 
master’s dogs provides an ironic retrospective comment on the worth of 
human life, with Stalin in the role of victim. Far from having the power 
of life and death over others, Stalin is reduced to potential dog-meat.34
Conclusion
Zuleikha and Notes from the House of the Dead share a common premise: 
the helplessness of the individual confronted by the implacable coercion 
of the state. Both novels use lived, historical experience to explore and 
decry the state’s callousness and its assault on individuality. Yakhina’s 
novels express greater concern with the physical process of how an 
entire way of life can be eradicated, whereas in Demons and still later 
in The Brothers Karamazov, Dostoevsky would present his fear of the 
logical (and possible future) outcome of nihilism. In Children of Mine the 
destruction of the ‘fertile valley’ and an entire way of life in Gnadental’ 
can be seen as a microcosm of the larger Soviet reality, just as the rural 
communities of Skvoreshniki and Skotoprigon’evsk in Demons and 
The Brothers Karamazov respectively serve as fictional backdrops to the 
formulation and enactment of momentous political ideas. 
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If we ‘read backwards’, the real, physical pain and loss depicted by 
Yakhina is converted into the existential sufferings of the archetypical 
Dostoevskian hero whose personal philosophy has gone awry. The 
idea often ascribed to Ivan Karamazov that ‘everything is permitted’ 
is the revenge of the nineteenth century on modernity: in Dostoevsky’s 
novels, horrendous lived experiences become abstract ideas, such as 
the reported atrocities which inform a friendly discussion between two 
educated brothers, Ivan and Alesha Karamazov. Through the trope of 
inhumane cruelty, the nineteenth-century literary ‘canon’ reconfigures 
twentieth-century reality. This is a postmodern irony that recalls, 
analogously, Vladimir Sorokin’s symbolic dismemberment of the 
Russian classical canon in works such as A Novel (Roman, 1985–89), and 
his semiotic reimagining of it in The Blizzard (Metel’, 2010). 
Dostoevsky’s oft-quoted faith as articulated in The Brothers Karamazov 
that ‘beauty will save the world’ is the final comment on a nihilism 
lacking any moral restraint or literary prettification. In Zuleikha, ‘beauty’ 
is reduced to the mutual respect forged by Zuleikha and Ignatov, a 
relationship born largely of expediency rather than sincere feeling. 
The fate of the children particularly foreshadows a world without 
moral signposts to the future. Bach’s ‘children’ survive in a hostile 
environment through chance not design, as do the children in other 
works by Yakhina. Hoffman’s praise for Bach’s ‘fairy tales’ in Children 
of Mine makes a child’s universe more ‘real’ than life itself, thereby 
anticipating Dostoevsky’s fears of a utilitarian literature. Dostoevsky’s 
response to the twentieth century’s horror is to denounce its reductive 
simplification, though the wild dogs threatening Stalin remind us 
that not everything in the ‘fairy tale’ ends happily ever after, even for 
dictators. 
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5. Notes from the Other Side of 
the Chronotope: Dostoevsky 
Anticipating Petrushevskaia
Inna Tigountsova
The contraintes, or formal rules for literary games, invented by the Oulipo 
group are nothing new in literature, as the group’s historian Pierre Bayard 
has noted.1 Russian literature offers many other examples of invented 
rules. Amongst these are the militant manifestos of the Cubo-Futurists; 
for instance, Aleksei Kruchenykh and Velimir Khlebnikov’s Word as Such 
(Slovo kak takovoe, 1913).2 A parallel from the 1980s, the Transfurist or 
Neofuturist grouping, included Sergei Sigei who invented a technique 
of writing poetry in so-bukvy (ligatures).3 Yet another form of innovation 
is attained by Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821–1881) with his ‘realism in 
the higher sense’ and his experimental récit Notes from Underground 
(Zapiski iz podpol’ia, 1864).4 Dostoevsky’s life spans only sixty years. 
Despite the fact that he is often considered to be, with Tolstoy, one of 
the two canonical Russian Realist writers, I will show how Dostoevsky’s 
experimental use of narrative in Notes from Undergound anticipates and 
plagiarizes Time: Night (Vremia noch’, 1992) by the contemporary writer 
Liudmila Petrushevskaia. While Dostoevsky’s well-known novella 
needs very little introduction, Petrushevskaia’s family tale told by a 
Soviet-era matriarch still has a limited readership in foreign translation.5 
In this chapter, I shall approach Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground 
and Petrushevskaia’s Time: Night in light of the ideas of anticipatory 
plagiarism and polyvalent hybrid authorship proposed by Pierre Bayard. 
I suggest that in view of the similarities between Notes from Underground 
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and Time: Night, Dostoevsky’s Notes can indeed be considered a case 
of anticipatory plagiarism. I also argue that Bayard’s model biography 
of a writer called ‘Tolstoevsky’ (blending Dostoevsky with Tolstoy) is 
especially fruitful for analysing the peculiarities of the Notes and Time: 
Night. By analogy with the ‘Homeric hymns’, a term that attributes 
poems written over several centuries to a single author,6 I propose to 
explore both texts as if they had been written by one hybrid author: 
‘Petroevsky’ (or ‘Dostoshevskaia’). The collected works of Petroevsky 
also include Dostoevsky’s Poor Folk (Bednye liudi, 1846), Crime and 
Punishment (Prestuplenie i nakazanie, 1866) and Petrushevskaia’s novella 
‘Our Crowd’ (‘Svoi krug’, 1990).
Authorial Merging: The Chronotope of Petroevsky
Bayard’s notion of anticipatory plagiarism (‘the act of being inspired, 
whilst concealing the fact, by the works of a later writer’7) may at 
first strike us in the same way as Gary Saul Morson’s suggestion 
that Dostoevsky’s Diary of a Writer (Dnevnik pisatelia, 1873–81) is ‘an 
integral (if idiosyncratic) literary work’— that is, as something quite 
improbable.8 If we take a closer look, however, Dostoevsky’s intention 
(as both author and editor) to present the Diary as a unified work 
becomes essential for our exploration of its structure and content. 
Another notion that might initially seem improbable is Bayard’s idea 
of a literary history capable of mobility (a history which is subject to 
temporal recombination and rearrangement), which I suggest develops 
Bakhtin’s concept of chronotope (a literary unity of time and space where 
time has the more significant role) in a non-linear, “rhizomatic” way.9 In 
A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia (1980), Gilles Deleuze 
and Felix Guattari describe two modes of social organization and 
reality, including literary reality: ‘One is arboresque and favors order 
and hierarchy. The other is rhizomatic and favors an undoing of all such 
orders and hierarchies.’10 If we accept their second mode as a viable 
literary reality, then the borrowing of ideas from future texts begins to 
appear sensible. Such a multi-directional, non-hierarchical chronotope 
informs what Bayard calls ‘the mobility of the new literary history’, with 
its chronologies that
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cannot be fixed insofar as any new work—and moreover, any work of 
importance—displaces the whole of the constituted chronology and 
makes the existing literary panorama appear in a new light.11
Who are we, after all, in the post-Stephen Hawking universe, to claim 
we know exactly which way time flows? Hawking postulates that if 
the universe was meant to ‘finish up in a state of high order…disorder 
would decrease with time’; he argues that in that case human beings 
‘would have a psychological arrow of time that was backward’.12 The 
concept of an a-chronological literary history with its inevitable updates 
is also mentioned by T. S. Eliot, for whom it takes into account complex 
networks of interconnected textual dialogue among culturally significant 
artefacts from different historical periods:
Whoever has approved this idea of order, of the form of European, of 
English literature will not find it preposterous that the past should be 
altered by the present as much as the present is directed by the past.13
In his book on anticipatory plagiarism Bayard highlights its usefulness 
as a pedagogical tool:
When this notion of anticipatory plagiarism is accepted, it is conceivable 
that our whole conception of literary history—as taught in educational 
establishments or universities and presented in textbooks—will have to 
be altered.14
Bayard’s theory of anticipatory plagiarism, supported by his idea of 
the polyvalent personalities of both writers and their characters, allows 
us to take a fresh look at older texts and to re-position contemporary 
ones, re-contextualizing both.15 When I was an undergraduate student 
of English, my Foreign Literature professor said that although James 
Joyce’s Ulysses was mentioned on the reading list, we should wait 
to read it since we would be not able to understand all the allusions 
involved. Naturally, I read it right away. Perhaps I did not grasp the 
intertextual connections, but the idea of their presence in the work has 
been imprinted on my mind ever since that rather unorthodox request 
from my professor. If we consider the possibility of the digital mapping 
of an eternally changing network of past and contemporary texts as well 
as texts yet to come as components of one data map with mobile links 
between shimmering literary and ‘geographical’ (spatial) destinations, 
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we will arrive at a different reading of the classics, and our conceptual 
understanding of them may change.16
How does our perception change if we see the New Testament as 
an older version of The Idiot (Idiot, 1869)? Or Crime and Punishment as 
borrowing a topos from Petrushevskaia’s Number One, or In The Gardens 
of Other Opportunities (Nomer Odin, 2004) in its entrance-way and attic 
scenes? What if we imagine that Dostoevsky and Petrushevskaia are 
indeed one and the same writer, whom we might call ‘Petroevsky’ and 
whom we have mistakenly considered separate people, as Bayard does 
with Tolstoy and Dostoevsky in his recent book on ‘Tolstoevsky’?17 Based 
on the greater number of similarities and overlapping themes in their 
writing, would it not make even more sense than Bayard’s investigation 
of Tolstoevsky? After all, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, even though they 
merged in a national mytheme well before Bayard, do exhibit significant 
differences in their writing styles and ideologies.18 
Or what if we imagined that Fyodor Dostoevsky and his brother 
Mikhail were the same person, since Fyodor Dostoevsky assumed 
Mikhail’s financial responsibilities after his death and continued writing 
his multi-narrated texts throughout his life, as is especially evident in 
Diary of a Writer? In the spirit of Eric Naiman’s counterfactual question, 
‘What if Nabokov had written “Dvoinik”?’,19 let us consider how we 
would read the Notes from Underground if Petrushevskaia had written it. 
Would we demand more from the character of Liza the prostitute, and 
expect her counter-narrative to be incorporated in the text? Would we 
expect the Underground Man to be a closeted bisexual or homosexual? 
Would we anticipate more societal disapproval of Liza, or argue that 
the relative lack of such disapproval—societal indifference—is more 
telling than condemnation? I suggest that Notes from Underground 
and Time: Night are the quintessential works of ‘Petroevsky’, who has 
benefited from the Russian nineteenth-century canon but also from 
the postmodern tradition, still populated by representatives of the 
Underground Man type, involving the ideal of Sodom and fragmented 
narratives. The further asymmetrical development of one element of 
Petroevsky’s polyvalent personality—that of Petrushevskaia—supports 
Bayard’s idea of anticipatory (or reciprocal) plagiarism in a different 
way. 
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Bayard argues in favour of Tolstoevsky and his characters 
having polyvalent personalities: ‘Tolstoevsky is multiple, because 
he is composed of several personalities who are not necessarily in 
communication with one another, and whose person consists of the 
conflictual merger of these personalities’.20 Once again, a Bakhtinian 
concept relates to Bayard’s psychoanalytical literary theory (the Russian 
translation of Bayard’s French original gives ‘réunion conflictuelle’21 
as ‘raznogolosoe ob’’edinenie’,22 recalling Bakhtin’s raznogolosost’, or 
vari-voicedness). Bakhtin considers the multi-voicedness and vari-
voicedness (mnogogolosost’ i raznogolosost’) of Dostoevsky’s discourse to 
be its principal features, enabling the exploration of different aspects 
of a theme from multiple points of view, as well as serving as a pivotal 
compositional device.23
Le Plagiat par anticipation discusses Oedipus Rex (429 BC) and Hamlet 
(1609) as examples of literary works that are key to re-writing literary 
history if we accept the idea of anticipatory plagiarism. Following 
Bayard, I designate Petroevsky’s Notes from Underground as another of 
those key texts that requires us to re-assemble the system of literary 
works, since this text was treated as an outsider in the literary 
compendium of nineteenth-century literature and arguably received the 
most criticism during that era of all of Dostoevsky’s oeuvre. The Notes 
would be much better placed in the context of the twentieth century, 
as they are in close dialogue with works by Robert Walser (The Child 
(Das Kind, 1924, in Die Rose)), Ralph Ellison (The Invisible Man, 1952), 
Evgenii Zamiatin (We (My, 1924)), Jean-Paul Sartre (Erostratus, 1939), 
Vladimir Makanin (Underground, or A Hero of Our Time (Andegraund, 
ili geroi nashego vremeni, 1998)), and possibly Woody Allen (Notes from 
the Overfed, 1968), amongst others. Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s prose 
has a special place in this literary web, as Dostoevsky’s Notes are much 
closer to her work than to that of any other twentieth- or twenty-first-
century writer. In spite of Dostoevsky-the-editor’s footnote to Notes to 
the effect that the Underground Man is a necessary feature of Russian 
society of his time, the latter lacks companions from his own generation, 
even if one could argue that the Underground Man is a variation on two 
nineteenth-century types: the ‘superfluous man’ and the ‘little man’.24 It 
is, after all, the latter two types as such that populate nineteenth-century 
Russian novels and verse. The Underground Man type is distinctly out 
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of place, dissonant with his own time. He is probably the Dostoevsky 
character least appreciated by nineteenth-century readers; yet we in the 
twenty-first century easily accept him as a popular type.
Petroevsky’s Narrators 
A particularly Dostoevskian Russian writer, Liudmila Petrushevskaia, 
was born at the height of the Stalinist purges in 1938 and survived family 
traumas, extreme poverty, near-starvation, and displacement, including 
a period in a children’s home where she was placed by her mother in 
order to avoid desperate circumstances. Her family was ruined by the 
purges; Petrushevskaia’s father left before she was born. Perhaps in 
part thanks to her family history, Petrushevskaia can be said to ‘[chart] 
the daily psychic monstrosities of a spiritual wasteland populated by 
victims and victimizers bound by an endless chain of universal suffering 
and abuse’ in The Time: Night and other works.25
Thus in many ways Dostoevsky and Petrushevskaia share a single 
outlook on the human condition; they are precisely the sort of writers 
about whom one can easily imagine, with Bayard, ‘that they have found 
a means of traversing the interval of time separating them so as to work 
together’.26 What reader of contemporary Russian literature can peruse 
Dostoevsky’s famously provocative Notes from Underground and not 
think of the protagonist of Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s novella The Time: 
Night? The image of the notoriously unattractive, manipulative narrator 
who twists and turns the textual fabric of Dostoevsky’s 1864 novella to 
suit his own needs is refreshed in the reader’s mind by Petrushevskaia’s 
1992 publication. The narrator of Notes from Underground, a nameless 
antisocial paradoxalist intellectual, philosophizes in the plotless first 
part of his text (‘The Underground’), using the second part (‘Apropos 
the Wet Snow’) to recall a series of events from his past. ‘Apropos the 
Wet Snow’ introduces his so-called friends; a prostitute, Liza, who takes 
pity on him; and his parodically named servant, Apollon, with whom 
the narrator squabbles over petty matters. Though not a mouthpiece 
for the nineteenth-century classic writer, the Underground Man still 
anticipates posterity on his creator’s behalf by claiming superior 
intelligence. As Dostoevsky-the-editor writes in his footnote to the 
Notes from Underground: ‘…such persons as the creator of such notes 
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not only can but even should exist in our society…’.27 By leaving the 
Underground Man’s notes ostensibly unfinished, Dostoevsky invites his 
fellow woman writer and her female narrator to complete his tale with a 
story just like his own, or to borrow a phrase from the Soviet-era author 
Natalia Baranskaia, ‘a story like any other’.28 
What if Petrushevskaia, or indeed one of her heroines, were to 
finish the Notes—which Dostoevsky never provided with a satisfactory 
conclusion? In his tortured discourse, which Bakhtin called ‘the 
word with a loophole’(‘slovo s lazeikoi’), the Underground Man, as 
a marginalized intellectual, takes a position analogous to that of 
Petrushevskaia’s Anna Andrianovna writing her notes ‘at the edge of the 
table’ in Time: Night.29 In this late twentieth-century Ich-Erzählung, Anna 
Andrianovna narrates events from the life of four generations of her 
family, in which the misfortunes of its predominantly female members 
(Anna Andrianovna herself, Anna’s mother Serafima, Anna’s daughter 
Alena and son Andrei, her feminized grandson Timochka, and Alena’s 
other assorted offspring) appear to be almost congenital. Parallels with 
Dostoevsky’s nineteenth-century text include narrative structure, type 
of protagonist, the prevailing poetics of ugliness and disorder, a shared 
chronotope depicting the family home as dystopic, and the excessive 
use of colloquial language with diminutives.
The Notes are the most popular of Dostoevsky’s texts in North 
American university curricula (thanks to their reputation as a ‘short 
novel’, their status as a quintessential Dostoevsky text, and because 
their author prefigures—or, in Bayardian terms, draws upon—so 
many twentieth- and twenty-first-century writers in his narrative). 
This makes me wonder if the idea of the Underground Man as the 
man of the majority has been somewhat artificially realized among our 
contemporaries, or—taking into account Bayard’s concept of a mobile 
literary history30—if Dostoevsky in fact anticipates posterity in this 
particular text to a greater degree than anywhere else in his writings. 
Ironically, Dostoevsky occupies a far more significant literary-historical 
place (especially in Western scholarship) than Russia’s national poet 
Aleksandr Pushkin, who was Dostoevsky’s own ideal of what a writer 
should be. This is in part because of the difficulty of doing justice to 
poetry in translation, but mainly because of Dostoevsky’s affinities with 
those late-twentieth and twenty-first-century writers who belong to the 
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postmodern (and post-postmodern) period. As I have argued elsewhere, 
it is the very concept of the ugly (bezobraznoe), depicted so well in 
Dostoevsky’s literary universe, that allows him to take his rightful place 
in the world of our contemporaries.31 A literary tradition, in this case 
that of Dostoevsky (continuing the Gogolian line) and Petrushevskaia, 
leads us from the proto-modern, protean Dostoevsky to the omnivorous 
postmodern end of the twentieth century, with Petrushevskaia’s dark 
realism. 32
Bearing in mind the near-ubiquity of Dostoevsky’s novella in post-
nineteenth-century cultural discourse (literary and beyond), it would 
be perverse to discount the significance of influence in what Bayard 
would call the ‘classical’ direction. In discussing the status of Tristan and 
Iseult (12th Century) as an outlier in the Middle Ages with regard to its 
treatment of the themes of love and death, he contends that the authors 
of the legend must have been inspired by the Romantics. At the same 
time, Bayard concedes that they have ‘exerted considerable influence 
upon a whole swathe of Western literature, including the Romantic 
writers’:
Thus it may be appropriate to admit that in certain cases there can occur 
simultaneously plagiarism and anticipatory plagiarism – or, if you like, 
reciprocal plagiarism. There is little doubt that the Tristan authors drew 
upon the Romantic imagination; but it is also likely that the latter were 
for their part equally inspired by Tristan, as if in some way, these authors, 
surmounting the barriers of time, had been influenced by each other.33
Discussing the anticipatory side of this special category of ‘reciprocal 
plagiarism’, Bayard focusses on the element of dissonance: ‘But here again 
the feeling of dissonance—Kafka stands alone whilst Volodine is part of 
a generation marked by totalitarianism and genocides—incites us to see 
him [Kafka] as plagiarist rather than plagiarized.’34 Indeed, dissonance 
seems to be the most important feature in Bayard’s classification of the 
elements of anticipatory plagiarism. The Underground Man, too, is out 
of place in his historical epoch, contrary to Dostoevsky’s provocative 
note about such men being typical of contemporary society.35 Only after 
Hesse, French existentialism and Petrushevskaia’s postmodern black 
realism in Time: Night (along with the magic realism/horror hybrid 
of her novel Number One, or In The Gardens of Other Opportunities), can 
we truly see the significance of this type for literature of the twentieth 
century and beyond. 
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Narrative Space in Petroevsky
In the chronotope of the metafiction of the Petroevskian world, the 
squalid dwelling of the Underground Man is borrowed from the topos 
of Time: Night. The deviations from linear chronos that we see in Notes 
from Underground appear even more pronounced in Petrushevskaia’s 
Time: Night, with its own cyclical time where family history repeats itself 
through generations of (mainly) female characters.
A typical Petroevskian topos is found in the ugly interior of the 
brothel visited by the Underground Man, in its messiness and disorder. 
The description of the room where he sees Liza echoes his psychological 
landscape: ‘In the narrow, cramped, low-ceilinged room, cluttered with 
a huge wardrobe and with cardboard boxes strewn about and all sorts 
of rags and clothing rubbish, it was almost completely dark.’36 The space 
is claustrophobic and chaotic, with a low ceiling alluding to the low 
motives of the protagonist.37
Crime and Punishment offers more details of St Petersburg flats than 
Notes from Underground. This narrative space is just as distorted as in the 
shorter work: ‘…a large room, but very low… Sonia’s room resembled 
a shed; it had the look of an irregular rectangle, and this made it seem 
deformed… monstrously obtuse.’38 This description of Sonia’s room (like 
Liza, she is a prostitute; her relationship with Raskolnikov resembles 
Liza’s with the Underground Man) includes a striking number of corners 
and angles, acute and obtuse, ugly and irregular.39 Like Raskol’nikov’s 
own coffin-like room, Sonia’s has a low ceiling; and though it is large, 
it is sparsely furnished and misshapen. Poverty is everywhere, and two 
different words for ‘ugly’ feature in the passage above: urodlivyi and 
bezobrazno. There are doors leading directly to another rented room, 
eliminating any feeling of privacy. Sonia’s room is like the marketplace 
on Sennaia Square, a place of chaos and bezobrazie. 
Women, including characters like Sonia, make up the majority of 
the protagonists in Liudmila Petrushevskaia’s texts, which mainly deal 
with specifically female problems and thus fit Monika Katz’s definition 
of ‘women’s literature’.40 In the nineteenth century, the image of the 
strong woman (Turgenev’s heroines, for example) was created as a 
complement to that of the superfluous man, self-focused and looking 
for his place in society. In Petroevsky’s prose, in the particular case of 
Liza and the Underground Man (a sub-type of the superfluous man), 
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the paragon of a strong woman proves to be a prostitute—traditionally 
a weak and degraded member of society. However, despite filling the 
lowest social role imaginable, she proves to have more common sense 
and compassion than the Underground Man.
Russian literature of the Soviet period depicted women as 
superheroes, or, indeed, supermen. The true Soviet woman, such as 
Baranskaia’s heroine in the story ‘A Week Like Any Other’ (‘Nedelia 
kak nedelia’, 1969) mentioned above, has to be productive for society 
both in the private and public sphere, that is, she bears a double 
burden of responsibility.41 In post-Soviet literature, the ‘strong woman’ 
motif still exists, although it is treated differently. In Petroevsky’s 
prose public life is given little emphasis; the daily life of the female 
characters is emphasized. Petroevsky’s heroines have to struggle to 
survive, overcoming numerous obstacles in order to feed their children: 
‘Everything was hanging in the air like a sword, all our life, ready to 
crash […]. Are there powers in the world that can stop a woman who 
has to feed a child?’42 For these women, life is a battlefield: ‘No, you 
can’t move in here, again faces distorted with hatred, seen in our mirror 
in the hall; we always have rows in the hall, the bridgehead of military 
actions.’43 And it is not clear who is winning the battle with the ‘loved 
ones’. In this permanent struggle, family members cannot help but be 
affected by their dehumanized environment. They lose their capacity 
for compassion and consideration; violation of human dignity becomes 
normal for them. In Petroevsky’s depiction of the human face, natural 
features appear beautiful and artificial ones ugly; Liza’s artificial smile 
in the Notes is a distorted, ugly facial expression provoked by the 
Underground Man, whose own face is repulsive and distorted: ‘My 
disturbed face seemed to me repulsive in the extreme: pale, malicious, 
vile, with unkempt hair. “Let it be, I’m glad of it,” I thought, “I’m glad 
precisely that I’ll seem repulsive to her; that pleases me…”’44
Space in Time: Night is restricted to a two-room flat, which for the 
members of this family is an object of residential claims. This flat cannot 
house eight people (including a mentally-ill elderly woman, a disabled 
alcoholic with a criminal past, two small children and a newborn). 
The adults in the group fight for shelter. Anna Andrianovna is unable 
to make the people closest to her secure; she loses everybody in the 
end.45 In Bayard’s reverse chronology, her ugly and distorted dreams 
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inspire those of the Underground Man. Both characters exaggerate the 
effect which they think they have on people around them. Both have 
a high opinion of themselves and are ugly in the celebration of their 
righteousness: the Underground Man in his speech to the prostitute 
Liza, and Anna Andrianovna in her real or imaginary conversations 
with her children—particularly her daughter Alena, who inherits some 
of the underground features. Alena is consistently described as being in 
a pit; both her psychological state and real-life accommodation belong 
to the underground: ‘From what terrible dungeons (podzemelii) has she 
surfaced if a room of eighteen square metres for four people seems a 
refuge to her!’46
Petroevsky obliquely addresses the utopian notion of the Crystal 
Palace in most of his fictional works, through depictions of his 
characters’ Petersburg dwellings. Morson calls Notes from Underground 
and The Possessed (Besy, 1872) ‘two of the most influential anti-utopias in 
European literature.’47 The dwellings in Petroevsky’s texts are the exact 
opposite of the Crystal Palace in the architectural sense: windows in the 
cramped rooms of the Petroevskian world are small and the walls are 
misshapen; galleries (mentioned, for example, in Crime and Punishment) 
are narrow, dark, labyrinthine passages. Consider the following extract 
from this novel:
Having found the entrance onto the narrow and dark staircase in the 
corner of the courtyard, he ascended, finally, to the second storey and 
came out into a gallery, framing the storey from the side of the yard. For 
the moment he was wandering in darkness and confusion…48
Woll writes that ‘all of Petrushevskaia’s characters inhabit spaces 
that steadily shrink’. In this connection, she draws a parallel between 
Petrushevskaia’s texts and ‘Dostoevsky’s abrasive Underground Man, 
trapped in his miserable cellar flat, and Raskol’nikov, entombed in his 
coffinlike room in the Petersburg slums’. As she also notes, twentieth-
century Russian writers, in depicting urban dwellings, reflect the actual 
material constraints of their time. Cramped Soviet flats are a reality of 
Russia of the twentieth century and beyond, yet they ‘resonate within 
the Russian [nineteenth-century] literary tradition’.49 The way space is 
portrayed in Notes from Underground and Time: Night clearly marks these 
texts as belonging to the same two authors, fused into one as Petroevsky.
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Petroevsky’s Poetics of Time
Morson has discussed the structure of Dostoevsky’s ‘generically 
problematic and formally anomalous works’, writing that
As Dostoevsky was well aware, his novels were likely to appear shapeless 
to most readers––‘loose and baggy monsters’—as Henry James was to 
call them—and he therefore outlined a theory of realistic art to justify, 
and to aid in the development of, his aesthetic practice. Like the novels 
themselves, which have had such great influence on twentieth-century 
European literature, this theory seems remarkably modern […] by the 
mid-1870s Dostoevsky had come to believe that social ‘disintegration’, 
‘fragmentation’, and ‘dissociation’[…] were, in all probability, literally 
apocalyptic in extent […].50
Petroevsky also finds ways to write about ugly themes; their (I use 
this pronoun as a polyvalent hybrid of his and her) narratives reflect 
fragmented social situations. Fragmentation is related to the problem 
of memory: we write the way we remember things and we remember 
them differently every time, bringing the truth into question; and the 
chronotope of Petroevsky’s narratives, in aiming to represent this truth 
mimetically, thus appears even more rhizomatic. In my previous work, I 
have argued that Dostoevsky’s treatment of time belongs outside of his 
historical epoch, suggesting that he offers a proto-modern understanding 
of narrative time.51 However, we can equally well argue that Dostoevsky 
offers a postmodern treatment of memory and time, as in the multiply-
deviated narrative time we see in works such as The Possessed.52 Time 
deviates in similar ways in Time: Night, when the narrator attempts to 
record her past. 
In terms of narrative structure, Petroevsky’s works often feature 
digressions, dialogic monologues, beginnings in medias res, editorial 
comments, and diaries. Time: Night, for example, features an apologue 
and at least three diaries. Its narrative structure is messy in a Petroevskian 
way: Alena’s diary, one of its constituents, is an example of Petroevskian 
confessional-type Ich-Erzählung, woven into a quilted narrative 
consisting of the ‘ten little sheets’ of Alena’s diary, the inclusions of Anna 
Andrianovna’s comments on the diary contents, Anna Andrianovna’s 
own textual shreds in verse and prose, the diary entries that she writes 
on behalf of her daughter, and her own distorted narrative of the 
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story of Time: Night, dating from various points in time. The presence 
of Alena’s diary, Alena’s voice, and the comments of the editor make 
this novella fundamentally polyphonic. The text also contains short, 
apparently randomly inserted narratives unconnected to the story 
of Anna Andrianovna’s family, such as a tale about a ‘late abortion’. 
Structurally, such inclusions are found elsewhere in the works of 
Petroevsky, for example in their ‘Winter Notes on Summer Impressions’ 
(‘Zimnie zametki o letnikh vpechatleniiakh’, 1863): ‘And by the way, can 
you possibly think that I am getting into Russian literature instead of 
writing about Paris? That I am writing a critical article? No, I am only 
doing this from having nothing better to do’.53 
Alena finds Anna Andrianovna’s diary after her death and mails 
it to a stranger, presumably an editor, lending her diary, titled ‘Notes 
on the Edge of the Table’ (‘Zapiski na kraiu stola’), a found-manuscript 
provenance analogous to that of Gorianchikov’s notes in Petroevsky’s 
Notes from the House of the Dead (Zapiski iz mertvogo doma), written by the 
Dostoevsky part of Petroevsky in 1862. The title of the diary in Time: Night 
thus recalls many other editions of Notes written by Petroevsky. There 
are also parallels between the ‘editor’ present in the text of Notes from 
Underground and in Time: Night. Both texts include a forced interruption 
of the narrative, which is caused by the death of the author in both Time: 
Night and Notes from the House of the Dead, as well as by the decision of 
the ‘editor’ in Notes from Underground to break off the narrative at an 
arbitrary point. Time: Night also has an introductory editorial comment 
by way of an epigraph, a typically Petroevskian feature from which the 
reader learns that the diary was written on disparate sheets of paper, 
school notebooks, even telegram forms, a combination that makes this 
physically multi-layered narrative remarkably postmodern. 
To differentiate among postmodernism, post-postmodernism, proto-
modernism, and various other ‘-isms’ is only useful or, indeed, viable 
within the wider context provided by all of them taken together, and by 
the web of literary theory. As a point of literary exercise in the spirit of 
Oulipo, it may be even more productive to modify the context in order 
to see how the technical features of the ‘-isms’ work in different epochs, 
in order to find out more about them and the eras with which they are 
conventionally associated. Romanticism, for example, appears to be a 
point of both arrival and departure for Dostoevsky; and the influence 
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of European Romanticism, as well as that of Nikolai Gogol’s native 
combination of Romanticism and Realism, are among the reasons for 
Donald Fanger’s classification of Dostoevsky as a ‘Romantic Realist’.54 
Ugliness and Dialogicity in Petroevsky
In his post-exile Notes from Underground, Petroevsky has his protagonist 
condemn dreams as Romantic and repulsive. The Underground Man 
attacks Schillerian Romanticism, and labels mirages and fantasies 
(both typical of Romanticism) as repulsive and ugly. Criticism and 
ridicule of Schillerian Romanticism is expressed already in the Insulted 
and Injured (Unizhennye i oskorblennye, 1861), and continues in Notes 
from Underground, where it combines with the Underground Man’s 
disorderly thoughts of revenge against his successful former classmate 
Zverkov and the rest of humanity:
They won’t go begging on their knees for my friendship. That’s a mirage, 
a banal mirage, revolting, romantic and fantastic––just the same ball at 
Lake Como. And that’s why I must give Zverkov a slap in the face!55
This adds to the Underground Man’s negative characteristics: the 
“dreamer” side of his character becomes part of his ugly nature—a 
significant change in the evolution of the dreamer-type protagonist. 
Sentimentality, which is in general a synonym for Schillerian 
Romanticism in Notes from Underground, is referred to as ugliness 
(poganost’): ‘…damned romanticism …Oh the nastiness, oh the stupidity, 
oh, the narrowness of all these “ugly [poganykh] sentimental souls”!’56 
The ‘poshlyi mirazh’ (‘banal/low mirage’) of the Underground Man links 
the realm of fantasy with the low and vulgar.
Petroevsky parodies Romanticism in Notes from Underground in an 
anticipation of postmodern irony which plays with Romantic ideas as 
it does with all the rest. By the end of the twentieth century, literature 
strives for fragmentation rather than congruency, a tendency that the 
Dostoevsky element in the Petroevsky polyvalent personality plagiarizes 
from the Petrushevskaia one, as he does the emphasis on multi-layered 
narratives. Dostoevskian ‘loose and baggy monsters’ become the artistic 
norm; fragments become whole works.
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The 1894 edition (but not the later, Russian Academy of Sciences 
edition of the Complete Works of Dostoevsky which I cite in this 
chapter) erroneously claims that Notes from Underground first came out 
in the journal Time (Vremia) in 1846 (I, II, IV), that is, at the height of 
Russian literary Romanticism and eighteen years earlier than its actual 
publication date.57 Had this been true, it would have provided grounds 
for a different reading in itself, since its use of Romantic discourse could 
then have been read non-ironically. 
Speaking of discourse, the language of Petroevsky’s Notes is more 
colloquial than modern readers often realize, with vocabulary such 
as ‘ni shisha’ (‘zilch’), ‘nagadil’ (‘messed up’) and so on.58 In the early 
Petroevsky novel Poor Folk, the protagonist Makar Devushkin anticipates 
the Underground Man’s diminutives. These often occur in unexpected 
contexts: for example, when the Underground Man explains that he is 
not, in fact, an angry man (and ‘not even embittered’), claiming that a 
mere child’s toy or a warming drink would suffice to distract him from 
his rage: ‘I might be foaming at the mouth; but bring me some sort 
of dolly (‘kukolku’) or give me a little tea with a bit of sugar (‘chaiku s 
sakhartsem’) and I’ll most likely calm down’. He goes on to assert that he 
would be almost religiously affected (‘dushoi umilius’’).59 Then, however, 
he admits: ‘I’ll probably gnash my teeth at myself and suffer insomnia 
from the shame for months thereafter. That’s how I am’.60
Based on the narrative of the Notes, the experience of this gnashing 
of teeth typically occurs at night, which may well be when the 
Underground Man is telling us his stories. This is when he is embarrassed 
by his philosophizing and his admission of personal vulnerabilities, his 
confession of sorts, especially with regard to Liza. The emphasis on 
night as the time of writing, confession, and helpless teeth grinding is 
clearly filched from Time: Night, where the articulation of temporality 
is stronger than that of topos, in accordance with Bakhtin’s classic 
formulation of the more significant role of chronos in chronotope.61 The 
Dostoevsky personality in Petroevsky also plagiarizes the skaz features of 
Time: Night which include colloquialisms and diminutives, for example, 
‘vazochki, statuetki, flakonchiki’ [little vases, statuettes, small bottles].62
In the Petroevsky hybrid, Dostoevsky’s discredited narrator who 
claims to be smart is borrowed from Petrushevskaia’s ‘Our Crowd’, a 
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story whose narrator-protagonist is similar to Anna Andrianovna of 
Time: Night. ‘I’m a very clever woman’, she states.63 The Underground 
Man identifies the paradox of ‘double temporality’64 in claiming that he 
himself could not have become anything on account of his being clever, 
as dictated by his time:
Now I’m living out my life in my corner, teasing myself with the 
malicious and useless consolation that a clever person cannot seriously 
make anything of himself; it’s only a fool who can do this. Yes, a person 
of the nineteenth century should and is morally obliged to be a creature 
substantially without character…65
Petroevsky’s Anna Andrianovna emphasizes her superior intellect in her 
notes as well; for example, when remarking on how a famous line from 
the children’s poet Agniia Barto is not recognized by other characters.66 
Another instance of the Underground Man’s claim to superior 
intellectual capacity occurs in the following passage of the Notes: 
‘I am, in the first place, to blame because I am smarter than all those 
surrounding me. (I’ve constantly considered myself smarter than all 
those surrounding me, and, would you believe it, sometimes I’ve been 
ashamed of it…)’. This is followed by yet another connection between 
past, present, and future, when Dostoevsky purloins the Faustian 
notion of the ‘person made in a retort’ (‘retortnyi chelovek’), harking 
both backward to Goethe and forward to the clones of the twenty-first 
century.67
An entirely new area of anticipated posterity opens up if we consider 
the twentieth-century political overtones of ‘podpol’shchik’ (a member 
of a political resistance group; this word is a cognate of ‘podpol’e’ 
(underground)), a word that Iurii Kudriavtsev uses in his study of 
Notes from Underground (the title of which is more accurately rendered 
in French, for example, as Les Carnets du sous-sol).68 The meaning of 
political resistance, often through non-resistance, by an intellectual in 
the English translation—and in the Russian study by Kudriavtsev—
recalls the anticipatory posterity of political concepts, as when Kafka is 
revealed by Bayard to have borrowed from the future of ideas concerning 
the two totalitarian states of the mid-twentieth century.
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Conclusion
The narratives in Notes from Underground and Time: Night are neither 
linear nor chronological, and their rhizomatic atemporality contributes 
to our perception of them as simultaneously similar and postmodern. 
Thinking along the lines of Bayard’s reader-response-based theory of 
anticipatory plagiarism, we discover three main connections between 
Dostoevsky’s Notes and Petrushevskaia’s Time: Night (and also her 
novella ‘Our Crowd’). These include: the type of the hero/anti-hero 
(the main point of anticipatory/reciprocal plagiarism here); the poetics, 
especially the rhizomatic chronotope of the novella (povest’), of notes as 
novella; and the element of dialogicity. The complex of plagiarism here 
is thus threefold. The innovative quality of Dostoevsky’s Notes means 
that since he has already availed himself of the favoured tricks of the 
postmodern trade he is posterior to it, in the same way that Sterne is 
posterior to Joyce or Woolf, according to Bayard.69 In this chronology 
of literary interconnections, ‘the after may be situated before the before’, 
which is logical, if anti-Hegelian.70 Dostoevsky after postmodernism, 
and especially after Petrushevskaia, is a different Dostoevsky, whether 
Petrushevskaia is regarded as a true postmodern writer or not. In the 
new mobile literary history which will focus on the future as well as 
the past, I would place Dostoevsky in the late-twentieth century; he was 
born in the nineteenth century, but his Other Self (in Proustian terms) 
clearly does not belong there. If we follow the traditional linear literary-
historical path and explore the closeness of the two texts in question 
through the prism of literary influence, then the question of why this 
influence occurs in a particular epoch (in our case—the late-twentieth 
through twenty-first centuries) remains unanswered. If we approach 
these texts from the viewpoint of ‘posterity by anticipation’, then this 
question is moot, as it then becomes rather ‘why was Dostoevsky born 
in the nineteenth century where he does not belong?’ There is also a 
certain local-only significance, a particular temporal provincialism, if the 
emphasis is placed on the study of Dostoevsky as a solely nineteenth-
century writer. My preference is therefore for a rhizomatic literary 
history with an ever-changing chronology. Bayard’s ‘heart of a double 
temporality’71 within the oeuvre of each author also comes close to the 
principle behind the Czech Canadian literary theorist Lubomír Doležel’s 
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idea of fictional worlds.72 As the latter writes, ‘A radical alternative to 
mimesis will be a fictional semantics defined within a multiple-world 
model frame,’73 which offers us a blueprint for how multiple fictional 
worlds and their creators might intersect. Doležel’s idea could explain 
both the appearance of the Petroevsky hybrid within the space of 
intersecting fictional worlds of Dostoevsky and Petrushevskaia, and 
Bayard’s point about reciprocal plagiarism. This type of plagiarism 
promises to help us read differently, from the perspective of the future, 
and to find this future-in-the-past in texts of profound originality. For 
Dostoevsky and Petrushevskaia, these texts coexist in an imaginary 
space of time-night, an example of the variety of ‘curvatures of time’ 
which appear if we are willing to read in ‘the other direction’.74
With this notion of reading backwards, Bayard offers a fresh, 
anti-Hegelian approach to literary history (and a relevant one, since 
literary trends overlap and inform one another significantly). A dual 
chronology for the writer’s persona—his Other Self—may apply when 
s/he does not fit the contemporary canon and needs to be counted 
elsewhere, as in the case of Sophocles, Stern, Kafka—and Dostoevsky. 
Instead of focussing either on what is often called the ‘prophetic’ 
vision of Dostoevsky in current scholarship from his native land, or on 
what Nikolai Mikhailovsky famously called his ‘cruel talent’,75 I have 
attempted to outline a new epistemological approach that, in view of 
the technical aspects of his work, treats Dostoevsky’s Notes as part of a 
literary framework belonging to the future.
Of particular interest in the Russian literature that is to be written in this 
future is the issue of gender. Discussing the German-language literature 
of Kafka’s era, Bayard asserts that the paucity of contemporary women 
writers whose influence could account for the ‘feminine element’ in the 
works of the author of The Castle tempts us to search for traces of such 
influence ‘in the future’.76 This provokes us to consider the analogous 
situation of Dostoevsky’s Russian nineteenth century. Bayard’s analysis 
of Kafka’s treatment of ‘feminine subjugation’ recalls the rejection of 
the masculine Bykov type—the man of action—in Dostoevsky’s texts, 
as well as his handling of the prostitute type, of which Liza in the Notes 
from Underground is a significant example. Originating in Dostoevsky’s 
Poor Folk, the Bykov type reappears in Notes from Underground: ‘Such a 
gentleman simply pushes his way forward to his goal like an enraged 
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bull, horns lowered, perhaps with only a wall to stop him’.77 To evoke the 
black hole effect, we could predict more changes in the realm of gender 
or gender-specific writing, and suppose that the more significant future 
fields of influence for anticipatory plagiarism will be gender studies and 
pedagogy.78
This theoretical framework, although achronological from the 
traditional linear point of view, is fruitful for teaching as well as for 
reconfiguring the literary-theoretical system of links amongst authors 
so as to arrive at a new understanding of classic texts. The principle of 
anticipatory plagiarism is based on the hermeneutic or epistemological 
differences between a history based on events and literary history (or 
the history of art more generally); and the theory offered by Bayard 
suggests that chronology is not adequate for an analytical approach 
to the literary text—only for a historical-philological one. It is a brave 
attempt to predict the literature that is yet to come by shifting the 
gears of chronology into reverse. Reciprocal plagiarism rather than 
influence implies a conversation, an exchange, a multi-directional 
dialogue amongst authors and their texts; and in the case of Petroevsky 
(or Dostoshevskaia), we may anticipate more texts in their style by 
women writers, or texts in which notions of gender are more fluid, 
in the future Russian prose. Bayard’s idea of anticipatory plagiarism 
may be paradoxical, but as the paradoxalist narrator from Notes from 
Underground insists, ‘two times two equals five can be a most lovely little 
thing’.79
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III. TOLSTOY

6. Master and Manxman: 
Reciprocal Plagiarism in  
Tolstoy and Hall Caine1
Muireann Maguire
In the winter of 1906, a reception was held in a Westminster flat for 
Mr and Mrs Maksim Gor’kii on their return from an exhausting and 
scandalous American tour (the title of “Mrs” was tactfully bestowed 
on Gor’kii’s mistress Maria Andreeva, whose presence had triggered 
the American scandal). Gor’kii had personally requested each guest; 
collectively, they represented a ‘galaxy of genius’, according to journalist 
Robert Ross.2 They included H. G. Wells, Bernard Shaw, Henry James, 
Thomas Hardy, the historical novelist Maurice Hewlett, the radical 
journalist Henry Nevinson, and A. W. Clarke, whose Jaspar Tristram 
(1899) was a fictionalized memoir of English boarding-school life. Ross 
himself was present as the editor of his friend Oscar Wilde’s De Profundis 
(1905), which would appear in Russian translation in 1909. Every guest 
was promised fifteen minutes’ audience with Gor’kii, described as ‘an 
astonishing shaggy figure in a blue sweater, who seemed a cross between 
a penwiper and an Eskimo’;3 however, as Bernard Shaw monopolized 
the great man for a full two hours, it was not until four in the morning 
that Gor’kii and Andreeva ultimately departed. As their host walked 
Gor’kii to his cab, the other guests lingered anxiously to hear his verdict 
on the evening.
We waited like boys waiting to hear the result of a scholarship 
examination; it was an awe-inspiring moment. Each man felt that no 
common evening had closed. ‘Gorky wants me to tell you that he has 
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spent an evening he will never forget; that to-night he met almost 
everyone he admired in England; everyone he wanted to meet.’ There 
was a murmur of gratuitous deprecation. ‘There are only two other 
writers he wanted to see,’ our host went on. The coats and mufflers 
were adjusted; there was an awkward pause. I knew what was coming; 
but we pressed him to be more explicit. ‘The only others Gorky hoped 
to have seen here… were Hall Caine and Marie Corelli!!’4
An alternative version of this party describes Gor’kii ‘search[ing] the 
room in vain for a looked-for face. At last, he could keep these feelings 
to himself no longer. “But the Great Man,” he asked, “is he not here? Is 
he not coming?” … He could see no sign of Hall Caine.’5
Both these writers, whom Gor’kii was so disappointed to miss, have 
now disappeared into a possibly deserved obscurity. Although Caine 
and Corelli were best-selling, influential authors in their late-Victorian 
heyday, we remember them now, if at all, as a footnote to others’ work. 
Corelli is the prototype for the title character in her friend E. F. Benson’s 
Lucia novels (1920–1939); Caine, as ‘my dear friend Hommy-Beg’, 
is the dedicatee of Bram Stoker’s Dracula (1897).6 Caine shares with 
Corelli an additional, if rather doubtful, honour: both were regarded 
with contempt by Lev Tolstoy. Tolstoy often excoriated popular icons 
(famously, Shakespeare) and bestowed praise on obscure or unexpected 
writers (regular reading of the Tauchnitz collection of British novels 
introduced him to the romances of Mrs Henry Wood and Mary Elizabeth 
Braddon).7 He did admire Dickens, Trollope, and George Eliot, but he 
could be caustic about other popular authors.8 
Ironically, Tolstoy’s novels often had more in common with the kind of 
romantic melodrama which he deplored than he chose to acknowledge. 
The case of Hall Caine (1853–1931) is particularly illuminating. Not 
only was Caine’s immense (if transient) popularity as a fiction writer 
equal to Tolstoy’s, the British novelist strenuously aspired throughout 
his career to achieve professional and reputational parity with Tolstoy, 
disregarding the latter’s disdain. By exploring the narrative themes 
and humanitarian concerns shared by Caine and Tolstoy, this essay will 
reveal considerable common ground between the novel of ideas and the 
novel of sensation at the turn of the nineteenth century.
 The great Russian author’s scorn must have stung Caine, who had 
spent years establishing himself in British circles as an authority on 
Russia (particularly on Russian Jews) while intermittently courting 
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Tolstoy’s favour. Journalists frequently compared Caine to famous 
European writers: as early as 1890, following the success of his early 
novels, the popular weekly Sunday Words ran a cover feature on ‘Hall 
Caine, The English Victor Hugo’.9 Several of Caine’s books, including 
an edition of his collected works in 1915, were translated into Russian; 
The Eternal City (1901) was even translated (as Vechnyi gorod, in 1902) by 
Konstantin Konstantinovich Tolstoy, a doctor and writer, and a distant 
relation of Lev Nikolaevich.
It was galling for a famous author, hailed by some reviewers as ‘the 
English Tolstoy’ and fond of emphasizing his own moral and imaginative 
sympathy with the Russian author, to be unable to provoke more than the 
faintest praise from his idol.10 Caine, or his publishers, swiftly recycled 
any appearance of encouragement from Tolstoy as a selling point for his 
own novels. One editor’s introduction to Caine’s The Bondman (1890) 
assured readers that ‘Leo Tolstoy read the book with “deep interest”’.11 
The original phrase was ‘great interest’, and this formulaic politeness was 
relayed by Tolstoy’s daughter Tatiana in a note acknowledging receipt of 
a gift copy of The Bondman.12 Despite the flimsiness of this connection, 
Hall Caine was not above exploiting it again in a preface to a later novel, 
referring to information received from Tolstoy ‘through his daughter’.13 
The jacket of the 1927 reprint of one of Caine’s bestsellers avers that 
‘The Christian provoked world-wide discussion, in which Tolstoy took 
part’14—which was, as we shall see, a remarkably neutral description 
of Tolstoy’s actual contribution. More subtle tokens of respect can be 
found in Caine’s epigraph to The Bondman, ‘Vengeance is mine—I will 
repay’, which is of course also the epigraph to Tolstoy’s Anna Karenina 
(1878; first English translation, 1886). Even the title of Caine’s last major 
novel, The Master of Man: The Story of a Sin (1921), seems to echo the 
various English translations of Tolstoy’s frequently anthologized short 
story, ‘Master and Man’ (‘Khoziain i rabotnik’, 1895).15 
Thanks to Pierre Bayard’s concept of anticipatory plagiarism, we 
can now regard Caine’s unrequited admiration for Tolstoy from a 
new and illuminating perspective. Bayard cites multiple cases where 
chronologically precedent writers have borrowed, or plagiarized, 
specific contraintes (sets of literary rules) from their posterity. As an 
example, he cites Voltaire’s novella Zadig (1749), which includes an 
episode of deductive reasoning by the title character which could well 
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have been pilfered from Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes series, despite 
preceding the deerstalker-wearing detective by almost one hundred and 
forty years.16 It is extremely doubtful that Conan Doyle plagiarized Zadig 
in the traditional direction, since as Bayard admits, Voltaire’s novella 
in no other way resembles a detective story, nor does its titular hero 
indulge in other flights of deduction.17 The existence of two markedly 
similar passages in otherwise completely unrelated and temporally 
distant texts is sheer coincidence—or, in Bayardian terms, a vindication 
of non-chronological literary cross-pollination. 
In other cases of anticipatory plagiarism, however, it is impossible to 
deny a relationship between the texts: the later text has been influenced 
by, and has even borrowed from, the earlier one, compounding as if 
condoning the earlier text’s theft.18 Bayard gives the examples of the 
twelfth-century legend of Tristan and Iseult and nineteenth-century 
Romanticism, which he claims share the contrainte of depicting romantic 
passion as self-destructive (even when it is reciprocated). In other 
words, while the core theft (the contrainte of self-destructive love) was 
perpetrated by medieval troubadours against the French Romantic 
poets and novelists, the latter group subsequently read and admired 
the medieval lyric poems and thus (however paradoxically) borrowed 
back their own ideas, which duly informed the Romantic movement. 
Bayard calls this phenomenon reciprocal plagiarism: an instance ‘where 
two authors, separated by time, inspire each other’.19 It is my main 
contention in this essay that Caine and Tolstoy formed just such a pair of 
chronologically separate, yet mutually influential, reciprocal plagiarists. 
Their literary careers overlap between Caine’s debut as a novelist in 1885 
and Tolstoy’s death in 1910; Caine was already popular in the late 1880s, 
when the first English translations of Tolstoy’s fiction were appearing. 
Caine was thus the first of the pair to establish an anglophone reputation, 
and so, to coin an oxymoron, the original plagiarist.
I argue that Caine’s admiration for Tolstoy was so extreme that he 
plagiarized the latter’s novel Resurrection (Voskresenie, 1899) five years 
before it was actually published; that Tolstoy returned the favour by 
plagiarizing, in Resurrection, Caine’s 1921 novel The Master of Man; and 
that Caine continued to plagiarize Tolstoy in the standard chronological 
direction until the end of his career. Moreover, Caine plagiarized in 
advance not only the Russian writer’s literary themes, but also Tolstoy’s 
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internationally praised statements of protest against the persecution 
of religious minorities through his own publicity networks. I begin 
this essay by reviewing Hall Caine’s reputation and literary career, 
including those novels which plagiarize Tolstoy either proleptically or 
analeptically; secondly, I use new archival research to study Caine’s 
fascination with Russia and Russian Jews, which peaked with his 
journey to Russia in 1892; and in the last section, I look at the history 
of Caine’s relations with Tolstoy. In conclusion, I suggest that Caine’s 
facility in plagiarizing Tolstoy’s last major novel suggests that these two 
authors had more in common—creatively and ideologically—than the 
living Lev Tolstoy would ever have conceded.
Caine, The Manxman, and Mutual Plagiarism
Fig. 1. Hall Caine, Self-portrait (caricature) (1892), MS 09542, from the 
papers of Sir Thomas Henry Hall Caine (1853–1931), Manx National Heritage 
Museum, Douglas, Isle of Man. Used with permission of the Manx National 
Heritage Museum.
Thomas Henry Hall Caine (known as Tom to his intimates), although 
born and educated in Liverpool, came of Manx stock on his father’s side; 
in 1870, aged seventeen, after a brief apprenticeship to an architect, he 
moved to the Isle of Man to assist his uncle as a village schoolteacher. 
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Two years later, influenced by Ruskin’s political and aesthetic writings, 
he returned to Liverpool where he became known as a journalist. A 
positive impression upon the ailing Dante Gabriel Rossetti, who later 
invited him to London as his assistant, secured Caine’s entrée into the 
British literary elite. In 1885 he published his first novel, The Shadow of 
a Crime, a historical melodrama set in rural Cumberland. The Deemster 
(1887), a historical novel set on the Isle of Man, and The Bondman (1890), a 
melodrama set between Man and Iceland, established Caine’s archetypal 
plot: an intrigue affecting humble individuals in remote, primitive 
communities, portrayed realistically in the manner of Pierre Loti, Knut 
Hamsun and Gor’kii himself. Caine owed his rapid popularity to the 
complex love triangles, extramarital sex, and melodramatic cliff-hangers 
in his fiction. Yet his authorial intentions were invariably modern and 
humanitarian. He carefully researched the exotic locations of works like 
The Bondman, The Scapegoat (1891; set in Morocco), and The White Prophet 
(1909; set in Egypt), while his ambitious treatment of Vatican politics 
in The Eternal City (1901) and of urban poverty and prostitution in his 
blockbuster romance The Christian (1897) were openly morally didactic 
(even if their appeal derived from the descriptions of immorality which 
they condemned). 
Modern readers may marvel that, at a reception including Wells, 
James, Shaw and Hardy, Gor’kii was chagrined by the absence of two 
merely popular novelists. But this view underestimates Hall Caine’s 
colossal fame on both sides of the Atlantic from around 1890, until at 
least the start of the First World War. His greatest triumph, The Christian, 
appeared serially in The Windsor Magazine; when published in book 
form, it sold 150,000 copies within six months, later becoming the first 
British novel to sell a print run greater than one million.20 Like most of 
Caine’s fiction it was successfully adapted for the theatre and toured 
internationally. It was also widely translated (the first Russian version, 
Khristianin, by Aleksandra Lindegren, appeared in 1901). Caine was 
talented and prolific; he was, as we shall see, genuinely troubled by 
humanitarian questions, principally child poverty, the persecution of 
Jews, and the fate of unmarried mothers; and he was a consummate self-
publicist and networker. The combination was unbeatable, though not 
unmockable. Oscar Wilde said of him: ‘Mr. Hall Caine, it is true, aims 
at the grandiose, but then he writes at the top of his voice. He is so loud 
that one cannot hear what he says’.21 The relentlessly noble profile which 
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both Caine and Tolstoy projected to their public was easy to lampoon: 
since Caine owed his success to the facility rather than the originality of 
his prose, he made a softer target than Tolstoy for both journalists and 
unsympathetic peers. 
The literary contrainte which Caine plagiarized by anticipation from 
Tolstoy—and which he would later borrow back—was a version of the 
theme of the ingenuous young woman abandoned by her inconstant 
lover. This contrainte differentiates Tolstoy’s and Caine’s stories from 
myriad similar scenarios in contemporary literature (to name just two 
examples, Hardy’s Tess of the D’Urbervilles (1891) and Chekhov’s The 
Seagull (Chaika, 1896)) by stipulating two specific, obligatory narrative 
steps: (a) the man sits in judgement over his beloved in a court of law, 
and (b) he subsequently decides to rescue her and redeem himself. Both 
Caine and Tolstoy’s narratives unite legal with moral awakening: after 
the unexpected courtroom encounter with his former mistress, each 
male protagonist realizes that even if society is prepared to ignore his 
previous behaviour, he must undertake public confession, renunciation 
of wealth and position, and restitution (by marrying or otherwise 
supporting the wronged woman). To study this contrainte and to 
fully expose the multidirectional plagiarism at work here, I will begin 
by summarizing the best-known narrative example—Tolstoy’s 1899 
Resurrection—before contrasting the plots of two novels by Caine which 
respectively anticipate and recapitulate it, The Manxman (1894) and The 
Master of Man (1921).
 As Tolstoy’s final novel, Resurrection was perhaps his fullest 
condemnation of the far-reaching consequences of casual sex. It was 
based on a real-life melodrama Tolstoy learned of in 1887 from his friend, 
the reform-minded judge Anatolii Federovich Koni, and which probably 
took place in the early 1870s. The individuals concerned were a wealthy 
St Petersburg nobleman, later vice-governor of a Siberian province; and 
a young Finnish peasant girl, Rozaliia, who became a prostitute after 
their affair. She was arraigned for theft, and thus the nobleman saw her 
again in a courtroom. Events resembled the first part of Resurrection 
closely, but in real life, Rozaliia’s death from typhus in prison terminated 
their relationship.22 This was the story that Tolstoy fictionalized. Rozaliia 
became Katiusha (Katerina) Maslova, an illegitimate peasant raised 
‘half servant, half young lady’ as the ward of two elderly aunts on a 
small country estate.23 At the age of seventeen, she is seduced by their 
136 Reading Backwards: An Advance Retrospective on Russian Literature
nephew, Prince Dmitrii Nekhliudov, who insensitively pays her off with 
a hundred roubles. Maslova, although abandoned and pregnant, does 
not acknowledge the hopelessness of her situation until a chance sighting 
of Nekhliudov departing on a train convinces her of his indifference. 
Losing faith ‘in God and in goodness’,24 Maslova gives her newborn 
to a nurse who sends it to a foundlings’ home; after an unsuccessful spell 
as a servant, she becomes a prostitute in the capital, St Petersburg. There, 
eight years after their fateful affair, Nekhliudov recognizes Maslova 
among the defendants on trial for robbery and conspiracy to murder. 
As a juror, Nekhliudov has no difficulty in steering the sympathetic 
jury towards a verdict of ‘“Guilty, but without intent”’, which carries 
a mild sentence; unfortunately, in their ignorance and confusion, they 
fail to use the necessary formula ‘“Guilty, but without intent to cause 
death”’.25 Because of this technical error, Maslova is condemned to four 
years’ exile in Siberia. Horrified by the baleful effect he has twice had 
on this woman—first by ruining her, and secondly by unintentionally 
exacerbating her sentence—Nekhliudov alters his entire way of life. 
He strives to get her sentence annulled (an appeal to the Senate and a 
petition to the Tsar both fail); he breaks off an advantageous engagement 
as well as an affair with a married woman, in order to become engaged 
to Maslova; he deeds his lands to the peasants who work them; finally, 
he accompanies Maslova to Siberia, as her fiancé. The theme of private 
awakening and public confession recurs throughout Resurrection.
I have lived a double life. Beneath the life that you have seen there has 
been another—God only knows how full of wrongdoing and disgrace 
and shame. […] Let it be enough that my career has been built on 
falsehood and robbery, that I have deceived the woman who loved me 
with her heart of hearts […]. The moment came when I had to sit in 
judgement on my own sin, the moment when she who had lost her 
honour in trusting to mine stood in the dock before me. I, who had 
been the first cause of her misfortune, stood on the bench as her judge. 
She is now in prison and I am here. The same law which has punished 
her failing with infamy has advanced me to power. […] When I asked 
myself what there was left for me to do, I could see but one thing. It 
was impossible to go on administering justice, being myself unjust […]. I 
could not surrender myself to any earthly court, because I was guilty of 
no crime against earthly law. The law cannot take a man into the court of 
his own conscience. He must take himself there.26
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The citation above, however, is not from Resurrection. It comes from 
Caine’s The Manxman, published in 1894 before Resurrection existed even 
in draft form; it was alluded to in Tolstoy’s notes only as ‘the Koni story’ 
(‘Konevskii rasskaz’).27 From the records of Tolstoy’s private library at 
Iasnaia Poliana, we know that he possessed copies of The Bondman, The 
Christian and The Eternal City, at least one of which was a gift from the 
author; there is no evidence that Tolstoy ever read The Manxman. Yet it 
is hard to deny correspondences between the passage cited above and 
Nekhliudov’s private reflections after hearing Maslova’s sentence:
[Nekhliudov had undergone …] defilement so complete that he despaired 
of the possibility of getting cleansed. […] But the free spiritual being, 
which alone is true, alone powerful, alone eternal, had already awakened 
in Nekhludoff, and he could not but believe it. Enormous though the 
distance was between what he wished to be and what he was, nothing 
appeared insurmountable to the newly-awakened spiritual being. ‘At any 
cost I will break this lie which binds me and confess everything, and will 
tell everybody the truth, and act the truth,’ he said resolutely, aloud. […] 
‘I shall dispose of [my] inheritance in such a way as to acknowledge the 
truth. I shall tell her, Katusha, that I am a scoundrel and have sinned 
towards her, and will do all I can to ease her lot. Yes, I will see her, and 
will ask her to forgive me. Yes, I will beg her pardon, as children do.’ ... 
He stopped—‘will marry her if necessary.’ He stopped again, folded his 
hands in front of his breast as he used to do when a little child, lifted his 
eyes, and said, addressing some one: ‘Lord, help me, teach me, come 
enter within me and purify me of all this abomination.’ He prayed, asking 
God to help him, to enter into him and cleanse him; and what he was 
praying for had happened already: the God within him had awakened 
his consciousness.28
For both Caine and Tolstoy, these fictional travails—and their moral 
underpinnings—were greeted by controversy. In 1894, the year 
Heinemann published Caine’s The Manxman, they also brought out 
Tolstoy’s influential treatise The Kingdom of God Is Within You (Tsarstvo 
Bozhie vnutri vas, 1894) in Constance Garnett’s English translation. 
Tolstoy insisted in this work that every human being has ‘rational 
conscience’ as his ‘sole certain guide’ to moral justice. He stirred public 
outrage by implying that reasoning Christians can choose to ignore the 
laws of Church and state.29 These arguments, followed by Resurrection’s 
cruel critique of Orthodox clergy, eventually led to Tolstoy’s 1901 
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excommunication from the Russian Orthodox Church.30 Caine would 
have his own brush with religious controversy twenty years later thanks 
to his novel The Woman Thou Gavest Me (1913), when the unhappily 
married heroine yields her virginity to her childhood sweetheart rather 
than her husband. But, as a stringent Catholic, she refuses to remarry even 
after her husband divorces her, since while ‘[t]he Church may [give] a 
wrong interpretation’ of sexual freedom, the marriage vow itself remains 
‘divine and irrevocable’.31 This exercise in Christian self-determination 
almost ruined both Heinemann’s finances and Caine’s reputation, when 
the circulating libraries of the United Kingdom decided to ban the book 
after a print run of five thousand copies had already been produced. 
Fortunately, Caine’s influential contacts prevailed over trade scruples, 
and the ban was relaxed.32 In the year 1894, however, Tolstoy appeared 
to have plagiarized the appeal for independent ethical thinking made 
in The Kingdom of God from The Manxman, where Caine’s hero realizes 
‘[t]he law cannot take a man into the court of his own conscience. He 
must take himself there.’33 Similarly, the sense of moral and physical 
suffocation experienced by Caine’s characters immediately prior to 
their spiritual awakening seems to prefigure Tolstoy’s claustrophobic 
evocation of an immature conscience:
Every man of the present day with the Christian principles assimilated 
involuntarily in his conscience, finds himself in precisely the position of 
a man asleep, who dreams that he is obliged to do something which even 
in his dream he knows he ought not to do. He knows this in the depths of 
his conscience, and all the same he seems unable to change his position; 
he cannot stop and cease doing what he ought not to do. And just as in 
a dream, his position becoming more and more painful, at last reaches 
such a pitch of intensity that he begins sometimes to doubt the reality 
of what is passing and makes a moral effort to shake off the nightmare 
which is oppressing him.
This is just the condition of the average man of our Christian society. 
He feels that all that he does himself and that is done around him is 
something absurd, hideous, impossible, and opposed to his conscience; 
he feels that his position is becoming more and more unendurable and 
reaching a crisis of intensity.34
The plot of The Manxman establishes just such a crisis of intensity. 
Like most Caine novels, it involves a love triangle between childhood 
friends—Philip Christian, grandson of the Deemster (or chief Judge) 
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of the Isle of Man; his illegitimate cousin, Pete Quilliam; and the local 
miller’s daughter, Kate Cregeen. Pete and Kate become engaged; but 
while Pete is seeking his fortune abroad, Philip and Kate fall in love 
and sleep together. Philip breaks off with Kate, ostensibly from belated 
loyalty to Pete but primarily because he knows that Kate’s inferior 
education and social class would stymie his legal career. When Pete 
returns as a wealthy man, he persuades Kate to marry him; but shortly 
after the wedding, Kate realizes she is pregnant with Philip’s child. No 
public scandal materializes, since Pete, who is apparently deficient in 
either arithmetic or biology, happily accepts the infant as his own. Kate, 
unable to bear the hypocrisy of living with a husband she cannot love, 
deserts her family. Philip is appointed Deemster. Kate, now suicidal, is 
arrested for self-harm. Her unexpected appearance in the Deemster’s 
court triggers Philip’s repentance and spiritual awakening. He renounces 
both the office of Deemster and the newly offered position of Governor 
of the entire island; he publicly confesses his part in Kate’s disgrace; and 
he embarks on a new life with her. The all-condoning Pete divorces Kate 
and sails conveniently away. 
Vivid characterization and local colour redeem The Manxman’s 
improbably fraught plot. From this outline, we can see that Caine 
plagiarized from Resurrection the following tropes: an unequal, short-
lived sexual liaison; a fortuitous pregnancy; the heroine’s arrest and 
court appearance; the hero’s repentance and confession. In 1921, having 
already outlived his heyday, Caine plagiarized Resurrection—or perhaps 
his own Manxman—all over again in his new novel, The Master of Man. 
In his ‘Author’s Note’, he thanks two sources for inspiring Chapter 
Forty-four of the novel (in which the hero commits increasingly illegal 
manoeuvres to restore justice). The first is his old friend, the Galician 
Jewish author Karl Emil Franzos (1848–1904), whose novel The Chief 
Justice (Der Präsident, 1884) was another Heinemann acquisition 
admired by Caine for its realistic treatment of the lives of Russian Jews.35 
As for the second source, Caine writes, ‘I wish to say that Tolstoy told 
me, through his daughter, that similar incidents occurring in Russia 
(although he altered them materially) had suggested the theme of his 
great novel, “Resurrection”’.36 While some borrowings are explicit (the 
use of ‘Resurrection’ as the title for the final section and one of the final 
chapters of Master of Man), others are more subtle. Caine’s narrative 
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features a love rectangle rather than a triangle, set once again on the 
Isle of Man around the turn of the nineteenth century. The Deemster’s 
son Victor Stowell, and Fenella Stanley, the Governor’s daughter, 
appear destined to marry. He is a rising lawyer; she is a passionate and 
expensively educated Christian feminist. Inspired by Fenella, Victor 
persuades juries to acquit abused wives who have murdered their 
husbands in self-defence. Yet Victor commits two deeply dishonourable 
acts: he sleeps with a lower-class local girl, Bessie Collister; and he allows 
his best friend Alick Gell to become engaged to her, without revealing 
his own prior liaison.
Naturally, as a good Edwardian heroine, Bessie becomes pregnant 
after sleeping with Victor once. Having concealed her condition, she 
accidentally suffocates her newborn. Police apprehend her trying to 
conceal its body. Meanwhile, Victor has been appointed Deemster; 
Bessie’s trial for infant murder takes place in his court. From this point 
onwards, The Master of Man retraces the plot of The Manxman, now 
complicated by Fenella’s fervent espousal of Bessie’s cause. Victor, 
caught between public disgrace and the loss of Fenella if he confesses 
his own involvement, and moral ruin if he allows Bessie to hang, tries to 
recuse himself from the latter’s trial. When Bessie is sentenced to death, 
he abuses his authority as Deemster to free her from prison, sending her 
to safety under the protection of Alick Gell. Eventually, Victor confesses 
and is forgiven by both Fenella and Alick; the former Deemster is 
sentenced to two years in a Manx gaol for abusing his office; and Fenella, 
in a neat reversal of Nekhliudov’s vow to follow Maslova into Siberian 
exile, becomes a prison warder in order to be near him. They even get 
married in prison (in Tolstoy’s Resurrection, Nekhliudov and Maslova 
never marry, because Maslova develops an affection for another convict). 
It falls to Fenella to dramatize Victor’s spiritual resurrection in the final 
paragraph of The Master of Man:
But well she knew that the victory had been won, that the resurrection 
of his soul had already begun, that he would rise again on that same 
soil on which he had so sadly fallen, that shining like a star before his 
brightening eyes was the vision of a far greater and nobler life than the 
one that lay in ruins behind him, and that she, she herself, would be 
always by his side to ‘ring the morning bell for him’.37 
The final lines of Resurrection read like a more concise and equivocal 
description of a similar mental state:
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And a perfectly new life dawned that night for Nekhludoff, not because 
he had entered into new conditions of life, but because everything he did 
after that night had a new and quite different significance. How this new 
period of his life will end, time alone will prove.38
Who is copying from whom? Was Caine’s Manxman plagiarizing Tolstoy’s 
Resurrection in advance, or did his The Master of Man retroactively steal 
from Tolstoy’s novel? Or was Tolstoy copying The Manxman while 
effecting an anterior plagiarism from The Master of Man? If we accept 
Resurrection as an intermediate text simultaneously provoking and 
pillaging the novels Caine wrote at opposite ends of his career, our next 
question must be the motivation behind Caine’s and Tolstoy’s shared 
and enduring fascination with this particular contrainte of illicit passion, 
legal consequence, and repentance. 
Unlike Tolstoy, who carefully documented his premarital liaisons 
with serfs, prostitutes and women of his own class,39 Caine had no reason 
to feel personally guilty for the exploitation of women or the neglect of 
illegitimate offspring. While his own wife, Mary Chandler, was under-
age at the time of their liaison (she was thirteen when they began living 
together in 1882), Caine married her in 1886. Their first son, Ralph, was 
born technically illegitimate, but his father later legally adopted him. 
Numerous letters home attest that Caine was a loving husband and an 
attentive father to both his sons (Derwent was born in 1891). Yet neither 
writer allowed domestic content to blind them to the adverse social 
consequences of sexual exploitation and social hypocrisy upon the lives 
of women and children. We know that Tolstoy contemplated the anecdote 
that would become Resurrection for more than a decade preceding the 
book’s 1899 publication; during this period, he wrote other influential 
and highly melodramatic fictions about the pernicious effects of socially 
condoned fornication: The Kreutzer Sonata (Kreitserova sonata, 1889); The 
Devil (D’iavol, 1889); and Father Sergei (Otets Sergei, completed in 1898). 
In 1888, Tolstoy told W. T. Stead that he was planning The Kreutzer Sonata 
as ‘a romance exposing the conventional illusion of romantic love’.40 In 
an 1890 interview, Caine claimed:
I agree very largely with Tolstoi in his ‘Kreutzer Sonata’, and hold that 
the love passion, both on its spiritual and its sensual sides, is exalted 
by modern writers to such undue importance that it seems to consume 
the best energies of man. If we believe the novels and plays of the time 
there is next to nothing in life but love, and next to nothing in love but 
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lust. Love is a part, not the whole of life. But it so dominates literature 
now that if it was forbidden to dramatists and novelists to touch upon 
the illicit side of love early all the theatres would be closed, and not a 
hundredth part of the novels would be written.41
In other words, while rejecting lust as a negative force, both writers were 
resigned (Caine openly so) to writing about it, if only to draw attention 
to its deleterious moral effects. 
Presumably this was how Caine justified his decision to revisit, 
between 1885 and 1897, his preferred plotline of illicit lust. The motif 
of two brothers or close friends competing for one woman appears in 
his very first novel, The Shadow of a Crime (1885); a year later, in A Son of 
Hagar (1886), three brothers are vying for the same inheritance and the 
same heiress, with the added sub-plot of one brother’s cast-off peasant 
mistress and their illegitimate child. In The Christian, the two main 
characters—the passionate Christian socialist preacher, John Storm, 
and the aspiring actress, Glory Quayle—lead turbulent but ultimately 
moral lives, despite exchanging the peaceful Isle of Man for London’s 
fleshpots. But one of Glory’s aristocratic admirers has an illegitimate 
child, whose mother commits suicide at her faithless lover’s wedding 
to an heiress. Unlike Resurrection, there is no evidence that these books 
were inspired by real-life events. Archetypal fallen women, short-lived 
babies, unnatural mothers, and irresponsible fathers were recycled and 
recombined in almost all of Caine’s works; Tolstoy, by contrast, was 
unlikely to blatantly re-use a plot motif or duplicate a character, even if 
some of his characters experience similar traumas and exigencies.42
After prostitution and unmarried pregnancy, a third and less well-
known consequence of sexual inequality which both writers denounced 
was the practice of baby farming. In baby farms, usually private homes, 
unscrupulous nurses accepted payment from unwed mothers to feed 
and house their infants. In an impassioned 1890 essay on the notorious 
Skublinskaia baby farm in Warsaw, where over a hundred infants were 
thought to have died of malnutrition and neglect, Tolstoy rejected the 
moral hypocrisy of denouncing the matron Skublinskaia and her ilk as 
‘beasts’ (‘zveri’), when the Russian government practised comparable 
acts of murder and imprisonment against its own population.43 Tolstoy’s 
initial, outspoken horror at the atrocity of murdered and abused children 
shades into an early version of the call for empathy and rational moral 
autonomy which he would reassert in The Kingdom of God Is Within You. 
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Baby farms also feature in Caine’s novels The Christian and The Woman 
Thou Gavest Me; in the first of these, Glory Quayle and John Storm are 
instrumental in exposing and closing down one such organization.44 
In 1909, Caine wrote to the Lord Mayor of London offering financial 
support to a charitable organization for ‘fallen women’, the Sisterhood 
of the West London Mission. Caine praised the Sisterhood’s policy of 
extending charity and shelter without requiring the women to leave the 
streets, adding, 
The great problem of the fallen woman is not to be easily solved, but 
it is the plain and urgent duty of Society to lessen as far as lies within 
its power the perils under which so many of the frailest of our fellow 
creatures spend their lives.45 
Clearly, both Caine and Tolstoy blamed society, rather than individual 
women, for the degraded and occasionally criminal lives led by 
unmarried mothers and by prostitutes; and they both used their fiction, 
their media presence, and their status as household names to bring 
questions of gender injustice to the forefront of public debate.
Caine, Russia, Jews and Doukhobors
The second contrainte shared by Caine and Tolstoy is the mobilization 
of literary capital (and, to differing degrees, the financial capital gained 
from one’s literary production) to assist a persecuted religious minority. 
This section will show how Caine’s widely publicized support for 
persecuted Russian Jews, pursued on the back of a new novel with a 
Jewish protagonist, plagiarized elements from Tolstoy’s world-famous 
advocacy for Russia’s threatened Doukhobors. In 1891, Caine published 
The Scapegoat, whose Jewish hero successively overcomes the negative 
stereotypes associated with his co-religionists—greed, pride, enmity, 
persecution, poverty—to attain a happy ending. As Anne Connor 
suggests, The Scapegoat was Caine’s response to a question he would 
pose rhetorically in a later speech: how literature could be used to defeat 
anti-Jewish prejudice in the UK and Europe.46 In May 1892, Caine’s 
lecture ‘The Jew in Literature’ (given at a dinner hosted by a Jewish club, 
the Maccabees) decried Jewish stereotypes in fiction, praised Jews as 
‘notoriously assimilable and clubbable’, and, while drawing attention to 
‘dark and distressful’ developments in some parts of Europe, urged Jews 
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to fight back against cultural misconceptions and political mistreatment 
by writing more fiction. He concluded: 
The Jew is now a great figure in literature, both as creator and subject of 
it. No base tyranny can be perpetrated on the Jews in any nation with the 
old impunity. Let the lowest of nations turn the Jews out of their country, 
and the pen in effect turns that nation out of Europe and out of the world 
of civilized man.47 
This and similar speeches, combined with sales of The Scapegoat, gained 
Caine the reputation of a sincere and unprejudiced advocate for Jewish 
culture. It led to a friendship with Israel Zangwill, an emerging British-
Jewish novelist, and an invitation to join the newly formed Russo-
Jewish Committee, which reported on pogroms and other anti-Semitic 
behaviour in Russia while attempting to manage the heavily politicized 
issue of the immigration of Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe to the 
UK and US.48 In 1891, Caine’s emergence as a literary spokesperson 
for assimilationist Jews led the British Chief Rabbi, Hermann Adler, 
to suggest he visit Russia to report on the condition of Jews in the 
western borderlands. The Russo-Jewish Committee would provide 
an interpreter, and Caine could carry out abundant fieldwork for the 
Russo-Jewish romance he was contemplating.49
Caine’s support of the Jewish community in the UK was, of course, 
anticipatory plagiarism of Tolstoy’s celebrated patronage of the 
Russian Doukhobor sect. In the 1890s, the pacifist Doukhobors’ civil 
disobedience, including abstention from military service, had provoked 
increasingly punitive measures against them, such as internal exile. 
Nor were they permitted to emigrate in order to pursue their way of 
life in a more tolerant milieu. In 1895, Tolstoy published his first public 
request (in the London Times) for the Doukhobors to be allowed to leave 
Russia, followed by a second appeal a year later and in 1898, a successful 
petition to Tsar Nicholas II.50 Meanwhile, the need to raise money for 
the Doukhobors’ travel stimulated Tolstoy to complete Resurrection 
in 1899. Its ‘phenomenal and unprecedented’ overseas success was 
orchestrated by Tolstoy’s international network of followers, notably 
Vladimir Chertkov, whose ‘Free Age Press’ in Essex was founded in 
1900 to distribute translations of Tolstoy’s writings, particularly those 
banned or censored in Russia.51 Resurrection was immediately and 
widely translated; it ran to multiple editions within a year; and the sale 
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of the French and British rights, accompanied by generous gifts from 
private donors, allowed Chertkov and his network, assisted by Tolstoy’s 
son Sergei, to charter ships for the Dukhobors and ultimately to help 
over 7,500 of them travel to sanctuary in Canada by mid-1899.
Although the logistics were on a much smaller scale for Caine’s trip 
to Russia undertaken seven years earlier in the summer of 1892, both 
journeys required diplomatic delicacy. Caine was supposed to travel 
discreetly, in order to avoid provoking the Russian government, who 
might decide to impede his trip. Unwisely, in 1891 Caine mentioned 
his forthcoming journey to a journalist, provoking a media flurry about 
his so-called ‘Russian mission’,52 reproaches from the Russo-Jewish 
Committee, and a clarification from Caine himself:
My object is a simple and, I trust, a harmless one. It is that of studying on 
the spot the life of the Russian Jews. I shall go, if I am allowed to do so, 
with an open mind, easily touched to sympathy with terrible sufferings, 
but primed with no apocryphal horrors; indignant at injustice, but 
holding no wild and mischievous notion of the cruelty of the Russian 
people; resolved to find the truth and equity of the question, as far as my 
powers of observation and judgement will permit; but determined to say 
exactly what I feel, even if that should be partly a warning to the Jews 
themselves to avoid those dangers which are said to have helped bring 
these evils upon them.53
Caine’s insistence on his status as an independent author did not fully 
convince journalists: as demonstrated by this comparatively measured 
commentary from The British Weekly (printed a few days after Caine’s 
statement above), most felt that he must have, at the very least, a literary 
agenda. Note the facile reference to Tolstoy.
It hardly needed Mr Caine’s letter to the Times to dispose of the absurd 
statement that he was going to Russia with a brief from a Jewish society, 
pledged to denounce Russia and to be blind to any faults on the other 
side. […] The other day, when Count Tolstoi was consulted on the subject 
of the famine in Russia, he had no very immediate remedy to suggest; but 
he thought the hearts of the rich might be effectively appealed to were 
someone to write a book. So did the Russo-Jewish Committee; and they 
have asked Mr Caine to write one. It is not a very speedy method, but 
that it can be successful, ‘Uncle Tom’—which, however, was not written 
by suggestion—can testify.54
Not every report was as forgiving:
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The popular novelist and the Czar of All the Russias being the only two 
omnipotent persons left, it is very right and proper that they should try 
conclusions with one another […]. We do not know whether it is more 
immoral for a novelist to hold a brief than for a barrister to do so; but, in 
accepting this commission from the London Jews, Mr. Hall Caine is at 
least consenting to hold their brief, is he not? But Holy Russia can look 
after herself. Let Mr. Hall Caine see to it that, after being duly tried, he is 
not sent off to Siberia.55
When after several postponements, Caine reached the Continent 
in midsummer 1892, he travelled on to the Russian borderlands via 
Brussels and Berlin. In Berlin, awaiting his interpreter, Caine spent time 
with his friend Emil Franzos, who had moved from the territory of 
modern Ukraine to Germany in the hope of avoiding persecution. Caine 
had not learned his lesson about unwanted self-publicity: Heinemann 
warned him again against advertising his whereabouts lest ‘the enemy’ 
(presumably Russian government agents) take action against him, 
while insisting:
I am strongly of opinion [sic] that you see a great deal more of the 
persecution of the Jews in Berlin than you will ever see in Russia. What 
Franzos tells you I consider worth nothing at all. It is not people of his 
calibre who conquer the world, but the English who go out unafraid, as 
you did, until you met him.56
In keeping with his opinion of English courage, Heinemann 
recommended an ambitious route into Russia: ‘south right through 
Hungary, and get in from the Black Sea through the Crimea’.57 Rumours 
of cholera in the borderlands compelled Caine to abandon his plans to 
see St Petersburg and Moscow after visiting only a few cities such as 
Krakow, Warsaw and Breslau; the fact that his Jewish interpreter was 
not permitted to enter Russian territory was an added complication. On 
his return to Britain, Caine delivered a detailed, deeply felt report about 
the poverty and deprivation he had witnessed to the Jewish Working 
Men’s Club, subsequently published in the Jewish Chronicle.58 Caine 
supported Zionism; and as late as 1921, he was still raising funds to 
alleviate famine in Russia.59 While not on the same scale as Tolstoy’s 
support for the Doukhobors, Caine’s advocacy of Jewish culture was a 
lifetime commitment, and certainly not a mere publicity stunt for The 
Scapegoat or for his projected, never-written Russo-Jewish novel. 
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Given that Caine was unable to refrain from advertising his journey 
to Russia, he clearly used his status as a goodwill ambassador for Jews to 
promote his own work. However, even Tolstoy’s high-profile advocacy 
of the Doukhobors was not without a smidgeon of self-publicity. While 
by the 1890s, Tolstoy was seen as the leader of international pacifism, 
the various pacifist factions were divided and ineffective. Tolstoy 
was frustrated by the lack of political reform following his argument, 
cogently expressed in The Kingdom of God and elsewhere, that individual 
enlightenment prefigures enlightened societies. The Doukhobor 
Rebellion of 1895, instigated by the sectarians’ spiritual leader Petr 
Vasil’evich Verigin, provided a timely opportunity to re-energize 
Tolstoy’s message. Although the Doukhobors were not Tolstoyans, 
Verigin’s personal philosophy coincided conveniently with Tolstoy’s 
principles.60 Hence, while neither Resurrection nor the Doukhobors’ 
resistance were publicity stunts, they display Tolstoy’s and Verigin’s 
ability to adroitly manipulate audiences and harness public sympathy.61 
The fact that both Hall Caine and Tolstoy could be savvy media operators 
detracts neither from their pacifism, nor from their impartial faith in 
the power of imaginative literature to unite disparate cultures. As Caine 
wrote in 1908:
In the progress of the nations from the barbarity of statecraft I see no 
force that is so surely making for the peace of the world as the force 
of education whereby the great national literatures are becoming one 
literature. I may hate and loathe the Russian government, and in any 
difference it may have with the government of England I may be a rabid 
Englishman, but when I open the books of Tolstoy and enter with him 
into the houses of the moujiks, and live their lives and share their joys 
and sorrows, I love the Russian people and hate the thought that my 
country can ever go to war with them.62
Caine and Tolstoy
As Dante Gabriel Rossetti’s personal secretary in the last year of the 
artist’s life, the young Hall Caine met or corresponded with many 
luminaries. He notes in a memoir that ‘Tourgenieff’ [sic], on a visit to 
London, attempted to call on Rossetti after the latter had recovered from 
a seizure.63 Caine’s biographer comments that ‘[t]here were few men 
Caine would have liked to meet more but he had to put him off along 
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with the rest. Turgenev […] died in 1883 and Caine never again had 
a chance to meet him’.64 It was Tolstoy, however, who quickly became 
Caine’s lodestar among Russian writers and indeed among all authors. 
On tour in America to promote The Christian, Caine praised Anna 
Karenina’s successful combination of realism and idealism: ‘I claim for 
Victor Hugo and Count Tolstoi that, with Walter Scott, they will in the 
time to come be recognized at [sic] the three greatest novelists of the 
nineteenth century’.65 Although Shakespeare had been (with Ruskin) 
Caine’s earliest and most enduring idol, Caine even defended Tolstoy’s 
critique of the bard. Caine wrote to a friend: ‘At present the spectacle 
of utter idolatry, as though every word in Shakespeare were divinely 
inspired, is, as Tolstoi says, a great evil and a great untruth’.66
 
Fig. 2. Hall Caine looking Tolstoyan. Hall Caine at Tynwald Fair, unknown 
photographer (1930). PG/0203, from the archive of Sir Thomas Henry Hall Caine 
(1853–1931), Manx National Heritage Museum, Douglas, Isle of Man. Used with 
permission of the Manx National Heritage Museum, https://www.imuseum.im/
search/collections/archive/mnh-museum-114514.html.
Caine’s attempts to meet or correspond with Tolstoy were, as we have 
seen, frustrated first by the cholera epidemic of 1892 and secondly by 
the Russian author’s refusal even to reply directly. An 1890 note from 
Tolstoy’s daughter Tat’iana, assures Caine blandly that her father ‘is 
much moved by your high opinion of the direction in which he labours 
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and by your sympathy to his aims’.67 It must have galled Caine that 
Tolstoy followed up his anodyne response to the gift of The Bondman with 
consistently negative assessments of The Christian, whose titular hero, 
the radical preacher John Storm, was the most consciously Tolstoyan 
of all Caine’s characters. Caine probably read the report by Harold 
Williams, a Manchester Guardian correspondent who visited Tolstoy at 
his Iasnaia Poliana estate in 1905, that ‘[Tolstoy’s] estimate of Miss Marie 
Corelli and of Mr. Hall Caine, particularly of the latter, was extremely 
unfavourable’.68 It was fortunate, however, that Tolstoy’s introductory 
essay to the Russian translation of Der Büttnerbauer (1895) by the 
German realist novelist Wilhelm von Polenz (1861–1903) has never been 
translated into English. Ironically enough, the novel’s Russian title was 
The Peasant (Krest’ianin), not to be confused with its near-homophone 
Khristianin (The Christian). In this essay, Tolstoy singled out Caine’s 
Christian for unfavourable comparison with von Polenz’s ‘indubitably 
beautiful’ (‘nesomnennoe prekrasnoe’) work:
Books, journals, and especially newspapers have become in our times 
immense monetary undertakings, requiring the maximum number of 
customers for their success. The interests and tastes of the majority of 
customers are always low and crude, and therefore for the success of a 
printed work it is necessary for that work to respond to the requirements 
of the greater number of customers, i.e. to touch on low interests and 
correspond with crude tastes.
[…]
Moreover, thanks to chance or excellent advertising, several bad 
books, such as Hall Caine’s The Christian, a novel which is false in content 
and not literary, which has sold a million copies, receives, like eau-de-
cologne or Pears soap, vast fame which is not justified by its virtues.69 
Still worse than this (but also mercifully unknown to Caine during his 
lifetime) was the verdict Tolstoy scribbled to his daughter Tat’iana, who 
had formerly corresponded with Caine. Tatiana’s letter to her father 
has not been preserved, but she must have mentioned The Christian. 
Perhaps she was noting receipt of a gift copy (possibly the volume 
still in the Iasnaia Poliana library today). Tolstoy responded: ‘Hall 
Caine is a publicist (‘reklamist’) and his “Christian” is a dreadful book 
(‘preskvernoe sochinenie’)’.70
It was a poor return for decades of mutual theft.
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Conclusion
As Bayard reminds us, the benefit of anticipatory plagiarism as an 
approach to literary criticism lies in the way it reveals how ‘each 
text enriches the other, and even transforms it’. In the special case of 
reciprocal plagiarism, ‘each text is doubled under the influence of the 
text [which it has] plagiarized, which plagiarizes certain points from it 
in its turn’.71 Taking Hall Caine and Tolstoy’s interactions as an example 
not only of plagiarism, but of reciprocal plagiarism, we have identified 
two major shared contraintes. The first is an unusual twist on the tired 
convention of the fallen woman: the trial of said woman by her former 
lover, followed by his sincere repentance. The second common contrainte 
is the metaliterary use of fictional melodrama to benefit a religious group 
threatened by persecution—for Tolstoy, the Doukhobors; for Caine, the 
Russian Jews. Our approach reveals that, all Bayardian conceits aside, 
Hall Caine did actually anticipate one of Tolstoy’s major literary themes; 
and that Caine, from his stronghold ‘Greeba Castle’ on the Isle of Man, did 
in fact precede the sage of Iasnaia Poliana’s defence of the Doukhobors 
by effectively combining self-promotion and humanitarian advocacy 
to help the vulnerable Jewish community. In fact, the criticisms Tolstoy 
levelled against Caine (indulgence in melodrama; self-advertisement) 
appear intrinsic to his own aesthetic and professional practice. By 
studying these two writers as a mutually influential dyad, we realize 
how much they shared thematically and philosophically—and how, for 
almost three decades, they enjoyed arguably equal fame. 
Moreover, since Caine outlived Tolstoy yet continued to plagiarize 
him (as both the epigraph and ruling metaphor of The Master of Man 
demonstrate), we can apply the Bayardian term revenant to Tolstoy’s role 
in mentoring his fellow author: ‘a writer from the past with whom a 
[later] writer holds a dialogue’.72 In life, Tolstoy viewed Caine’s work 
with contempt: in death, ‘separated by the illusory barrier of time, 
[authors] found a means of working together’.73 Bayard envisaged the 
latter-day reciprocal plagiarist enjoying what he called ‘a privileged 
connection’ with his predecessors, ‘as with benevolent ghosts from 
whom he occasionally asks, despite the intervening years and because 
he knows them to be located beyond time, advice and protection’.74 
In the spirit of Flann O’Brien, who wrote a series of comic vignettes 
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picturing John Keats (born in 1795) and George Chapman (who died in 
1634) jovially if anachronistically sharing a bachelor existence,75 I like to 
imagine Lev Tolstoy and Hall Caine reconciled as literary chums in the 
ahistorical space of reciprocal plagiarism, setting the world to rights with 
a winning combination of spiritual rhetoric and titillating melodrama.
Fig. 3. Hall Caine’s tombstone in Maughold Churchyard, Isle of Man, sculpted by 
Archibald Knox. Photograph by author (2019). Copyright author’s own.
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7. The Posteriority of the 
Anterior: Levinas, Tolstoy, and 
Responsibility for the Other
Steven Shankman
‘The Russian novelists’, the French philosopher Emmanuel Levinas 
(1906–1995) remarked, ‘ceaselessly wonder about the philosophical 
problem understood as the meaning of the human, as the search for 
the famous “meaning of life”.’1 While literary scholars have written 
extensively about Dostoevsky and Levinas, relatively little has been 
said of how powerfully the fiction of Tolstoy anticipates key aspects of 
Levinas’s philosophical thought.2 The chief preoccupations of Totality 
and Infinity (Totalité et infini: essai sur l’extériorité, 1961) and Otherwise than 
Being, or Beyond Essence (Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence, 1974) 
correspond to the two phases of Tolstoy’s literary career as a novelist. 
In the first phase, War and Peace (Voina i mir, 1869) anticipates what 
Levinas means by his pairing of totality with war and of infinity with 
peace. Indeed, both authors, as young military officers, experienced the 
horrors of war first-hand, Tolstoy in the Crimean War and Levinas in 
World War II. In the second phase, beginning with Anna Karenina (1878) 
and culminating in his late novel Resurrection (Voskresenie, 1899), Tolstoy 
understands religion, or the word God, as bearing witness, above all, to 
ethical obligation. Tolstoy’s critical portrait of the dogmatic Christian 
believer Aleksei Aleksandrovich Karenin is a bridge between these two 
phases of Tolstoy’s literary career. 
Our volume of essays has been inspired by the concept of ‘anticipatory 
plagiarism’, a notion that defies logic. How can an author plagiarize a 
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text from a later time period? How, more generally, can the after influence 
the before, the posterior the anterior? Yet the influence of the posterior 
on the anterior is precisely Levinas’s claim in a key passage from the 
early pages of Totality and Infinity in which he describes the necessary 
separation of the subject from totality lest that totality swallow up—i.e. 
assimilate—that subject. ‘The posteriority of the anterior’, Levinas 
writes, is ‘an inversion’ that is ‘logically absurd’. In what Levinas calls 
the interiority of the separated subject, ‘the After or the Effect conditions 
the Before or the Cause.’3 
Let us now try to unpack Levinas’s rather dense articulation of 
anterior posteriority in this passage. I think now, in the present. All 
thought happens in the present, even the thought that thinks of a 
before that precedes the present, and that conditions the present. In the 
famous Cartesian articulation, I think, and therefore I am: cogito, ergo 
sum. Thought proceeds from the cogito. As Descartes discovers in his 
Third Meditation, however, in chronological time, in the time of thinking, 
this very cogito discovers that it does not, in fact, proceed from itself. The 
cogito discovers this when it thinks the idea of infinity, an idea which, 
Descartes posits, cannot originate in the cogito, because that cogito is 
finite. The finite cannot contain the infinite. Its source must therefore 
be infinite; must, in fact, be God, the infinite being, who put this idea 
into my consciousness, which is finite. ‘The being infinitely surpassing 
its own idea in us—God in the Cartesian terminology’, Levinas writes, 
‘subtends [sous-tend]’ or underlies ‘the evidence of the cogito’.4 What 
was posterior, what emerged in the chronological time of thinking, is 
now understood—in the time of thought—to have preceded thought, 
to be anterior to thought. As William Large explains this phenomenon, 
‘[w]hat comes first in terms of the exposition is second in terms of 
the condition.’5 In the course of reading Descartes’ Third Meditation 
(Méditation troisième, 1641), in the time of our reading, we come to learn 
that subjectivity, in Large’s words, ‘is in fact dependent on the existence 
of God. In the same way’, Large continues, ‘although Levinas [in Totality 
and Infinity] first of all describes the separate existence of the self, we 
later discover that without the relation to the other, this existence would 
not have been possible.’6 
It is logically absurd that Tolstoy could have plagiarized Levinas, that 
the later author could have influenced the earlier one, that the posterior 
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could have conditioned the anterior. But what is not logically absurd—
and this is my argument—is that Levinas recognized this logical 
absurdity, as did Tolstoy. Both Tolstoy and Levinas posit a self that is 
primordially haunted by the other. Tolstoy articulates and embodies 
this in his fiction, which in turn had a profound effect on Emmanuel 
Levinas, who expounds the meaning of the ‘posteriority of the anterior’ 
in Totality and Infinity.
 Totality and Infinity as War and Peace
In the first part of this essay, I shall comment on the first of the two phases 
of the correspondence between the philosophy of Levinas, the poetic 
philosopher, and the fiction of Tolstoy, the philosophical poet. Levinas’s 
Totality and Infinity is a philosophical meditation—evoking Tolstoy’s War 
and Peace—on war as totality and peace as infinity. In War and Peace, 
Tolstoy sees war as a grimly anonymous totality that is, stunningly, 
ruptured by the face of the other. For Levinas, inspired by Tolstoy, peace 
is produced when I, breaking the ‘anonymous utterance of history’, see, 
and address, the face of the other; and when, in seeing and responding 
to the face, I break ‘with the totality of wars and empires in which one 
does not speak’.7 Thus for both Tolstoy and Levinas, ‘ethics’, as Levinas 
puts it in the preface to Totality and Infinity, ‘is an optics’: or, ‘l’éthique est 
une optique’.8
Levinas makes a number of explicit references to Tolstoy in his 
writings. He was particularly struck by Prince Andrei’s famously 
transformative vision, after being wounded on the battlefield at 
Austerlitz, of the infinite height of the sky.9 In the course of War and 
Peace, Tolstoy transposes the vertical infinity of physical or cosmic space 
to the horizontal ethical dimension, namely to the infinity of the other 
in front of me. The infinity of the far, of the distant, becomes the infinity 
of the near.
Just after he is badly wounded at Austerlitz, Andrei opens his eyes 
and sees 
nothing but the sky—the lofty sky, not clear yet still immeasurably lofty. 
[…] How was it I did not see that lofty sky before? And how happy I am 
to find it at last! Yes! All is vanity! All falsehood, except that infinite sky.10 
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What we see ruptured here is the totality of war understood as the 
system, the totality in which Andrei had been seeking the meaning of 
life in glory and fame. The infinity of the sky reveals a beyond of the 
brutality of war, a beyond of the totalizing system in which Andrei had 
been immersed. 
There had been an absurdity at the very heart of Prince Andrei’s 
commitment to a military career in the Russian army. His hero was 
Napoleon, and yet it was against Napoleon that he and his fellow Russians 
were fighting. When the wounded Prince Andrei now encounters 
Napoleon beneath this ‘lofty sky’, he sees him as an ‘insignificant’, 
mean-spirited ‘little’ man.11 
Totality and the Face of Vereshchagin
Napoleon’s forces have now invaded Moscow. The Russian General 
Kutuzov concludes that it is impossible for the Russian army to defend 
Moscow. Count Rostopchin, governor of Moscow, deeply disagrees with 
Kutuzov’s decision, but Moscow must be emptied. One of the political 
prisoners to be evacuated is the young Vereshchagin, who becomes 
the focus of Rostopchin’s frustrations. When Rostopchin learns from 
a subordinate that Vereshchagin is among the political prisoners, he 
angrily shouts, ‘“Vereshchagin! Hasn’t he been hanged yet? […] Bring 
him to me!”’.12 The face of Vereshchagin makes its appeal to Rostopchin, 
but in vain. Vereshchagin’s ‘emaciated young face, disfigured by the 
half-shaven head, hung down hopelessly. At the Count’s first words he 
[Vereshchagin] raised it slowly and looked up at him as if wishing to 
say something or at least to meet his eye. But Rostopchin did not look at 
him’.13 Rostopchin orders that the pitiful young man be turned over to 
an unruly mob of incensed Muscovites, who beat him to death.
Rostopchin tries to soothe his guilty conscience by maintaining to 
himself that he had acted for the public good. In deciding to throw 
Vereshchagin to the mob, Rostopchin tries to excuse himself by saying 
that he acted not as the private individual Fyodor Vassilievich Rostopchin 
but rather as a representative of the ruling authorities, including the tsar. 
‘“If I were merely Fyodor Vassilievich”’, Rostopchin comments, ‘“ma 
ligne de conduite aurait été tout autrement tracée [my line of conduct would 
have been drawn quite differently], but it was my duty to safeguard my 
life and dignity as commander in chief.”’14 
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Vereshchagin is a prisoner in chains, young, vulnerable. He is thus 
what Levinas describes as the Stranger, ‘l’absolument Autre’.15 The 
absolutely Other, Levinas continues, 
is the Other human being in front of me [Autrui]. He and I do not form 
a number. The collectivity in which I say ‘you’ or ‘we’ is not the plural of 
the ‘I.’ I, you—these are not individuals of a common concept. Neither 
possession, nor unity of number nor the unity of concepts link me to the 
Stranger, the Stranger who disturbs the being at home with oneself. But 
Stranger also means the free one. Over him I have no power. He escapes 
my grasp by an essential dimension, even if I have him at my disposal. 
He is not wholly in my site.16 
If the Other is truly other, he and I do not, in truth, comprise a totality 
in which ‘I’ am reduced to a public official and the other to a threat to 
the public good. The only way to rupture this totality is for the I to see 
the face of the other and to speak to him. But this is what Rostopchin 
refuses to do. 
The stranger is the one who troubles the being at home with oneself. 
Over him, Levinas insists, I have no power, even if I have him at my 
disposal. Just after the mob murders Vereshchagin, Rostopchin, leaving 
the site of the carnage he had licensed in his carriage, encounters 
a ‘lunatic’ who has just been released from an asylum as part of the 
exodus of the Russian population from Moscow ordered in anticipation 
of Napoleon’s arrival. The ‘gaze’ of this madman—with his ‘solemn, 
gloomy face […] with its beard growing in uneven tufts’ and his ‘black, 
agate pupils with saffron-yellow whites’ moving ‘restlessly near the 
lower eyelids’—was ‘fixed’ on Rostopchin. Rostopchin orders his driver 
to fly past the madman. Rostopchin then hears ‘the insane despairing 
screams’ of the madman ‘growing fainter in the distance’. The screams 
are those of the madman, but Rostopchin’s ‘eyes saw nothing but the 
astonished, frightened, bloodstained face’17 of Vereshchagin. Rostopchin 
is haunted by the face of the stranger whom he has betrayed and over 
whom, in truth, he has no power.
Rostopchin fails to respond to the face. Some pages later, the 
notoriously cruel French general Davout, in contrast to Rostopchin, 
does indeed respond to the face of the other. Pierre and several other 
Russians, charged with being incendiaries in now French-occupied 
Moscow, are brought before Davout. Davout accuses Pierre of being 
a Russian spy. Pierre insists he is not. ‘Davout looked up and gazed 
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intently at him’, Tolstoy writes. ‘For some seconds they looked at one 
another, and that look saved Pierre.’18 Unaware that Davout has just 
decided to pardon him, Pierre imagines that he is being escorted to his 
death by an anonymous totality. Who, precisely, Pierre wonders, 
was executing him, killing him, depriving him of life—him, Pierre, with 
all his memories, aspirations, hopes, and thoughts? And Pierre felt 
that it was no one. It was a system—a concurrence of circumstances. A 
system of some sort was killing him—Pierre—depriving him of life, of 
everything, annihilating him.19 
Pierre is spared execution, but he witnesses the execution of other fellow 
Russians and, as a result, he ‘felt it was not in his power to regain faith in 
the meaning of life’.20 Pierre is brought back to life by his encounter with 
the kindly peasant Platon Karataev.
The Rupture of Totality: Enjoyment
The novel’s protagonist Pierre Bezukhov had, before his capture by the 
French, consistently found himself in situations which reduced his role 
to a part in an anonymous drama: a loveless marriage to a shallow and 
beautiful socialite—a marriage to which he felt fatally and helplessly 
drawn despite his better instincts. And now, in Moscow, after being 
seduced by numerology, he is convinced that he is predestined to kill 
Napoleon and thus to free Russia of this scourge. Pistol in hand, he goes 
in search of Napoleon through the streets of Moscow. But rather than 
acting as a pawn of his imagined fate (killing Napoleon), Pierre finds 
himself responding to the face of the other in front of him: he saves the 
French officer Ramballe and then goes on to rescue, at great personal 
risk, a young girl from the flames of her burning house.
Levinas is known as the philosopher of the ethical relation, of the I 
who is called into question by the other in front of me. We have just seen 
how Pierre experiences and exemplifies precisely this transcendence 
of the I towards the other. What is often not sufficiently appreciated 
about the work of Levinas, and about Totality and Infinity in particular, is 
that, while Levinas compellingly shows how totality is ruptured by my 
response to the face, by my responsibility for the other, the I, even before 
its being called into question by the other, escapes totality through 
enjoyment. The I, for Levinas, is what in Totality and Infinity he calls a 
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psychism with its own interiority.21 The self has an active existence. It 
lives in enjoyment, already outside of history and of any totality. 
Pierre makes this discovery, remarkably, while in captivity in 
Moscow. Prince Andrei, Pierre reflects while in prison, ‘had thought 
and said that happiness could only be negative […] as though all desire 
for positive happiness is implanted in us merely to torment us and never 
be satisfied.’ For Pierre, however, ‘the satisfaction of one’s needs and 
consequent freedom in the choice of one’s way of life, now seemed to be 
indubitably man’s highest happiness.’ Pierre continues: 
Here and now for the first time he fully appreciated the enjoyment 
of eating when he wanted to eat, drinking when he wanted to drink, 
sleeping when he wanted to sleep, of warmth when he was cold, of 
talking to a fellow man when he wished to talk and hear a human voice. 
The satisfaction of one’s needs–good food, cleanliness, and freedom–
now […] seemed to Pierre to constitute perfect happiness […] and for the 
rest of his life, he thought and spoke with enthusiasm of that month of 
captivity, of those irrecoverable, strong, joyful sensations, and chiefly of 
the […] inner freedom which he experienced only during those months.22 
As Levinas writes in Totality and Infinity, ‘[t]he imprisoned being, 
ignoring its prison, is at home with itself.’23 Pierre soon finds his 
separation from totality, his interiority, his enjoyment, his psychism 
threatened by the anonymous totality that is war. Just as Pierre was 
speaking to a French corporal about what could be done to assist a very 
sick Russian soldier, Tolstoy writes, ‘the sharp rattle of the drums on two 
sides drowned out the sick man’s groans.’ Tolstoy continues: ‘“There it 
is! … It again!” [‘Vot ono!.. Opiat’ ono!’] said Pierre to himself, and an 
involuntary shudder ran down his spine.’ Having experienced himself 
in prison as an independent being, Pierre now once again feels ‘that 
fatal force which had crushed him during the executions, but which he 
had not felt during his imprisonment’. This force was ‘terrible,’ Pierre 
remarks, but he now feels that ‘there grew and strengthened in his soul 
a power of life independent of it’.24 
That evening, Pierre is sitting by the campfire and enjoying 
conversation with his fellow prisoners. He decides he wants to cross the 
road to visit with the ‘common soldier prisoners’. On the road a French 
sentinel orders him back to the side of the road which he has just crossed. 
Before he rejoins his ‘companions by the campfire’, he stops, thinks, and 
laughs loudly as he rejoices in the recognition of his separation from the 
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totality that is war, of the joyful independence of his being, what Levinas 
would call his psychism: 
‘Ha-ha-ha!’ laughed Pierre. And he said aloud to himself: ‘The soldier 
did not let me pass. They took me and shut me up. They hold me captive. 
What, me? Me? My immortal soul? Ha-ha-ha! Ha-ha-ha!...’ and he 
laughed till tears started to his eyes. […] Pierre glanced up at the sky and 
the twinkling stars in its faraway depths. ‘And all that is mine, all that is 
me, all that is within me, and it is all I!’ thought Pierre.25
As Levinas writes in Totality and Infinity, the essence of enjoyment is ‘the 
transmutation of the other into the same: […] an energy that is other, 
recognized as other, recognized […] as sustaining the very act that is 
directed upon it, becomes, in enjoyment, my own energy, my strength, 
me’.26 
Infinity and the Face of Karataev
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas speaks of how the self, before taking 
responsibility for the other, enjoys his spontaneous freedom. When 
confronted with the other, I sense a prior responsibility that this 
spontaneity had in fact betrayed. The other calls this spontaneity into 
question. It is not necessarily a pleasant experience! It is, rather, a 
shameful one. Pierre, after experiencing the happiness of his freedom 
while imprisoned in the shed, on his march with the other prisoners 
from that location was loath to see and hear how the French army under 
whose authority he was travelling ‘shot the prisoners who lagged behind, 
though more than a hundred perished in that way’. Nor did he ‘think of 
Karataev, who grew weaker every day and evidently would soon have 
to share that fate’.27 One evening, just after midnight, ‘Pierre reached the 
fire and heard Platon’s voice enfeebled by illness, and saw his pathetic 
face brightly lit up by the blaze’. Pierre feels ‘a painful prick at his heart. 
His feeling of pity for this man frightened him, and he wished to go 
away, but there was no other fire, and Pierre sat down, trying not to 
look at Platon’.28 Similarly, just before Karataev is shot by his captors, the 
kindly Karataev looks at Pierre, but Pierre ‘was too afraid for himself’29 
and, pretending that he did not see Karataev look at him, Pierre ‘moved 
hastily away’.30
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It was largely his encounter with the kindness of Platon Karataev 
that brought Pierre back from a state of despair after he had witnessed 
the pitiful and pointless execution of his fellow Russian prisoners. The 
narrative proper of War and Peace ends with a paean to Karataev and 
what he meant to Pierre, the novel’s protagonist, and what he continues 
to mean to him after he returns from his war-time experiences, marries 
Natasha, becomes a parent and begins family life. 
Tolstoy’s description of Pierre’s discovery of faith in this concluding 
section of the narrative of War and Peace consists in Pierre’s seeing, in 
Karataev, the witness of someone who is devoted ‘to love life in one’s 
suffering, in innocent sufferings’.31 The infinity that, earlier in the novel, 
Tolstoy associates with the height of the sky here finds its locus in the 
near, which Pierre had previously dismissed as mere commonplace. In 
his captivity, Tolstoy writes, Pierre had learned that ‘in Karataev God 
was greater, more infinite and unfathomable than in the Architect of the 
Universe recognized by the Freemasons’. Tolstoy continues: 
He felt like a man who after straining his eyes to see into the far distance 
finds what he sought at his very feet. All his life he had looked over the 
heads of the men around him, when he should have merely looked in 
front of him without straining his eyes.32 
In what ways is God greater, more infinite and unfathomable in Karataev 
than in the Architect of the Universe recognized by the Freemasons? 
As a moral example, surely, of an innocent suffering that bears witness, 
nonetheless, to the joy of living. But for Pierre the memory of Karataev 
also brings vividly to mind a responsibility for the other, for the stranger, 
that Pierre had, to his shame, tried to shirk, to ignore—regardless of 
the fact that, for his own survival at that point in the narrative of War 
and Peace, it was arguably necessary for Pierre to ignore that crippling 
sense of shame. Tolstoy, through his portrayal of Prince Nekhliudov, the 
protagonist of his last novel Resurrection, will go on to fully confront this 
sense of shame that goes ignored or repressed in the perhaps somewhat 
smug happy ending of War and Peace. Pierre, just before that happy 
ending, recalls his encounter with Karataev as an encounter with what 
Levinas refers to as ‘the Most-High’. ‘[T]his height is’, however, ‘no 
longer’ found in ‘the sky [le ciel]’. It is rather in the infinity I encounter 
in the face of the other in front of me, an infinite responsibility that is, 
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for Levinas and increasingly for Tolstoy, ‘the very elevation of height 
and its nobility.’ 33 
Religion, Faith, and the Resistance to Vulnerability in 
Anna Karenina
In War and Peace, Tolstoy anticipates what Levinas means by his pairing 
of totality with war and of infinity with peace. In Anna Karenina and 
culminating in his late novel Resurrection, Tolstoy understands religion 
as bearing witness, above all, to ethical obligation, as does Levinas in his 
late work. Tolstoy’s critical portrait of the dogmatic Christian believer 
Aleksei Aleksandrovich Karenin, Anna’s husband, whom she leaves for 
the other Aleksei, the dashing Count Aleksei Kirillich Vronskii, can be 
seen as a bridge between these two phases of Tolstoy’s literary career. 
In this section, I will show how Karenin sacrifices Anna’s otherness 
to a notion of religious belief that is divorced from ethics, a notion of 
religion that Emmanuel Levinas labels as ‘primitive’: ‘Everything that 
cannot be reduced to an interhuman relation’, he writes in Totality and 
Infinity, ‘represents not the superior, but rather the forever primitive, 
form of religion.’34 Karenin’s dogmatic understanding of Christianity, 
his determined resistance to vulnerability, makes it impossible for 
him to hear Anna’s voice, to see her face, to register her otherness, her 
alterity. Tolstoy’s critique of conventional religious belief as a refusal of 
vulnerability is sounded again and again throughout the remainder of 
his career as a writer and thinker. 
Before we turn to Karenin’s refusal of vulnerability, let us look at two 
passages from Levinas about vulnerability, a term that is central to his 
late work. The first is from an interview that is included in Of God Who 
Comes to Mind (De Dieu qui vient à l’idée, 1982):
The Bible is the priority of the other [l’autre] in relation to me. It is in the 
other [l’autrui] that I always see the widow and the orphan. The other 
[autrui] always comes first. This is what I have called, in Greek language, 
the dissymmetry of the interpersonal relationship. If there is not this 
dissymmetry, then no line of what I have written can hold. And this is 
vulnerability. Only a vulnerable I can love his neighbor [italics added].35
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The second is from Levinas’s account of sensibility in Otherwise than 
Being:
Exposure as a sensibility is […] like an inversion of the conatus of esse, a 
not finding any protection in any consistency or identity of a state. It is a 
having been offered without any holding back and not the generosity of 
offering oneself, which would be an act. […] In the having been offered 
without any holding back, it is as though sensibility were precisely 
what all protection and all absence of protection already presuppose: 
vulnerability itself. 36
Levinas insists that I can love my neighbour only when I find no 
protection in identity, when I am vulnerable. 
It is not as if the spiritually flat, unimaginative bureaucrat Karenin is 
incapable of vulnerability. He is in fact deeply vulnerable, but—perhaps 
because he was brought up as an orphan,37 adopted by an uncle who 
was a bureaucrat, and as a young child was deprived of maternal love—
he is terrified by his own vulnerability. As Tolstoy informs us, 
None but those closest to Karenin knew that this to all appearances 
supremely cold and sensible man had one weakness that contradicted 
his general cast of character. Karenin could not bear to hear or see the 
tears of a child or a woman. The sight of tears put him in a state of great 
distress, and he lost the ability to think. His head clerk and secretary 
knew this and forewarned lady petitioners that they were by no means to 
cry if they did not want to spoil their case. ‘He will get angry and will not 
listen to you,’ they would say. Indeed, in those instances, the emotional 
distress produced in Alexei Alexandrovich by tears was expressed in 
impatient fury. ‘There is nothing I can do, nothing. Would you kindly get 
out!’ he would shout in those instances.38 
Karenin considers himself a believer, a religious man. Religion, for 
him, however, is a mere matter of rules. As Tolstoy comments, Karenin 
‘was a believer interested in religion primarily in its political sense’.39 
His embrace of religion in a political rather than in an ethical sense is 
precisely the opposite of how Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, understands 
religion:
For the relation between the being here below and the transcendent being 
that results in no community or concept or totality—a relation without 
relation—we reserve the term religion.40 
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In a remarkable passage early in the novel, Tolstoy shows how Karenin 
is utterly incapable of encountering his wife Anna from a “religious” 
perspective, in Levinas’s sense of the word “religious”, i.e. as absolutely 
other than himself. Karenin now has good reason to suspect Anna of 
infidelity. As he prepares to confront Anna in their home in St Petersburg, 
before she returns from a tryst with Vronskii, he enters her sitting room 
and looks at her things. He and Anna have been married for eight years, 
but it is here, for the very first time, that he finally recognizes that Anna 
has an existence separate from his own. This extraordinary passage is 
worth quoting at length:
Here, looking at her desk with the malachite blotter lying on top and 
a note she had started, his thoughts suddenly changed. He began 
thinking about her, about what she thought and felt. For the first time 
he vividly imagined her private life, her thoughts, her desires, and the 
thought that she might and must have her own separate life seemed 
to him so terrible that he hastened to drive it away. This was the abyss 
into which he was afraid to look. Trying to imagine the thoughts and 
feelings of another being was an emotional exercise alien to Alexei 
Alexandrovich. He considered this emotional exercise harmful and 
dangerous fantasizing.
‘What is most horrible of all,’ he thought, ‘is that now, as my work 
is drawing to its conclusion’—he was thinking about the project he was 
overseeing now—‘when I need all the tranquility and strength I can 
muster, now I am being inundated with this senseless worry. What else 
can I do, though? I’m not one of those people who suffers upset and 
alarm and lacks the strength to look them in the face.’
‘I must think this through, come to a decision, and set it aside,’ he 
said out loud.
‘Questions of her feelings, of what has and might come to pass in 
her soul, that is none of my affair, it is the affair of her conscience and 
falls under religion,’ he told himself, feeling relief at the awareness that 
he had found the established formal category [punkt uzakonenii] under 
which the newly arisen circumstances rightly fell.41
Karenin refuses to see his part in his failed marriage. He takes no 
responsibility for Anna’s unhappiness, which drove her towards her 
liaison with Vronskii, whose aggressive advances she at first staunchly 
resists. Karenin characterizes Anna as 
‘Without honor, heart, or religion. […] I made a mistake in linking my life 
with her; however, there is nothing bad in my mistake, and so I cannot be 
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unhappy. It’s not I who am to blame [Vinovat ne ia],’ he told himself, ‘it’s 
she. But she’s no business of mine. For me, she doesn’t exist.’42
In Dostoevsky’s 1881 novel The Brothers Karamazov (Brat’ia Karamazovy), 
the jury renders its guilty verdict against Dmitrii Karamazov with the 
word vinovat (‘guilty’). Dmitrii is not technically guilty of his father’s 
murder, but he is certainly responsible (vinovat), in no small measure, 
for his disciple and bastard half-brother Smerdiakov’s crime. Karenin, 
unlike Dmitrii Karamazov, refuses to take responsibility for a crime 
(for Karenin, adultery rather than parricide) that he did not technically 
commit, but for which he is nevertheless in large part responsible. Note 
that, in the quotation cited above, Karenin explicitly says that he is not 
‘responsible’ (vinovat) for Anna’s adulterous affair.
Karenin comes closer to a embracing a truly religious attitude—to 
embracing vulnerability—at Anna’s bedside when, in attempting to give 
birth to the child she conceived with Vronskii, she is perilously close 
to dying. In response to Anna’s desperate urging, Karenin forgives 
Vronskii:
At his ill wife’s bedside, for the first time in his life, he surrendered to 
the warm compassion which other people’s suffering evoked in him and 
which had previously embarrassed him as a harmful weakness; and his 
pity for her, and remorse for having wished her death, and, most of all, the 
very joy of forgiveness made him feel not only relief from his sufferings 
but also a spiritual peace he had never before experienced. He suddenly 
felt that the very thing that had been the source of his sufferings had 
become the source of his spiritual joy; that what had seemed insoluble 
when he had condemned, reproached, and hated became simple and 
clear when he forgave and loved.43
Forgiving Vronskii is not sufficient, however. In order to truly save 
Anna, to allow Anna her absolute otherness, Karenin must be willing 
to agree to a divorce. A divorce can be granted, according to the male-
centred laws of the time, only if the husband admits to being at fault, 
i.e. to being the adulterer. Anna, however, is the adulterous party, so 
Karenin must take the blame in spite of his (technical) innocence. He 
agrees to do so, but more as a martyr than as someone who truly takes 
responsibility for his part in his failed marriage. Karenin at first agrees 
to permit Anna to divorce him, but even in this consent we can already 
sense that his transcendence before Anna is not quite transcendent 
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enough, for he finally balks and refuses the divorce. We sense this failure 
of transcendence in his response to Anna’s brother, Stiva Oblonskii, who 
comes to see Karenin to plead, on Anna’s behalf, for the divorce.
‘Yes, yes!’ Karenin exclaimed in a shrill voice, ‘I will take the disgrace 
upon myself and even give up my son, but ... but wouldn’t it be better to 
leave it be? But do what you like.’
Turning away from his brother-in-law, so that he could not see him, 
he sat in the chair by the window. It was a bitter and shameful thing 
for him; but along with this grief and shame he was experiencing joy 
and tenderness at the loftiness of his own humility [pred svoei vysotoi 
smireniia].44
As we have noted, Levinas (in Otherwise than Being) says that 
vulnerability ‘is a having been offered without any holding back and not 
the generosity of offering oneself, which would be an act’.45 Karenin’s 
experience of ‘joy and tenderness at the loftiness of his own humility’ 
bears ironic witness to the incompleteness of his transcendence before 
the face of Anna. Tolstoy is here subtly but clearly mocking Karenin’s 
exalted sense of his own humility, of his own generosity, of which he 
is abundantly and proudly conscious. Hardly true humility, or true 
vulnerability!
Karenin recants his generous offer of divorce under the influence of 
his socialite friend Lidiia Ivanovna, who introduces Karenin to the cult 
of an emotive “spiritualism” that was the rage in Petersburg high society 
at the time, and who despises Anna. ‘[F]rom an indifferent and lazy 
believer’, Lidiia Ivanovna turns Karenin
into an ardent and firm supporter of that new interpretation of the 
Christian doctrine which had spread of late in Petersburg. Alexei 
Alexandrovich was easily convinced of this. […] He saw nothing 
impossible or incompatible in that notion that death, which exists for 
nonbelievers, did not exist for him, and that since he possessed the fullest 
faith […] then there was no sin in his soul now, and he was already 
experiencing complete salvation here, on earth. […] Alexei Alexandrovich 
needed so much to think this way, so needed in his humiliation to have 
that loftiness, however fabricated, from which he, despised by all, might 
despise others, that he clung to this salvation, this mock salvation.46
For the spiritualists, ‘faith’ counts for more than ‘works’. In fact, for the 
believing spiritualist to attain salvation, ‘works’ mean nothing at all. ‘For 
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the believer, there is no sin’, Lidiia Ivanovna remarks at a spiritualist 
séance to which she has invited Stiva Oblonskii in order to introduce him 
to the charlatan who will seal Anna’s fate by proclaiming, after allegedly 
consulting spirits, that Karenin must refuse the divorce. ‘Yes, but faith 
without works is dead’, Stiva remarks, remembering this phrase from 
the catechism, to which Karenin replies:
‘There it is, from the Epistle of James the Apostle,’ said Alexei 
Alexandrovich, turning to Lydia Ivanovna with a certain reproach, 
evidently about a topic they had already spoken of more than once. ‘How 
much harm the false interpretation of this passage has done! Nothing so 
repels a man from faith as this interpretation. “I have no works, I cannot 
believe,” since nowhere is this said. What is said is the opposite.’47 
Karenin, in the end, anchors his religious faith in a resistance to 
vulnerability. I will conclude this second section by contrasting the 
believer Karenin, whose Christianity has cut itself off from a vulnerable 
love of the neighbour, with the nonbeliever Levin, with whose epiphany 
the novel ends. I began by citing Levinas’s comment that ‘only a 
vulnerable I can love his neighbor’.48 Levin’s wife Kitty, herself a believer, 
has never been bothered by her husband’s unbelief. For Kitty, Levin’s 
actions speak for themselves:
What kind of nonbeliever is he? With his heart and his fear of 
disappointing anyone, even a child! Everything for others, and nothing 
for himself. […] All these peasants who come to see him every day, as if 
he were obligated to serve them.49
At the end of the novel, Levin recognizes that he had been taught, 
through his early religious education that he came to reject in favour of 
science, to love his neighbour. ‘“Was it by reason”’, Levin asks, ‘“that I 
arrived at the idea that one must love one’s neighbor and not strangle 
him?”’.50 No, Levin concludes, he did not arrive at this principle through 
reason, which Spinoza (and Tolstoy tells us elsewhere in the novel, that 
Levin had been reading Spinoza!) refers to as the conatus essendi, the 
striving of each living thing to persist in its being, to be at the expense 
of, rather than for, other beings. In the passage from Otherwise than Being 
I discussed with reference to Karenin, Levinas refers to Spinoza’s notion 
of the conatus essendi.51 The conatus essendi, as both Levin and Levinas 
make clear, protects itself, at all costs, from vulnerability. 
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‘The Russian novelists ceaselessly wonder,’ Levinas remarks in 
Ethics and Infinity, about ‘the philosophical problem understood as the 
meaning of the human, as the search for the famous “meaning of life” 
[sens de la vie]’.52 Levin, as he says at the end of Anna Karenina, finds this 
meaning not in faith, which he is still not sure he truly possesses, but 
rather in embracing the feeling of being a vulnerable I who, in striving 
for goodness, is loving towards his neighbour: 
This new feeling has not changed me, has not made me happy, or suddenly 
illuminated things as I had dreamed. […] But faith—not faith—I don’t 
know what it is [A vera—ne vera—ia znaiu]. […] —but my life now, my 
whole life [vsia moia zhizn’], regardless of whatever may happen to me, 
each minute of it, is not only not meaningless [ne bessmyslenna], as it was 
before, but possesses the undoubted meaning [smysl’] of that goodness 
[dobra] I have the power to put into it!53 
Are we not presented, at the end of Anna Karenina, with an anticipatory 
portrait of Levin as Levinas? 
Thinking God on the Basis of Ethics: Tolstoy’s 
Resurrection
Anna Karenina concludes, as I have just proposed, with an anticipatory 
portrait of Levin as Levinas. Levin, like Levinas in his late work, 
approaches the meaning of God through ethical obligation rather than 
through faith. 
Tolstoy’s late novel Resurrection (1899) is a rewriting both of 
Dostoevsky’s Notes from the House of the Dead (Zapiski iz mertvogo doma, 
1860–62), Tolstoy’s favourite work by Dostoevsky, and of The Brothers 
Karamazov, by which Tolstoy claims to have been bored and which he 
says he never finished and which lay by his bed when he left Iasnaia 
Poliana for the last time. Like Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov, 
in Resurrection Tolstoy, or rather his protagonist Prince Dmitry Ivanich 
Nekhliudov, makes the case that ‘Each of us—before the faces of everyone 
and for everything—is responsible, but I more than all the others’.54 
In his youth, Nekhliudov had seduced a servant, Katiusha Maslova, 
then in the employ of his aunt. Years later, as a member of the ruling 
aristocratic elite, Nekhliudov is a juror at a trial in which a prostitute 
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is accused of poisoning a client. Nekhliudov is shocked to recognize 
the accused as the once innocent young woman he had seduced and 
who, as a consequence of that seduction, went on to become a prostitute. 
Nekhliudov sees Katiusha’s face and is overwhelmed with guilt and the 
betrayal of his own responsibility for her:
Yes, this was she. He now clearly saw in her face that strange, 
indescribable individuality which distinguishes every face from all 
others; something peculiar, all its own, not to be found anywhere else. 
In spite of the unhealthy pallor and the fullness of the face, it was there, 
this sweet particular individuality; on those lips, in the slight squint of 
her eyes, in the voice, particularly in the naïve smile and the expression 
of readiness on the face and figure.55
After the guilty verdict, which is a travesty, Nekhliudov is determined to 
follow Katiusha to Siberia and to devote himself to her and to the other 
prisoners, whom he comes to see more as victims of a cruel political 
system than as evil criminals. 
Resurrection
Unlike Dostoevsky in The Brothers Karamazov, Tolstoy in Resurrection is 
not encumbered by insisting on a literal understanding of resurrection 
or of salvation. Nor is Tolstoy burdened by what Dostoevsky described 
as his own unquenchable ‘thirst to believe’.56 In Resurrection Tolstoy, 
in anticipation of the later work of Emmanuel Levinas, thinks God 
beginning with—or on the basis of—ethical obligation, outside the 
question of faith or belief. Tolstoy equates true religion with ethical 
responsibility, and he creates, in Resurrection, a work of literature that 
embodies what Tolstoy, in What is Art? (Chto takoe iskusstvo?, 1897), 
defines as ‘religious art’.57 
Anna Karenina, written just before Tolstoy’s conversion to a religious 
consciousness (a process described in A Confession (Ispoved’, 1882)), 
is more artfully written than Resurrection and its characters are more 
three-dimensional. But redemption through literary greatness was not 
enough for the later Tolstoy, who came to believe that his own moral life 
had been corrupted by the thoughtless privilege that, once glimpsed 
and acknowledged, brought his final literary alter ego, Prince Dmitrii 
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Ivanich Nekhliudov, to his knees. Tolstoy’s novel is titled Resurrection, 
but the resurrection of which he speaks is more precisely an awakening 
of the moral consciousness. 
In What I Believe (V chem moia vera, published in 1884, four years 
before the publication of the final version of Resurrection), Tolstoy 
argues that, in the New Testament, ‘there are thirteen passages which 
are understood as being predictions by Christ of his resurrection,’ but, 
in truth, ‘[i]n none of these passages in the original does the word 
“resurrection” even occur.’ Of the two Greek verbs (ἀνίστημι and ἐγείρω) 
that are conventionally translated as meaning ‘to resurrect,’ Tolstoy 
insists, ‘[o]ne of these words means “to upraise”; the other means “to 
awaken,” and, in the middle voice, “to wake up,” “to rouse oneself.” 
But neither the one nor the other can ever, under any circumstances, 
mean “to raise from the dead.”’ Tolstoy insists that ‘[o]f his own 
personal resurrection—strange as this may sound to people who have 
not themselves studied the Gospels—Christ never spoke at all!’.58 Tolstoy 
understands resurrection as moral regeneration. Sonship to God, for 
Tolstoy, is not so much a supernatural or miraculous fact of divine 
inheritance as it is to be morally awake, to love and to be responsible 
for your neighbour. To be the Messiah, or a Messiah, moreover, is not 
limited to Christ’s particular sonship for Tolstoy in What I Believe. In 
Matthew 16.20, Christ warned his disciples not to say that he, Jesus, 
was the Messiah. Why not? Because, for Tolstoy, it is the disciples’ own 
‘sonship to God’ that allows them to participate, on a personal level, in 
messianic deliverance. When I, like Christ, take responsibility for others, 
I, too, am a ‘son of God’. I am a Messiah. 
And here we note a link to a passage from the Talmudic treatise 
Sanhedrin, with which Tolstoy was familiar, a section of which is devoted 
to rabbinic discussions of the resurrection of the dead as well as to the 
meaning of messianic deliverance. Two years before he published What 
I Believe, Tolstoy studied Hebrew and the Talmud with the Chief Rabbi 
of Moscow, Solomon Zalkind Minor. Let us attend to the remarks of Rav 
Nachman, a Talmudic scholar who died in the year 320 of the Common 
Era. Some of the rabbis cited in this section (98b) of Sanhedrin say that 
the name of the Messiah is Shiloh (meaning ‘a gift [shai] to him [l’o])’; 
some say his name is Chaninah (‘mercy’); still others say his name 
is Menachem the son of Chizkiah, for the name ‘Menachem’ means 
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‘comforter’. Rav Nachman offers a different interpretation: ‘If he [the 
Messiah] is of the living, then he might well be (like) Me,’ or ‘he may 
in fact be me’ (kegon ’ana’). As Levinas remarks of this passage from 
the Talmud, Rav Nachman is saying ‘the Messiah is Myself [Moi]; to 
be Myself is to be the Messiah. […] The fact of not evading the burden 
imposed by the suffering of others’59 is what it means to be a self, to be 
Moi. 
The Brothers Karamazov (published as a complete novel in 1881, the 
year of the author’s death) ends with the funeral of the young boy 
Iliushechka, attended by the boy’s young friends. Alesha Karamazov 
assures the boys that they will all ‘certainly’ see each other again in the 
life to come.60 Here we have a very different response to the meaning of 
resurrection than that of Tolstoy who, in conversation with his friend the 
philologist I. M. Ivakin, remarked at virtually the same moment (1881): 
‘What is it to me if [Christ] is resurrected? If he was resurrected, then 
God bless him! The questions important to me are: What should I do? 
How should I live?’61 
Tolstoy’s Rejection of Redemption through Faith
There is a stark difference, for the Tolstoy of Resurrection, between 
faith or belief, on the one hand, and ethical obligation, on the other. 
Tolstoy continually critiques the idea of the requirement or necessity of 
religious or dogmatic belief. Towards the end of the novel, Nekhliudov 
is staying in St Petersburg with an aunt. What has brought Nekhliudov 
to Petersburg was the opportunity it afforded him to speak with 
government officials who could alleviate the suffering of the convicts 
on whose behalf he is now tirelessly working. Urged by his aunt, 
Nekhliudov attends a dinner party at her stylish house one evening to 
hear the emotive words of the itinerant German preacher Kiesewetter, 
who speaks in English, immediately translated into Russian for his 
audience of aristocratic Petersburgers. Here we have a reprise of 
Tolstoy’s critique of the charlatan spiritualist Landau, whose mutterings 
in Anna Karenina spelled doom for Stiva Oblonskii’s plan to secure his 
sister Anna’s divorce from Karenin. 
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Kiesewetter begins by telling the guests how terribly sinful they—
and he—all are, how ‘no salvation’ is possible for any of them; ‘“we are 
all doomed to destruction”’. His tone then changes:
The orator suddenly uncovered his face, and smiled a very real-looking 
smile, such as actors express joy with, and began again in a sweet, gentle 
voice:
‘Yet there is a way to be saved. Here it is—a joyful, easy way. Salvation 
is in the blood shed for us by the only Son of God, who gave Himself up 
to torments for our sake. His sufferings, His blood, will save us. Brothers 
and sisters,’ he said, again with tears in his voice, ‘let us praise the Lord, 
who gave His only Son for the redemption of the world. His holy blood—’ 
Nekhlyudov felt so deeply disgusted that he rose silently, and, 
frowning and keeping back a groan of shame, he left on tiptoe and went 
to his room.62
For Nekhliudov to seek redemption or salvation as a goal for himself 
personally, Tolstoy constantly suggests, is a form of egoism, of selfishness. 
Kiesewetter, in contrast, preaches a praising of ‘the Lord, who gave His 
only Son for the redemption of the world’. Praise of God, with a tacit 
belief in Him, is enough for Kiesewetter. Here is a ‘joyful, easy’ way to 
salvation. True redemption or salvation, however, requires that I spend 
time in the filth of the prison system listening to those incarcerated 
there, and that I bear witness to injustice. 
Towards the end of the novel, another foreigner—this time an 
Englishman rather than a German who speaks English—similarly 
emphasizes the importance of religious belief at the expense of ethical 
obligation. At this point in the novel, the reader has made the gruelling 
journey eastward with Nekhliudov across the vastness of Russia to the 
grim prison in Siberia to which the convicts have been sentenced to 
spend many years of their lives in exile. An Englishman who claims to 
be studying Russia’s carceral system asks Nekhliudov, a well-educated 
aristocrat whose English is excellent, to show him around the prison. It 
is only towards the end of their tour that the Englishman’s true motives 
are revealed. 
Nekhliudov and the Englishman, accompanied by a prison official, 
pass through a corridor where they witness two prisoners urinating 
on the floor. They then enter the first of several wards. This first ward 
houses those sentenced to hard labour. Two of the prisoners are clearly 
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very ill but they go untreated because ‘the infirmary was overfull’.63 The 
Englishman now announces that
he would like to say a few words to these people, and asked Nekhliudov 
to interpret. It turned out that besides studying the places of exile and 
the prisons of Siberia, the Englishman had another object in view, that 
of preaching salvation by faith and the Redemption. ‘Tell them,’ he said, 
‘that Christ pitied and loved them and died for them. If they believe in 
this they will be saved.’ While he spoke all prisoners stood silent with 
their arms at their sides. ‘This book, tell them,’ he continued, ‘tells us all 
about it. Can any of them read?’64 
Of course, most of the prisoners could not read. But what good would it 
have done them if they could? The Englishman was preaching ‘salvation 
by faith and the Redemption’. The miserable convicts will, he believes, 
be saved through their belief in salvation and redemption. Their belief 
will, apparently, make it unnecessary for those in power to confront 
their own betrayal of responsibility that has resulted in this display of 
man’s inhumanity to his fellow man, in which ‘Everywhere men—cold, 
hungry, idle, diseased, degraded, and confined—were shown off like 
wild beasts’.65 
The Religious Discourse Prior to Religious Discourse: 
‘Here I Am’
Several chapters later, Nekhliudov comes upon a strange, nameless man 
who bears witness to the moral horrors of the prison system that had 
been glossed over by the evangelizing Englishman. Nekhliudov had 
originally encountered this strange man while traversing a broad river 
on a raft towards the end of his journey to the prison in Siberia. As they 
prepared to set off, the men on the raft all took off their hats and crossed 
themselves except for this strange, disheveled old man, who asked: 
‘Who’s one to pray to?’ 
‘To God of course,’ said the driver witheringly.
‘And you just show me where He is––this God?’ […] 
‘Where? In heaven of course.’
‘And have you been up there?’
‘Whether I’ve been or not, everyone knows that one must pray to God.’ 
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‘No man has ever seen God at any time. The only begotten Son, who is in 
the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him,’ said the old man in the 
same rapid manner, and with a stern frown. 
‘It’s clear you are not a Christian, but a hole-worshipper. You pray to a 
hole,’ said the driver.66 
And how does this declaring occur, we might ask? Is it by saying ‘I 
believe in God’? Apparently not, as in response to one of the passengers 
asking the nameless man what his ‘faith’ is, the stranger replies, ‘“I have 
no kind of faith, because I believe no one—no one but myself.”’67 Who 
is ‘myself’? What does it mean to be ‘me’? What does it mean to believe 
‘myself’? This is the same ‘myself’ that Nekhliudov comes to realize, to 
his shame, he had abandoned in his youth and which he is determined 
to reclaim by devoting his life to Maslova and to so many of the other 
prisoners. As Levinas writes in his late essay ‘God and Philosophy’, 
The sentence in which God comes to be involved in words is not ‘I believe 
in God.’ […] The religious discourse prior to all religious discourse is the 
‘here I am’ said to the neighbor to whom I am given over, and in which I 
announce peace, that is, my responsibility for the other. 
Levinas then quotes Isaiah 57:19: ‘I [the Infinite One/the Eternal, i.e. 
God] create the fruit of the lips [which say], “Peace, peace to him who 
is far off, and to him who is near,” says the Infinite One/the Eternal.’68 
The infinite is in me, speaks through my lips when I say ‘Here I am’ 
before the face of the other in front of me (‘to him who is near’), and 
before all the other others (to those who are ‘far off’), for whom I am 
also responsible.
Let us now turn to the end of the novel, where we meet the strange, 
nameless man for the last time. He is in prison simply because he has no 
passport. We have earlier in the novel seen others imprisoned unjustly 
for the very same reason, and for unconscionably long periods of time. 
What the stranger bears witness to is ‘the Antichrist’ in the prison ‘who 
tortures men’. For see here, he says, how the Antichrist has ‘locked them 
in a cage, a whole army of them. Men should eat bread in the sweat of 
their brow. But he has locked them up with no work to do, and feeds 
them like swine, so that they should turn into beasts’.69 
But how, the Englishman then asks, ‘“should one treat thieves and 
murderers now?”’ What are we to do with them? Nekhliudov translates 
this question from English into Russian for the strange old man:
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‘Tell him he should take the seal of Antichrist off from himself,’ the 
old man said, frowning sternly; ‘then he will know neither thieves nor 
murderers. Tell him so.’
‘He is crazy,’ said the Englishman, after Nekhlyudov had translated 
the old man’s words; and shrugging his shoulders he left the cell.70
The evangelizing Englishman fails to take account of his own 
responsibility for the fact that some are labelled thieves and murderers 
in prison. Instead he himself becomes an Antichrist, judging others 
while taking no responsibility for the prison system. In this sense, the 
Englishman, who professes Christianity, has not followed the teaching 
of Dostoevsky’s Father Zosima in The Brothers Karamazov. Father Zosima 
insists that, while ‘each of us—before the faces of everyone and for 
everything—is responsible, but I more than all the others’, it is also true, 
at the same time, that 
no one can judge a criminal, until he recognizes that he is just such a 
criminal as the man standing before him, and that he perhaps is more 
than all men to blame for that crime. When he understands that, he will 
be able to be a judge. Though that sounds absurd, it is true. If I had been 
righteous myself, perhaps there would have been no criminal standing 
before me.71
What is my role in the phenomenon of crime, and of punitive 
incarceration? Dostoevsky was haunted by the same question after his 
experience of serving four years in prison in Western Siberia. ‘How 
much youth’, the narrator of House of the Dead asks, ‘lay uselessly buried 
within those prison walls, what mighty powers were wasted here in 
vain!’. The narrator continues,
After all, one must tell the whole truth; those men were exceptional men. 
Perhaps they were the most gifted, the strongest of our people. But their 
energies were vainly wasted, wasted abnormally, unjustly, hopelessly. 
And who was to blame, whose fault was it (a kto vinovat)? And that’s just 
it, who was responsible (kto vinovat)?72
In his last novel, Tolstoy—through his protagonist Nekhliudov—says 
‘Here I am’. I, Lev Nikolaevich Tolstoy, am responsible, infinitely 
responsible for the other in front of me, and for all the other others. 
Here I am, Lev (Nikolaevich Tolstoy), creator of the fictional character 
Konstantin Dmitrievich Lev-in, and an anticipatory disciple of 
Emmanuel Lev-in-as. 
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8. From Sky to Sea: When Andrei 
Bolkonskii Voiced Achilles
Svetlana Yefimenko
The ancient poet lives on in what others make of him.
Nora Goldschmidt and Barbara Graziosi, Tombs of the Ancient Poets1 
Tolstoy’s engagement with classical literature, philosophy, and history, 
both Greek and Latin, lasted throughout his life. His thought drew on 
the work of Herodotus, Plato, Plutarch, and Stoic philosophers, and his 
interest in antiquity culminated in a sudden and passionate yearning 
to teach himself ancient Greek in the 1870s. However, Tolstoy’s greatest 
debt is, arguably, to Homer. To state that Tolstoy’s writing is Homeric 
is not a new insight, and critics like George Steiner2 and Harold Bloom3 
have famously pointed out the connections between the epic writers. 
What has escaped notice, however, is the possibility of reversing the 
direction of influence: perhaps the reach of Tolstoy’s writing is so vast 
that it prodded Homer to pick up his lyre. 
This paper presents a comparative analysis of the language of Tolstoy’s 
Andrei Bolkonskii and the language of Homer’s Achilles, approaching 
both characters as warrior archetypes. I will proceed by contrasting 
the Bakhtinian notion of stable and self-consistent epic heroes with a 
Tolstoyan epic heroism that is both unstable and self-contradictory. Such 
comparison will serve to illuminate latent tendencies in Homer’s text 
and will also show us how select passages from the Iliad (8th Century 
BC) and War and Peace (Voina i mir, 1869) rely on a self-reflexive, at times 
critical, multiplicity of voices. Reading Homer’s Achilles as informed by 
Tolstoy’s Andrei helps us glimpse how what Tolstoy took for granted 
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when writing, and perhaps more importantly, what readers take for 
granted when reading, can retroactively determine the meaning of 
ancient epic narrative.
The Epic Character
Approaching Achilles as Tolstoyan—or, more precisely, as Andreian—
troubles the distinction between epic and novelistic writing put forth 
perhaps most comprehensively by Mikhail Bakhtin. In his typology of 
the novel, familiar to most critics in the humanities, Bakhtin characterizes 
the genre as fundamentally opposed to the epic in a variety of ways. 
Most relevantly, Bakhtin emphasizes the novel’s inconclusiveness and 
internality. This ambiguity stands in contrast to the epic’s external 
exhaustiveness. By virtue of its historical distance, the world of the epic is 
complete and knowable: ‘In distanced images we have the whole event, 
and plot interest (that is, the condition of not knowing) is impossible’.4 
Such a monolithic conception of epic, however, cannot account for the 
ambivalence of Homer’s Achilles. 
In Book 9 of the Iliad, Achilles receives an embassy of beloved 
and esteemed friends—Odysseus, Phoenix, and Ajax—who attempt 
to persuade the hero to re-join the battle against the Trojans. With 
characteristic articulacy, Odysseus begins by describing how the 
Achaeans are suffering; he appeals to Achilles’ love and respect for his 
father, Peleus; he lists the splendid gifts Agamemnon offers, and finally 
adds that if these things cannot persuade Achilles, then perhaps he will 
be tempted by the great glory he will surely achieve. After Odysseus has 
spoken, Phoenix recalls his own long history with Achilles and recounts 
the story of Meleager5 as both an ethical example and a cautionary 
tale. Finally, seeing that they are getting nowhere, Ajax says the envoys 
ought to leave. Their visit was in vain, Ajax explains, because Achilles 
has no sense of camaraderie. The three envoys had appealed to multiple 
Achaean values: duty, loyalty, friendship, kinship, ethics, tradition, 
glory, and honour. Paul Friedrich identifies nine honour-linked values 
for Iliadic heroes: power, wealth, magnanimity, personal loyalty, 
precedence, sense of shame, reputation, courage, and excellence.6 Each 
of these values is present in some way in the offers, concessions, and 
arguments offered by the envoys. 
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In rejecting the embassy, Achilles rejects these heroic honour-linked 
values of warrior society for reasons of his own. These reasons certainly 
seemed incomprehensible to Odysseus, Phoenix, Ajax, and later even to 
Patroclus, who are closest to him as comrades and epic heroes. Readers, 
too, are bewildered by the passage, and the embassy to Achilles 
remains the most contested section of the Iliad.7 Donald Lateiner writes, 
‘Akhilleus penetrates the ruse and refuses the “king’s ransom”. Thus 
he confounds heroes trained keenly to scent booty (which presumably 
confers most of the desired honour) and at least eighty-one generations 
of critics.’8 Richard Martin and Seth L. Schein comment upon the unusual 
nature of Achilles’ refusal; Schein suggests Achilles inhabits a world he 
‘qualitatively transcends but cannot leave’, existing as ‘a hero alienated 
not only from the world of the poem but from the world celebrated by 
hundreds of years of poetic tradition and cultural values’.9 How can 
Achilles exist within heroic epic and yet defy its ethos? 
Describing the epic hero, Bakhtin argues that ‘what is complete is 
also something hopelessly ready-made; he is all there, from beginning 
to end [...]. He is, furthermore, completely externalized. There is 
not the slightest gap between his authentic essence and its external 
manifestation […] outside of this predetermined fate and predetermined 
position there is nothing.’10 Achilles does have a predetermined fate, 
and this is the source of his sorrow. However, Bakhtin is not referring 
to the inescapable prophecy passed on this hero’s short life, but to the 
inability of heroes of epic narrative to question the validity of their lives 
in a non-trivial, meaningful way (perhaps even in a philosophical way). 
In Bakhtin’s framework, Achilles has no choice but to reflect epic values 
because he cannot contradict them. If this is the case, then Achilles’ 
refusal of the embassy’s appeal is a fit, a temporary aberration, a brief 
bend in his familiar course until he knows better and returns to himself, 
unchanged. His narrative becomes an entertaining story with a moral: 
do not be angry like Achilles. This is precisely the sort of story Phoenix 
recounts: do not be angry like Meleager. 
For Homer to have implied a deeper and more psychologically 
and philosophically complex meaning, Achilles would require 
an individuated, private self that is capable of reflecting on and 
transcending the epic horizon. If Achilles’ tale is different from that of 
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Meleager, it is because Achilles himself differs from the type of hero 
Meleager personifies. Thomas Finan writes of Achilles:
It is so easy to see him as what he has been called, merely ‘A magnificent 
barbarian’, in reference to his relentless heart, his savage anger and 
paroxystic vengeance. Even those who perceive the Iliad as a tragedy 
then find it all too easy to fit the pieces together in the traditional 
moralistic pattern […]. Achilles is a great character with one big ‘flaw’, 
his ‘temper’ which becomes the ruination of him – until he ‘purges’ it 
[…]. This […] puts the ceiling of the tragedy too low. It misses the vital 
centre of Achilles. It mistakes existential torment for a primitive force 
of nature, a ‘restless heart’ for a glandular condition, and rage against 
human finitude for a violent temper and want of virtuous self-control. It 
explains away the character of Achilles.11
If concepts such as existential torment and rage against finitude seem like 
dubious qualities to assign to an ancient hero embedded in a traditional 
heroic context, it is because they are so thoroughly modern. Approaching 
Achilles as part warrior, part amateur philosopher who positions himself 
critically against the Homeric epoch might be regarded as the result of a 
complacent presentism; Kenneth Haynes notes that some critics12 ‘reject 
that reading as anachronistically imputing to Achilles modern forms of 
subjectivity and interiority’.13 The assertion that Achilles lacks interiority 
is reminiscent of Bakhtin’s position. Justina Gregory, too, argues that 
such a reading introduces a ‘subjective-individualist’ concept of self 
which ‘seems intuitive to moderns but is anachronistic in the context of 
archaic Greece’.14 However, if Achilles is displaced from his own time, 
modern readers may not be to blame. Perhaps it is not critics who are 
guilty of anachronism, but Homer. 
Heroes
To treat themes which are not readily available within the bounds of the 
writer’s historical context is to participate in what Pierre Bayard terms ‘an 
effect of dissonance’ insofar as a text features a genre, theme, or concept 
‘used at a time when it had yet to be invented’.15 If we regard Achilles as 
a philosophically inclined temporal vagabond, he becomes a textbook 
case of Bayardian dissonance. How does the ancient warrior express 
such a historically implausible literary psychology? By borrowing the 
modern language of Tolstoy’s Andrei Bolkonskii. 
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Andrei, it must be noted, is no hero if by hero we imply strict obedience 
to an internalized heroic code which consists of interdependent elements 
comprising status, performance, and reward.16 Heroes, whether on the 
plain of Scamander or the field of Austerlitz, perform bravely in battle 
and prudently in the assembly, thereby obtaining renown, admiration, 
and glory. James Redfield writes: ‘In his nature the hero remains like 
other men, but culture bestows on him a value; he does not survive, but 
he is remembered […]. His community sustains him and sends him to 
his destruction. On behalf of community he must leave community and 
enter a realm of force’.17 Andrei’s father sends him to war with a weighty 
injunction:
‘Remember one thing, Prince Andrei: if you are killed, I—an old man—
will suffer… But if I learn that you did not behave as befits the son of 
Nikolai Bolkonskii, I will be… ashamed!’ 18
Compare how Nestor reminds Achilles of the day Achilles’ father Peleus 
prepared his son for Troy:
Remember your father’s last commands? […]
The day he sent you out of Phthia […]
‘Now always be the best, my boy, the bravest,
And hold your head up high above the others!’ (Il. 2.912–37, p. 322)
As the sons of recognized heroes, Andrei and Achilles are to behave 
courageously, fight only in the front ranks, and achieve glory for 
themselves and their families. Their allegiance is to themselves, their 
fathers, and their community. What does it mean, then, when a hero 
rejects these obligations to family and community and refuses to fight? 
After all, this is precisely what Andrei and Achilles do. 
First, their refusal separates Andrei and Achilles from typical, run-of-
the-mill heroes, such as Prince Sarpedon (a Trojan ally) and the Greek 
warrior-king Diomedes in the Iliad, and the Russian army captains 
Timokhin and Tushin in War and Peace. What unites these latter figures is 
their fulfilment of martial duty without intellectual or moral deviation. 
Whether they are sung or unsung, whether they question the legitimacy 
of war or not, nothing interferes with their uncomplicated loyalty and 
their acquiescence to the way things are. It is such commitment that 
wins battles, as Andrei points out in the following passage, a notion 
Tolstoy surely seconded:
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‘Success never depended, and never will depend, on position, or 
equipment, or even on numbers, and least of all on position.’
‘On what, then?’
‘On the feeling that is in me, in him, […] in every soldier.’19
It is this ‘feeling’ that prompts Prince Sarpedon’s famous address 
to his captain Glaucus on the meaning of heroism in Book 12 of the 
Iliad. Sarpedon is no fanatical youth like War and Peace’s Petia Rostov, 
inexperienced yet eager to fight the enemy. The Trojan ally has already 
glimpsed the brutal heart of war and so would much rather not be 
fighting. However, Sarpedon also understands that he must die one day, 
regardless, so there is no sense in cowardice now: 
Ah my friend, if you and I could escape this fray
and live forever, never a trace of age, immortal,
I would never fight on the front lines again
or command you to the field where men win fame,
But now, as it is, the fates of death await us,
thousands poised to strike, and not a man alive
can flee them or escape—so in we go for attack!
Give our enemy glory or win it for ourselves! (Il. 12.374–81, pp. 
335–36)
Sarpedon is open to the possibility of the enemy’s triumph partly 
because he has no illusions about justice favouring either side. Tushin is 
the heroic equal of Sarpedon; he calmly remarks, ‘pokorit’sia nado’ (‘one 
must submit’).20 Like Sarpedon, Tushin’s attitude is not one of resignation 
but of acceptance. He resembles the Anatolian Trojans when he sits 
squatting ‘Turkish-style’;21 in his own imagination, he identifies with 
epic heroes: ‘He pictured himself as an enormously tall, powerful man, 
hurling cannon balls at the French with both hands’.22 Tushin’s vision of 
himself is truer to his nature than his deceptively feeble appearance, and 
those who are also heroic, such as Andrei, see him this way, too. 
Sarpedon, Timokhin, and Tushin do not challenge the justice of war 
because they do not challenge the justice of mortality; even if they do, 
they submit to both nonetheless. An unwillingness to submit is part 
of what separates Achilles and Andrei from typical heroes; it makes 
them worthy subjects of inquiry. It is also what makes epic character 
decidedly less one-dimensional than Bakhtin allows. F. T. Griffiths and 
S. J. Rabinowitz write:
 1958. From Sky to Sea: When Andrei Bolkonskii Voiced Achilles
Heroism manifests itself faster and more interestingly by its deformations 
than by its triumphs, which, narratively, must always be rare and 
climactic […]. The normative hero being normatively heroic […] plays 
no more than a supporting role in epic […]. There is just no story in it.23
While Homer’s hearers and Tolstoy’s readers respect and admire 
Sarpedon and Tushin, their story of quiet constancy is not the central 
story that one wants to read or hear. Readers of epic may expect the 
heroic, but readers of literature expect unique voices and the familiar 
made strange. We want to be surprised. Achilles surprised his comrades 
and continues to surprise readers today precisely because of his 
inconstancy, a quality I suggest he acquired from Andrei Bolkonskii.
Deformed Heroes
The recalcitrant and arrogant Andrei certainly fails to observe Tushin’s 
maxim that ‘one must submit’. Andrei has never submitted to the 
general mood:
‘Why are you so gloomy?’ Nesvitskii asked, noticing Prince Andrei’s pale 
face and glinting eyes.
‘There’s nothing to be happy about,’ answered Bolkonskii. 24
This exchange occurs early in the novel but might well have happened at 
almost any point, because Andrei’s eyes are usually glinting feverishly 
and he broods often. Yet it is not his sullenness that marks Andrei 
as out of place. He is described in terms of his excesses—he is more 
intense, angrier, and more relentless than others. Overwhelmed by his 
impressions, he rejects a friendly gesture from Prince Nesvitskii:
Grown even paler, Bolkonskii, with a malicious expression on his face, 
pushed him away […]. That nervous irritation the sight of [the Austrian 
general] Mack had caused him, the news of his defeat, and thoughts of 
what awaited the Russian army, found their outlet in exasperation at 
[junior officer] Zherkov’s inappropriate joke. 25
Such ‘nervous irritation’ (‘nervnoe razdrazhenie’) is not unusual for 
Andrei:
With an expression of nervous irritation […]. His serious face trembled 
with nervous animation in every muscle; his eyes […] now shone with 
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a bright, radiant glitter […]. [It could be seen that] the less lively he 
seemed ordinarily, the more energetic was he during moments of sickly 
irritation.26
The nervous energy which manifests itself in Andrei’s gleaming eyes 
and sudden rages can be useful, too:
…[A]nxious, but not tired ([…] Prince Andrei could endure physical 
exhaustion much better than the strongest people) […]. 27
Andrei can endure more than the strongest people because he feels 
more. This well of feeling is not mediated intellectually—its source is 
primal. As with his passionate predecessor Achilles, Prince Andrei’s 
greatest fear is dishonour. Yet this purely social fear is overwhelmed 
by the excess of powerful energy which is responsible for his outbursts 
and characterizes his inner, socially unmediated self. During a minor 
disagreement with an officer, Andrei becomes disproportionately angry:
[Prince Andrei saw] that which he feared most in the world, what the 
French call ridicule, but his instinct urged otherwise. […] Prince Andrei, 
with a face disfigured by fury, rode up to him […].28
Andrei’s reaction is excessive; a face disfigured by fury (‘izurodovannym 
ot beshenstva’) is an elemental, almost bestial thing. These unreasonable 
reactions never afflict self-possessed heroes who know how to submit. 
In their excesses of pride, anger, and obsession with honour, Achilles 
and Andrei can understand one another. In Book 1 of the Iliad, in the 
first of many instances of sudden anger, Achilles reacts violently to an 
insult from Agamemnon. Like Andrei confronting his brother officer, 
Achilles is consumed by pride, vacillating between controlling his rage 
and reaching for a weapon:
The heart in his rugged chest was pounding, torn…
Should he draw the long sharp sword slung at his hip […]
or check his rage and beat his fury down? (Il. 1.223–26, pp. 83–84)
Athena intervenes and prevents Achilles from harming Agamemnon, 
yet Achilles remains furious:
But Achilles rounded on Agamemnon once again,
lashing out at him, not relaxing his anger for a moment. (Il. 
1.262–63, p. 85)
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Achilles’ father, companions, and even Athena regularly remind him to 
control his pride and temper; Andrei receives a similar scolding from 
his sister, Mar’ia. Such admonitions are in vain because the defect of 
ill-humour is implicit in these warriors’ superiority. Achilles’ anger is 
disproportionate because everything about him is disproportionate—
like Andrei, he is stronger and stranger than his fellows. Andrei and 
Achilles feel more intensely and suffer more deeply because there is 
more for them to feel and to suffer. 
In a certain sense, unusual depth of anger is an asset to a particular 
type of fighter. Donna Orwin writes, ‘[t]he spokesman in War and Peace 
for righteous anger as the motivator of the warrior is Prince Andrei’.29 
Anger does not inspire Sarpedon or Tushin; it is a dangerous motivation, 
both for the warrior and for those who love him. Crucially, it also makes 
the warrior more complicated by disrupting the nature of his heroism. 
In their inability to submit and in their emotional and physical excesses, 
Achilles and Andrei distort the traditional shape of what heroism 
means. They are deformed heroes in a double sense: they themselves 
are disproportionate and so they are able to de-form the concept of the 
heroic. 
Without question, however, Andrei is a hero. He runs with the 
standard into the most violent heart of battle, refuses to fall to the 
ground to avoid cannon fire, and will not let himself be afraid. His 
father calls him ‘voin’ (‘a warrior’); 30 the diplomat Bilibin calls him 
‘un héros’;31 most tellingly for Tolstoy, General Kutuzov (in the book, 
an exemplar of what it means to be Russian) claims in a letter to old 
Bolkonskii that Andrei ‘pal geroem’ (‘fell as a hero’).32 Later, he praises 
Andrei nostalgically: ‘“I remember you at Austerlitz… I remember, 
I remember you with the standard […] I know that your path is the 
path of honour”’. 33 Andrei enters the war expecting glory, and the two 
men he consistently admires most, his father and Kutuzov, expect him 
to be courageous and honourable. These expectations exist because, 
somewhat circularly, Andrei is a warrior and a hero. As with Achilles, 
heroism is Andrei’s social role, determined by birth and by authority: 
the first as son of the illustrious Bolkonskii, and the second as adjutant 
to General Kutuzov, who regards himself as Andrei’s second father.34 
Andrei’s heroic role is then confirmed by practice, namely, success in 
battle. Andrei’s two fathers have pre-determined and delimited the 
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horizon of his possibilities: ‘The community asks of some members 
that they leave the community and enter the anticommunity of combat. 
There they must overcome mercy and terror and learn to value their 
honour above their own lives or another’s.’35 
If Andrei’s unwillingness to submit to acceptable social mores 
manifests itself in seemingly trivial ways—a shove here, a hostile 
remark there—ultimately, the excesses which motivate his insubstantial 
insubordinations well up into something very substantial indeed: the 
hero’s rejection of his prescribed social role. After Austerlitz, Andrei is a 
warrior and a hero who renounces both roles. If Sarpedon prefers not to 
fight, it is because he has a family he misses and because war is cruel and 
hard. Andrei’s withdrawal from the war has very different motivations: 
he has seen through the illegitimacy of the hero’s position in society and 
the false association with glory that sustains it. Combat may exist outside 
the boundary of community, but so does freedom, which includes the 
overturning of conventions established by community. Combat is where 
Andrei and Achilles learn freedom from convention. In Andrei’s brief 
moments with Napoleon, the warrior ethos collapses for him:
At that moment, all the interests preoccupying Napoleon seemed so 
insignificant to [Prince Andrei], his own hero appeared to him so trivial 
[…], that he could not reply to [Napoleon].
Gazing into Napoleon’s eyes, Prince Andrei thought of the 
insignificance of greatness […]. 36
I began by asking what it means for an epic hero to refuse his role. First, 
departing from the ‘typical’ violent heroism of epic forms, a different 
sort of heroism is elevated to prominence, one which Griffiths and 
Rabinowitz identify by its deformations from the norm. There is a 
grandeur in rejecting honours, but only if the rejection is performed by 
one who has already earned them. Such a narrative implies a sort of 
virtue ethics: only an Andrei or an Achilles can refuse glory, and this 
refusal contributes to the deformation of heroism. Within the bounds of 
this deformed epic, heroes can take on the novelistic burden of rejecting 
the traditional values of epic, and their rejection is legitimized by 
their position within epic. If an unwarlike, weaker type, like Homer’s 
grotesque Grecian soldier Thersites or Tolstoy’s naïve civilian Pierre 
Bezukhov, concluded that violence is unjustifiable, we would suspect 
their criticism of cowardice or sloth, no matter how morally justified it 
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might be.37 In Achilles and Andrei, epic is performing a self-reflexive, 
critical function which Bakhtin regards as typical solely of the novelistic 
genre: ‘This ability of the novel to criticize itself is a remarkable feature 
of this ever-developing genre.’38
In her writings on molodechestvo, Donna Orwin points out that the 
molodets figure is fundamentally positive for Tolstoy, especially because 
the molodets is usually engaged in defending narodnye (popular) 
interests: ‘Freed from preoccupation with themselves, soldiers in this 
state throw themselves into communal activity in a way that mimics 
and indeed produces self-sacrifice.’39 Pierre imagines the soldier type as 
occupying this ethical and almost supernatural height: 
They—these people strange and unfathomable for him until now, they 
were clearly and sharply separated in his thoughts from all other people.
‘To be a soldier, just a soldier!’ Pierre thought […]. ‘To enter into that 
communal life with all one’s being […]. But how to throw off all this 
unnecessary, devilish stuff, all the burden of the outer man?’ 40
What Pierre envies is the self-forgetful commitment so characteristic of 
Tushin and Sarpedon which, as Andrei understands, determines victory 
or defeat. Only those who have achieved this kind of self-abnegation 
can legitimately question it. A life of courage, vitality, and violence can 
be regarded as its own justification partly because it produces a unique 
space for sacrifice, of course, but also for the much more prosaic reason 
Sarpedon points out: such a life is not possible for most of us because 
it is painful and hard. Few of us, even if we choose it, would be able 
to endure it. Only after the prescribed and supremely difficult social 
role has been affirmed by inheritance, authority, and most importantly, 
successful violent action, can it be rejected. To be legitimate, judgement 
on violence must be passed by those who are capable of committing 
violence. An ex-molodets is a tragic, admirable figure. 
Second, the nature of the hero’s ethical rejection of the epic role is 
reflective, at the level of both authorial and embedded narrative. A work 
which simultaneously celebrates “typical” heroism in a Sarpedon or a 
Tushin, but also interrogates war’s validity in the deformed heroism of 
an Achilles or Andrei, is a self-reflective, polyvocal work, equipped to 
question its own foundations. The self-reflective epic takes the trouble to 
provide reasons and arguments for rejecting heroism, here articulated 
by Achilles and Andrei. These reasons do not necessarily echo the 
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reasons Homer or Tolstoy might have articulated, further complicating 
the multiplicity of voices. Ruth Scodel describes violent moments in the 
Iliad which beget moral disagreement between narrator and narrative:
When moral judgments appear in such passages, it is impossible to 
know exactly whose they are. Agamemnon convinces Menelaus not to 
spare the lives of any Trojans, ‘persuading him in accordance with how 
it should be’ (6.62): this is Menelaus’ reaction, but by giving his voice to 
Menelaus’ feelings, the poet hints that for Menelaus, the victim of Trojan 
outrage, this reaction is appropriate. Zeus waits for Hector to fire a Greek 
ship as the fulfilment of Thetis’ ‘excessive’ prayer (15.598), inviting the 
hearer’s agreement. When Achilles ‘cruelly’ sacrifices Trojan prisoners 
on Patroclus’ pyre, the poet almost merges their viewpoint with his own. 
The technique is surprisingly modern.41
The conclusions of Achilles and Andrei can, and do, invite the reader’s 
and hearer’s disagreement, yet deformation enables them to see 
farther and more deeply, with a more philosophically nuanced vision 
motivated by something other than the pursuit of admiration. Tolstoy’s 
autobiographical 1855 story Sevastopol in May (Sevastopol’ v Mae) 
concludes that seeking traditional heroes is futile:
Neither Kalugin with his brilliant courage […], nor Praskukhin, a vacant, 
harmless fellow although he fell in battle for faith, the throne, and the 
fatherland, nor Mikhailov with his timidity […], nor Pest—a child with 
no firm convictions or rules, can be either villains nor heroes of a tale.
The hero of my novel, whom I love with all the strength of my soul, 
whom I have tried to represent in all his beauty, and who is, always has 
been, and will be beautiful—is truth.42 
This narrator can unite those who participate in battle heroically, 
faithfully, timidly, or naïvely because a narrative which undermines 
conventional values—a philosophical narrative—does not distinguish 
between great and trifling questions. Such a narrative privileges not 
typical heroism but the pursuit of truth, which involves estrangement 
and decontextualization. Tolstoyan heroes, who are not privy to the 
narrator’s discourse, can nevertheless arrive at the narrator’s assessment. 
Achilles’ deformation of character alienates him from his comrades and 
enables him to conceptually remove himself from the action and take up 
a quasi-narratorial perspective. After stipulating that he detests a man 
who says one thing and means another—in other words, anyone who 
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does not privilege truth—Achilles collapses conventional epic distance 
between glorious and ordinary: ‘The same honour waits/ for the coward 
and the brave’ (Il. 9.386, p. 262). There can be no difference in honour 
between Sarpedon and Thersites when honour is a myth. Achilles’ ability 
to pass such a damning judgement on heroism is one of the ways epic 
overflows its categories, reaching beyond itself to wonder at, question, 
and even mock itself. For Griffiths and Rabinowitz, 
In Homer, the glorious past does […] maintain its absolute superiority 
over the present; but it is a glory that instructively dismantles, discredits, 
and analyses itself. If the ‘epic age’ is pre-philosophical and unreflective, 
the great epics are its most philosophical and least characteristic part.43 
However, the dismantling, discrediting and analysis belong primarily not 
to Homer but to one of his heroes. And thus Achilles is no conventional, 
Homeric hero—he is a Tolstoyan hero of truth. 
Life and Thought
Andrei’s and Achilles’ unique position results in their mutual dismissal 
of heroism—for what? If glory and the social capital it brings are not 
good, what is good? Andrei’s answer to this question shifts from an 
elemental home to an intellectual nothing. When he awakens on the 
Pratzen Heights after the Battle of Austerlitz, Andrei is immediately 
conscious that he is still alive. Then he recalls the sky: 
… [I]n the exact place where he fell with the standard in his hands, Prince 
Andrei lay bleeding […]. Suddenly he again felt alive, and suffering from 
a burning, tearing pain in his head.
‘Where is it, that lofty sky […]?’ was his first thought. 44
Andrei’s first experience is pre-discursive and somatic: he knows he 
is alive because he feels it. It feels like pain in his physical body as 
something is being torn in his head or, more likely, in his mind. The 
second experience is thought (mysl’): abstract, distancing, and clearly 
secondary to spontaneous awareness. After recognizing the voices of 
Napoleon and his attendants nearby as they inspect the field, Andrei’s 
focus returns to his body, dissolving Napoleon’s individual self into 
a general sense of humanity. Humans—it does not matter which 
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ones—come between Andrei and the sky, and they will help him return 
to life, which remains precious:
It made absolutely no difference to him in that moment who stood above 
him […] he was simply happy that people had stopped above him, and 
wished only that these people would help him and return him to life, 
which seemed to him so beautiful, because he understood it differently 
now. 45
Humanity is the intermediary between Andrei and the sky, between the 
particular and the universal, and humanity’s function is to restore the 
dying back to life, to continue and to contribute to life. Then thought 
(mysl’) returns. Mysl’ follows the weakening of the body; it measures 
life against itself, that is, against abstract thought. The outcome of this 
comparison is a condemnation of life: 
Everything seemed so pointless and insignificant in comparison to 
that severe and majestic course of thought which suffering, the near 
expectation of death, and the weakness caused by blood loss had 
called forth in him. […] Prince Andrei thought of the insignificance of 
greatness, the insignificance of a life, the meaning of which no-one could 
understand […]. 46
It is important to note that it is not only Napoleonic grandeur that 
appears hollow to Andrei now; life itself becomes insignificant. There 
is a dichotomy here between the powerfully felt beauty of life, and the 
powerfully thought unimportance of it. Upon losing consciousness again, 
the solemn mysl’ is replaced with visions of home and simple joys, which 
are then immediately subordinated to the thinking, doubting self again:
He was imagining a quiet life and serene family happiness in Bald 
Hills. He was already enjoying this happiness, when suddenly a little 
Napoleon appeared […] and the doubts [and] torments began, and only 
the sky promised peace. 47
The heroism Andrei had previously sought is empty, while ordinary life 
among beloved family members is precious. However, just as Andrei 
begins to take pleasure in this prosaic comfort, he is overtaken with 
intellectual doubt that only the sky can alleviate. The solution of the 
sky is negative—it replaces doubt with nothingness because for the sky, 
individual life does not matter. It dissolves Napoleons into generalities, 
makes all human activity seem pointless (bespolezno) and insignificant 
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(nichtozhno), and silences communication—in thinking of the sky, 
Andrei has no need for the mediation of language.48 The passage implies 
that Andrei reaches a “correct”, Tolstoy-approved conclusion—heroic 
glory is unimportant—yet he does so for the wrong reasons. This is 
because the sky is what Jeff Love describes as ‘infinite indifference, an 
equanimity that marks freedom from decision as well as the temptation 
to narrative that depends on it, indefinite indifference being a cultivation 
of nothingness as unaware of itself as it is of the need for authority’.49 Yet 
life in the midst of this indifference is not possible. If home and family 
are life, and the majestic silence of the sky is nothingness and even death, 
then Andrei founders somewhere in between, where the unanswerable 
questions are. 
The disillusioned Achilles follows Andrei in his response to 
fighting: he too realizes that he wants to live at home instead of dying 
on a battlefield. The first words Achilles utters in the Iliad, long before 
Agamemnon insults him, are a plea to return home (‘Son of Atreus, now 
we are beaten back, I fear/ the long campaign is lost. So home we sail…’ 
[Il. 1.67, p. 79]). However, even after Agamemnon vows to take Achilles’ 
war prize, the girl Briseis, Achilles explains that he is not invested in 
the battle. He is angry at Agamemnon, of course, but he has obviously 
long been aware that the reasons for his participation in the war—
presumably, the pursuit of glory—mean little to him. After a decade of 
fighting, Achilles contrasts the fury of battle with the vast expanse not 
of the sky, but of the peaceful sea, soil, and mountains:
It wasn’t Trojan spearmen who brought me here to fight.
The Trojans never did me damage, not in the least,
they never stole my cattle or my horses, never
in Phthia where the rich soil breeds strong men
did they lay waste my crops. How could they?
Look at the endless miles that lie between us…
shadowy mountain ranges, seas that surge and thunder. (Il. 
1.179–85, p. 82)
This contrast, with its final emphasis on distance, is borrowed from 
Andrei, who observed that the vast sky is very different from the 
chaotic arbitrariness of battle, that untroubled expanse is ‘not like how 
we ran, shouted, and fought; not like how with angry and frightened 
faces the Frenchman and the artilleryman tugged the standard from 
one another’.50 
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Achilles then announces that he is returning to Phthia since it is ‘better 
that way by far,/ to journey home in the beaked ships of war’ (Il. 1.219–
20, p. 83). The great warrior’s immediate response to injury is desire 
not for vengeance and power, but for home and the father who waits 
for him there. Achilles thinks the best use for warships is a homeward 
journey. He wants to live, glory or no glory. When Agamemnon’s insult 
comes, Achilles’ keen perception pierces through the king’s authority 
as Andrei’s pierced through that of Napoleon, revealing his power as 
founded on nothingness: ‘King who devours his people! Worthless 
husks, the men you rule [...] (Il. 1.270, p. 85).’ By withdrawing from 
battle, Achilles is trying to shelter himself from pain and from his heroic 
role, which suddenly seems hollow. 
If Andrei’s mysl’ is begotten by the infinite sky with which he has all 
but become identified, then Achilles’ mysl’ comes from the infinite sea, 
with which he is in constant communion. After Briseis is taken, Achilles 
wanders away from his friends: 
Achilles […] slipping away from his companions,
far apart, sat down on the beach of the heaving gray sea
and scanned the endless ocean. (Il. 1.413–15, p. 89)
Achilles finds solace in the expanse of sea. To reach the hero, his 
companions have to journey ‘where the battle lines of breakers crash and 
drag’ (Il. 2.243, p. 106). Achilles is not only physically situated near the 
sea, but emotionally akin to it; both qualities alienate him from others. 
In Book 16, Patroclus laments Achilles’ inhuman excesses:
But you are intractable, Achilles! […]
You heart of iron! He was not your father,
the horseman Peleus—Thetis was not your mother.
Never. The salt gray sunless ocean gave you birth
and the towering blank rocks—your temper’s so relentless. (Il. 
16.33–40, p. 413)
This passage eliminates precisely that which is personal about Achilles’ 
association with sea—his mother Thetis, who dwells there. It also 
describes the sea and ‘towering rocks’, which recall the mountains 
Achilles mentioned earlier, as bereft of humanity. The nihilistic, inhuman 
wisdom that Andrei receives from the sky and Achilles receives from 
the sea prompts the latter to speak for both when he says:
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One and the same lot for the man who hangs back
And the man who battles hard […]
They both go down to Death,
the fighter who shirks, the one who works to exhaustion. (Il. 
9.85–87, p. 262)
Achilles has now had time to think. His considered response, so different 
from his previous emotional one, is the radical and astonishingly 
modern conclusion that there is no meaningful difference between hero 
and loser, between himself and ‘cowards’. Death—whether represented 
as sky, sea, or nothingness—is the great leveller. Here Achilles is echoing 
Andrei’s earlier insight that everything is pointless and insignificant. 
Yet, after a few moments, Achilles has changed his mind again. Maybe 
going home is the answer, after all, because life among those who love 
you is more precious than glory or heroic death: 
I say no wealth is worth my life! […]
Cattle and fat sheep can all be had for the raiding,
tripods all for the trading, and tawny-headed stallions.
But a man’s life breath cannot come back again—
no raiders in force, no trading brings it back […]
To the rest I’d pass on this advice:
sail home now! […]
[…] home in the ships with me
To the fatherland we love. (Il. 9.488–520, pp. 265–66)
Achilles explains that his position as hero, as initiator of violence and 
destruction, cannot beget the kind of life that matters to him now. Having 
undergone a profound transformation, Achilles is here divided three 
ways between honour, life, and the perspective of the sea which makes 
either choice meaningless. Like Andrei, he is hurt and disillusioned, 
trying to think his way out of a deep uncertainty. In refusing the best 
solution made available to him by his epoch which the embassy proffers, 
namely, to accept Agamemnon’s gifts and fight, Achilles follows 
Andrei’s thoughts until they are both lost. Only one thing is clear to 
them: Andrei knew after Austerlitz that the honour which comes from 
human admiration is false, and so Achilles asks rhetorically, ‘What do I 
need with honour such as that?’ (Il. 9.740, p. 272). 
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From this socially and personally doomed but philosophically 
privileged place, Andrei and Achilles glimpse the same reasoning 
presented by the narrator of War and Peace:
The ancients left us examples of heroic poems in which heroes make up 
the entire interest of the story, and we still cannot get used to the fact that, 
for our time, such a history makes no sense. 51
This is an overt reference to the Iliad, and the irony is that it is precisely 
that heroic poem which informed the scope and themes of War and 
Peace.52 After presenting a narrative of heroes and powerful individuals, 
the narrator says that they are unimportant. Yet the narrator does not 
argue that heroic history is never relevant, only that it is not relevant 
today. Achilles, however, realized this truth nearly three millennia ago, 
and the knowledge deformed him. The world for which epic narrative 
was valid could neither limit nor account for his insights, and he is a 
stranger to the heroes who are closest to him. Patroclus regrets that 
Achilles is intractable, and of course he is, but only because he is a 
novelistic hero in an epic poem. 
What They Said to the Ambassadors
Bakhtin wrote that an epic hero cannot obtain critical distance from 
his epic context: ‘He has no face for it, no gesture, no language’.53 Yet 
language is precisely what Achilles has in excess. Richard Martin notes 
that ‘the power of Achilles’ representation […] has persuaded readers 
since Plato that the words of the hero are somehow different from 
ordinary discourse’.54 This assertion has been borne out by empirical 
studies on Homeric diction, which have demonstrated that Achilles’ 
language is distinct from that of other Iliadic heroes. The distinction 
is not solely one of content, but of diction itself; signifiers as well as 
signifieds render the speech of Achilles idiosyncratic. Stephen Nimis 
has argued that, within an oral tradition in which systematic formulas 
underlie Homeric composition, innovative diction proceeds by a ‘rule-
governed creativity’ which generates new meanings with conventional 
units, but that Achilles expands the linguistic conventions available to 
him by means of a ‘rule-changing creativity’ that utilizes, among other 
things, the rhetorical devices of poetry.55 
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Such tools of rhetoric and syntax are manifested in Achilles’ speeches 
in ways that are either exclusive to him or qualitatively different from 
that of the other speakers in the Iliad. They include, as Paul Friedrich 
and James Redfield have shown, repetitions that take the form of an 
expanding series (instead of the mere verbatim reiterations which other 
speakers make) and the ability to depict hypothetical images.56 When 
Achilles lists Agamemnon’s gifts, for example, he begins with those 
explicitly offered and ends with imagined gifts of which there are first 
‘ten times as much’ then ‘twenty times over;’ then he moves from a city, 
to a larger city, to sand, to, finally, all the particles of dust: 
I wouldn’t give you a splinter for that man!
Not if he gave me ten times as much, twenty times over, all
he possesses now, and all that could pour in from the world’s end—
not all the wealth that’s freighted into Orchomenos, even into 
Thebes,
Egyptian Thebes where the houses overflow with the greatest troves
of treasure,
Thebes with the hundred gates and through each gate battalions,
two hundred fighters surge to war with teams and chariots— 
no, not if his gifts outnumbered all the grains of sand
and dust in the earth—no, not even then […]. (Il. 9.463–71, p. 264)
At a syntactical level, Friedrich and Redfield identify the marked 
frequency of subjunctive verbs in Achilles’ language along with an 
elaboration of emotive particles and vocative expressions which results 
in a free use of both terms of affection and terms of abuse. By plotting 
the syntagmatic and paradigmatic formulas in Achilles’ speech,57 
Richard Martin has concluded that the hero’s language includes phrases 
with unexpected juxtapositions and that his use of verbs deviates from 
traditional patterns used elsewhere in the Iliad.58 Most idiosyncratically 
of all, Achilles employs what Martin terms the ‘expansion aesthetic’59 
which inserts new words and phrases into formulaic patterns or 
connects them to other patterns. For instance, Achilles’ famous retort 
to Odysseus’ entreaties in Book 9—‘I hate that man like the very Gates 
of Death/ who says one thing but hides another in his heart’ (Il. 9.378–
379, p. 262)—was produced by the poet’s splitting of the traditional 
phrase tetelesmenon estai, ‘and it shall be brought to pass,’ which occurs 
elsewhere in the Iliad only in contexts of threat or promise, to insert the 
completely different material.60
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Achilles’ language follows Andrei’s to a surprising extent, with 
both speakers arriving at similar conclusions. Andrei, whom Gary Saul 
Morson describes as possessing a unique mastery of language, and as 
a ‘character from another genre (the epic)’,61 utters descriptions of and 
reflections upon his situation which become useful for an epic hero who 
must speak beyond the epic to convey his discontent. In the following 
section, we will examine the discourse both heroes use when their 
motives are questioned by their comrades and what it means. 
Pierre visits Andrei as a sort of ambassador twice. First, at 
Bogucharovo where Andrei describes himself as being ‘na bivakakh 
(‘bivouacking’),62 and again at Borodino, where Andrei is literally in 
a military camp. During the first visit, Andrei tells Pierre that he has 
become disillusioned with the war that has nearly killed him, that he 
cannot sleep until morning because of his endless thoughts (mysli), and 
that he seeks only to live near his family in his own quiet corner, busy 
with humble tasks like gardening: 
‘I lived for glory. […] Thus I lived for others, and not nearly, but 
completely destroyed my life. […] I have become calmer since I began 
living only for myself.’
‘But how can one live only for oneself?’ asked Pierre, growing heated. 
‘What about your son, your sister, your father?’
‘But that is all also me, that is not others,’ said Prince Andrei […] ‘I 
build a house, I cultivate a garden […]. […] I go to bed at three o’clock, 
thoughts come to me, and I cannot fall sleep, tossing and turning, I do 
not sleep until morning because I am thinking and I cannot stop thinking 
[…].’63
When Achilles’ embassy arrives at his camp to ask him to return to war, 
Achilles models his reply on Andrei’s. He, too, has suffered and seen 
through the charade of glory which nearly killed him, cannot sleep at 
night in his bivouac, and wishes only for a quiet life with his father in a 
fertile land:
And what’s laid up for me, what pittance? Nothing—
and after suffering hardships, year in, year out,
staking my life on the mortal risks of war […]
Many a sleepless night I’ve bivouacked in harness […]
Ah but now,
since I have no desire to battle glorious Hector […]
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once I have […]
loaded up my holds
and launched out on the breakers […]
you will see my squadrons sail at dawn […]
[…] the third day out we raise the dark rich soil of Phthia.
There lies my wealth. (Il. 9.389–442, pp. 262–63)
While enduring the torment of battle fatigue and insomnia in a military 
camp (or its equivalent), Andrei and Achilles both wish for the exact 
opposite of everything a military camp represents. They want to 
participate in life in its most literal sense, which is why their respective 
words refer to gardening and fertile soil, both notions associated with 
peaceful activities of planting and harvesting.
In response to Pierre’s query about whether Andrei will return to 
the army, Andrei rejects the notion in his characteristically extreme 
manner: ‘“I vowed to myself that I would not serve in the active Russian 
army. And I wouldn’t, even if Bonaparte stood here, near Smolensk, 
threatening Bald Hills, even then I would not serve in the Russian 
army”’.64 So too, Achilles concludes his reply to his friends by asking 
them to tell Agamemnon the following:
I will not think of arming for bloody war again,
not till […] Hector
battles all the way to the Myrmidon ships and shelters […]
But round my own black ship and camp this Hector
blazing for battle will be stopped. (Il. 9.795–800, p. 273)
Achilles almost exactly repeats Andrei’s promise, but softens its 
extremism. He will consider returning, but not until that which explicitly 
belongs to him—his shelters, his ships, his people—is threatened by the 
enemy. This is because Achilles in his camp, like Andrei in his camp, has 
self-protectively delimited the horizon of his loyalty. 
The second time Pierre arrives at Andrei’s camp is just before the 
Battle of Borodino. Predictably, Andrei is in one of his haunted moods, 
cynically describing the logic of battles. In his attitude to war, Achilles’ 
pride is as great as Andrei’s not for the apparent reason of his arrogance, 
but because it is underwritten by the same keen insight and suffering. 
On the eve of battle, Andrei realizes that he has been duped and has 
paid a heavy price:
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‘We played at war, that’s what’s vile, we act magnanimously and so on. 
[…] It’s all nonsense. […] [W]e were duped, and we duped others. They 
rob other men’s homes, issue counterfeit notes, and worst of all, they 
kill my children, my father and they talk about the rules of war and 
magnanimity to one’s enemies. Take no prisoners, but kill and accept 
death! Whoever reached this conclusion as I did, by means of the same 
sufferings…’65
Reaching a pitch of emotional intensity typical of him, Andrei mocks the 
arbitrary nature of war:
Prince Andrei […] suddenly paused in his speech because an unexpected 
tremor had seized him by the throat. […] [H]is eyes glinted feverishly 
and his lip trembled when he began speaking again.
‘If there were no such thing as magnanimity in war […] there would 
be no wars because Pavel Ivanich insulted Mikhail Ivanich.’ 66
A revelation about the cruelty of pillaging and killing, or the foundation 
of battle as grounded upon petty disagreements, does not astonish 
Andrei’s hearers. However, when Achilles echoes Andrei in questioning 
the legitimacy of the pursuit of loot and honour upon which his heroism 
depends, he is doing something extraordinary, especially when he 
points out the arbitrariness of the battle’s cause. Enduring the horrors 
of warfare because Paris insulted Menelaus is the absurd equivalent of 
going to war because Pavel Ivanich insulted Mikhail Ivanich. This cynical 
insight is anticipated by Andrei when he says that it can be achieved 
only as he achieved it, through suffering. Achilles becomes more and 
more emotional as he explains that it was through suffering that he 
glimpsed the foolish credulity of his position, that he has been duped, 
both by Agamemnon and by the apparent legitimacy of the battle cause:
Like a mother bird hurrying morsels back
to her unfledged young […]
but it’s all starvation wages for herself.
So for me […]
[D]ay after bloody day I’ve hacked my passage through,
fighting other soldiers to win their wives as prizes.
Twelve cities of men I’ve stormed and sacked from shipboard […]
And from all I dragged off piles of splendid plunder […]
Why must we battle Trojans,
men of Argos? Why did he muster an army, lead us here,
that son of Atreus? Why, why in the world if not
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for Helen […]?
But now that he’s […]
robbed me, lied to me—don’t let him try me now. (Il. 9.392–418, pp. 
262–63)
Whether Achilles’ critique is accurate is less important than the fact 
that it occurs in a world prescribed by the values men like Sarpedon 
maintain via enthusiasm for battle and submission to hierarchy. Andrei 
and Achilles are emotionally paralyzed by the contradiction between 
what they expected from combat and what they found there. 
The three sources of Achilles’ sorrow—the deeply insulting loss of 
Briseis, the distance from his father, and the horror of war which leads 
to the death of Patroclus—find analogies in Andrei’s brooding on the 
night before battle. Andrei is plagued by three very similar tragedies: 
the loss of Natasha and its implied insult to his honour, the death of his 
father, and the protracted war. The first of these sorrows is particularly 
bitter for both heroes as it is a matter of pride, and Andrei reflects on 
how Anatole seduced Natasha:
And suddenly he remembered how his love ended. ‘He did not need any 
of it. He […] didn’t understand anything. He saw in her a pretty and fresh 
girl, with whom he did not condescend to link his fate. And I? And he is 
still alive and happy.’  67
When Achilles recalls the seizure of Briseis, he, too, is tormented by the 
gall of the rival as much as by the absence of the stolen girl:
[W]hen one man attempts to plunder a man his equal […]
That’s the pain that wounds me, suffering such humiliation.
That girl […]
right from my grasp he tears her […]
Treating me like some vagabond. (Il. 16.61–66, p. 414)
The ‘treating me like some vagabond’ is a restatement of Andrei’s 
outraged ‘And I?’. Achilles, as quick-tempered and dramatic as Andrei, 
loves Briseis as much as he is capable of loving, but it is his obsession 
with his own honour that makes her absence so painful for him (Achilles 
laments: ‘Any decent man/a man with sense, loves his own, cares for his 
own/ as deeply as I, I loved that woman with all my heart’ [Il. 9.414–16, 
p. 263]).
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Yet it is their peculiar sense of their own mortality which is greatly 
emphasized by war that binds the heroes most of all:
Despite […] how not needed by anyone and sorrowful his life seemed 
to Prince Andrei, just as in Austerlitz before the battle, he felt himself 
nervous and irritated […]. The three great sorrows of his life commanded 
his attention. His love for a woman, the death of his father, and the French 
invasion, which captured half of Russia […].
He gazed at the line of birches […] shining in the sun. ‘To die, so that 
I am killed tomorrow, so that I no longer exist […] so that all of this exists, 
but I do not.’68
What is striking about this passage is the pervasiveness of Andrei’s pity 
for himself and his prophetic doom-consciousness. As he anticipates 
his death, nervous and irritated as usual, his thoughts are almost 
grandiloquent, and his own story as he retells it to himself is Iliadic in 
its epic scope. Before his final battle, Andrei thinks that his life is ‘not 
needed by anyone’;69 he imagines himself dead. Achilles, before his final 
battle in the Iliad, repeats Andrei’s lament about his own unneeded life 
while anticipating death:
I shall not return to my fatherland…
nor did I bring one ray of hope […]
to […] my steadfast comrades […]
No, no, here I sit by the ships…
a useless, dead weight on the good green earth
I’ll lie in peace, once I’ve gone down to death. (Il. 18.118–43, pp. 
470–71)
In a passage that recollects Andrei’s gazing upon the sunlit birches 
while contemplating death, the nymph Thetis repeats the juxtaposition 
of sunlight and mortality when she says of her son Achilles:
Never again will I embrace him
striding home through the doors of Peleus’ house […]
[L]ooking into the sunlight, he is racked with anguish. (Il. 18.513–
16, pp. 481–82)
It is significant that Andrei and Achilles reflect on a life that they 
believe has been of no use to anyone immediately before they return to 
battle—where they will die. They can neither take refuge in intellectual 
ambivalence nor return home. Andrei’s and Achilles’ lives can be useful 
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again only if they fulfil their social role as heroes. This means that they 
must accept destruction. In their rage at this inexplicable unfairness, 
they will inflict destruction first. Their attitude to the enemy is hard: 
considering themselves deeply insulted and awaiting annihilation, they 
feel no mercy. Andrei explains it like this:
‘The fact is […] whoever fights more wickedly and spares himself less, 
will win’.
[…]
‘I would not take prisoners. What are prisoners? It’s chivalry. The 
French […] have insulted me and continue to insult me every second. 
They are my enemies […]. They must be executed. If they are my enemies, 
they cannot be my friends […]’. 70
It is important to note that Andrei used to subscribe to the notion of 
taking prisoners. However, he has changed. Taking prisoners is not 
possible for Achilles anymore, either. He, too, is possessed by the same 
sense of personal injury and so feels neither patience nor mercy. In one 
of the most oft-quoted passages of the Iliad, Achilles echoes Andrei 
when he mockingly calls the begging Lykaon ‘friend’ (Il. 21.119, p. 523). 
A Trojan cannot be Achilles’ friend any more than a Frenchman can be 
Andrei’s. Achilles, too, used to spare the enemy, but he now follows 
Andrei in describing the practice as foolish. Achilles has changed for 
the same reason Andrei has, and he now knows that whoever will fight 
more meanly and pity himself least, will win:
Fool,
don’t talk to me of ransom. No more speeches.
Before Patroclus […]
it warmed my heart a bit to spare some Trojans:
droves I took alive and auctioned off as slaves.
But now not a single Trojan flees his death […]
Come, friend, you too must die […]
There will come a dawn or sunset or high noon
when a man will take my life in battle too. (Il. 21.111–26, pp. 522–23)
The changed attitude to sparing the enemy which manifests itself before 
battle is part of the deformation Andrei and Achilles undergo. As noted 
above, magnanimity—or ‘rytsarstvo’ (‘chivalry’), as Andrei mockingly 
calls it—is one of the honour-linked Iliadic values identified by Paul 
Friedrich to which Achilles and Andrei once subscribed. As readers 
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or hearers, we are not sympathetic to their deeply unethical logic, and 
we are likely to take Lykaon’s side. However, this might be because 
we have not endured the suffering of deformed heroes. We are not 
capable of enduring such violence, so we cannot accept a legitimation 
for inflicting it. The position of Achilles and Andrei is not knowledge 
abstractly acquired but is an accretion of bitter experience. They are both 
hungry to kill while simultaneously accepting that they will die. They 
seek to follow Andrei’s cruel and tragic advice against taking enemy 
prisoners. There is room in epic to sympathize with this bitterness, and 
yet encourage its critique. This critique becomes especially apparent 
when we consider that after the battle, Andrei and Achilles change once 
again into morally reformed heroes who take great pity on their rivals, 
in some sense returning to their better selves.
Griffiths and Rabinowitz write: ‘The heroism that is the simple, 
static, ancient thing from which literary theory traces all the interesting 
variations and debunkings turns out to be […] a more manageable 
inspiration than the disruptive heroes of Greek poetry. In epic, a heroic 
figure can include all manner of contradictions’.71 In the simplest terms, 
the static hero is an abstraction and a narrative function. As the centre of 
epic, he does not exist. Sarpedon and Tushin are introduced as a foil for 
Achilles and Andrei. Homeric heroes do not merely disrupt their own 
historical context but can reach into the future and take inspiration from 
modernity, because epic narrative includes its own contradiction. 
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Afterword: But Seriously, Folks…. 
(Pierre Bayard and the Russians)
Eric Naiman
You talk like a book, Dad.
No, books talk like me.
Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita1
Pierre Bayard—the Great Liberator
A country with a notoriously unpredictable past, the consequence of 
its history’s frequent rewriting and of its most powerful inhabitants’ 
dismal record of anticipating the future, Russia offers an ideal testing 
ground for the paradoxical and gloriously anachronistic interpretive 
practice of Pierre Bayard. It is no coincidence, as the saying goes, that 
Bayard eventually followed his Anticipatory Plagiarism (Le Plagiat par 
anticipation, 2009) with The Tolstoevsky Enigma (L’énigme Tolstoïevski, 
2017), a book based on the premise that Tolstoy and Dostoevsky were 
the same person, an author whose range was so great that many scholars 
have been tempted to divide him into two distinct writers. Even readers 
of Dostoevsky’s The Double (Dvoinik, 1846) couldn’t have expected this 
sort of afterlife for Russia’s most famous novelists.
Unlike Tolstoevsky, or another object of Bayard’s fascination, Marcel 
Proust, Bayard refrains from writing loose baggy monsters, books that 
might be improved by the cutting of digressions. He takes his ideas in 
unexpected directions and the reader on sudden swerves through an 
absurdly defamiliarized canon, yet for all the wildness of their content, 
Bayard’s books are creatures of formal and reassuring predictability: an 
introduction is followed by three parts of four chapters each, totaling 
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around 150 pages. Chapters are no longer than a dozen pages; one 
consumes them like candy (like the fiction of Agatha Christie or, in his 
heyday, the films of Woody Allen), and even if one might feel dizzy or 
even queasy afterwards, the conceits are memorable. Bayard describes 
one of his books as ‘dedicated to the experimental construction of 
a delusional reading’. ‘Such a reading’, he adds, ‘is not intrinsically 
mad, but is certainly shot through at moments, like all great systemic 
delusions, with an invisible streak of lunacy’.2 The contrast between 
the delusion at the heart of each work and the orderly, concise fashion 
with which that delusion is elaborated, is a defining feature of Bayard’s 
charm.
Anticipatory Plagiarism begins with a traditional presentation of 
the concept’s pedigree. It was first coined by members of the Oulipo 
group, and François Le Lionnais in particular, to describe cases 
where contemporary writers discovered in texts from the past ideas 
of which they had considered themselves the innovators. The notion 
of ‘anticipatory plagiarism’ was a way of crediting predecessors with 
having first expressed insights the consequences of which they were not 
in a position to develop. Le Lionnais used the term ‘plagiarism’ loosely, 
so loosely that it might be applied to almost any case of literary influence. 
Bayard calls his bluff and stakes his own claim for originality on his 
insistence that anticipatory plagiarism must be wilful. He professes 
that his study will concern itself with ‘the deliberate intention to seek 
inspiration in works to come’.3 
Bayard does not deliver on this claim, and how could he? Although 
he reverts to terms like ‘embezzlement’ (malversation) to describe a past 
writer’s anticipation of future work, he allows that the plagiarism need 
not be ‘completely conscious’.4 In the case of Kafka, he speculates about 
the writer’s amorous affairs with the ghosts of future women writers, 
some of whom may not yet have been born; a critic intent on uncovering 
cases of anticipatory plagiarism must thus function not only as a 
medium but also as a matchmaker with a clientele of spectral brides. 
In Bayard’s hands, a discourse used more normatively for crimes gives 
way to talk of inspiration and play. A charge of anticipatory plagiarism 
‘is not bound up in an exclusively condemnatory logic, but equally pays 
homage to the authors whose methods it calls into question’.5 Authors 
who can anticipate the future well enough to steal from it should be 
credited for having the good sense—perhaps even the genius—of 
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knowing whom to rob. The discourse of inculpation is merely a façade; 
as we will see, Bayard’s work is far more invested in the dynamics of 
liberation and acquittal. 
Bayard insists that we must distinguish ‘authentic thefts of ideas’ 
from illusory ones that are based on mere similarities, often arising 
from our having read the later texts first.6 T. S. Eliot famously wrote that 
each new work of art modifies all its predecessors: it is not ‘preposterous 
that the past should be altered by the present as much as the present 
is directed by the past’.7 Bayard claims to go beyond Eliot’s insight: 
‘According an excessive place to retrospective influence would thus 
serve to relativize anticipatory plagiarism, even to exculpate those 
guilty of it, who would thereby be provided the means of defending 
themselves by blaming the imagination of readers and the ability of 
readers to come up with similarities’.8 He wants to preserve the frisson 
of transgression, and he fears that without an insistence on plagiarism, 
anachronistic reading might be too easily naturalized. In the absence 
of a requirement for intentional copying, ‘there is a genuine risk, in the 
overly large conception which the writers of Oulipo often accord to 
anticipatory plagiarism, of letting the notion dissolve and thus lose its 
disruptive force’.9
As these last words suggest, Anticipatory Plagiarism is perhaps less 
about the promotion of an idea or the identification of culprits than the 
generous sharing of an emancipatory affect. The book’s principal foe 
is rigidity—in scholarship and in chronology, and also in literary style. 
Although Oulipo’s practice revolved around play with self-imposed 
‘constraints’, Bayard seeks to free his readers from limitations on 
interpretation absorbed during their professional formation. So much 
of learning how to interpret and how to present and defend a reading 
is bound up with mastering how not to argue and interpret. Bayard 
describes school as ‘a realm of violence driven by the fantasy that there 
exists such a thing as thorough reading’, and as ‘a place where everything 
is calibrated to determine whether students have truly read the books 
about which they speak and face interrogation’. Such an aim, he adds, 
‘is illusory, for reading does not obey the hard logic of true and false, of 
waving off ambiguity and evaluating with certitude whether readers are 
telling the truth’.10 Although Bayard makes this claim in a book entitled 
How to Talk About Books You Haven’t Read (Comment parler des livres 
que l’on n’a pas lus, 2007), that book itself establishes Bayard as a very 
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close reader—if only for his ability to find authoritative propositions in 
passages which many actual readers of those books easily forget—and 
which Bayard now renders emblematic.11
For all his talk about plagiarism, Bayard is a very forgiving scholar. 
In the writing of literary history, ‘the choice is not between the true and 
the false but between diverse modalities of error.’12 
To accept a margin of imprecision in scientific work is thus not simply a 
mark of humility, but the recognition—as the entire history of sciences 
tends to show—that there can be a fecundity of error and that the creative 
detours that error incites can lead us sometimes to an original vision.13 
‘Reading otherwise’ can expose a scholar to ridicule. Appearing 
ridiculous is a risk Bayard endorses, and in a philological version of the 
Passion he is prepared to assume the consequence of that sin, so that 
others may find the courage—often productively—to err and play. 
Vladimir Nabokov described the experience of appreciating—and 
analyzing—a work of art as the cultivation of ‘a tingle in the spine’.14 That 
tingle is in part a result of our education and is not easily developed, yet 
much of what we are trained to do is to discipline that excited response 
when it occurs. A great deal of that disciplining comes from respecting 
chronology. Aesthetic appreciation, the starting point of literary 
scholarship, is bound up with sensory reactions, while history, that 
fetishist of chronology, is more strictly an intellectual field, working on 
the body most when the historian borrows from the armory of literature. 
Bayard encourages literary scholars to struggle against chronological 
repression. Even those of us who believe that linear time exists should be 
willing to concede that too often literary scholarship submits to history 
at too early a stage in the interpretive work that precedes the outlining 
and writing of a scholarly contribution.
In this respect Bayard echoes—or inspires—the work of Mikhail 
Bakhtin, the absence of whose name in Bayard’s work—i.e. those books 
of his that I really have read—is reminiscent of the missing letter ‘e’ 
in Perec’s The Disappearance (La Disparition, 1969). Bakhtin’s celebrated 
essay on the chronotope follows a roughly chronological structure—
albeit with several important deviations—but it begins with the words 
‘the process of the mastering in literature of real historical time’—a 
phrase that is less the beginning of an assertion about a historical fact 
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than an invocation of a creative muse. The entire first paragraph of 
Bakhtin’s famous essay on the chronotope is worth quoting:
The process of the mastering [osvoenie] in literature of real historical 
time and space and of the real historical man unfolding in them has 
flowed in complicated and erratic ways. Isolated aspects of time and 
space accessible at a given historical stage of human development have 
been mastered [osvaivalis’], and corresponding generic techniques have 
been elaborated for the reflection and artistic reworking of mastered 
[osvoennykh] sides of reality.15
Both Bakhtin and Nabokov, as we shall see, are potential and perhaps 
even repressed interlocutors for Bayard, and what Nabokov said 
about the word dom [home] at the opening of Anna Karenina—‘this 
ponderous and solemn repetition, dom, dom, dom, tolling as it does for 
doomed family life […] is a deliberate device on Tolstoy’s part’—applies 
with equal force to the start of Bakhtin’s essay.16 Osvoeniia, osvaivalis’, 
osvoennykh: Bakhtin’s extraordinarily creative and extremely influential 
contribution to the study of literature begins, like Bayard’s, with the 
conquest, subordination, and reworking of time.
The essays in this volume seek to apply Bayard’s concept of 
anticipatory plagiarism to works of Russian literature. That tack already 
introduces a certain amount of dissonance, because Bayard himself is 
less interested in literature for its own sake, than for what literature 
can tell us about the human mind and the process of literature’s 
psychic consumption. The application of psychoanalysis to literature, 
he admits, is essentially reductive, finding only what it already knows 
will be there. The use of literature and reading for psychic modelling, 
literature’s application to psychoanalysis, is Bayard’s principal concern. 
Sometimes, as in his reading of Agatha Christie’s The Murder of Roger 
Ackroyd (1926), Bayard’s analysis can transform our understanding of 
an entire genre, but for the most part his underlying hypotheses about 
particular writers or texts don’t aim specifically to be true to those texts. 
Instead, they seek to put those texts to work to produce new models 
of thinking about literary evolution, reading, or even the structure of 
the psyche. In disciplinary terms, this is psychoanalysis embracing 
counter-transference.
How useful a tool is anticipatory plagiarism for the understanding of 
specific literary texts? One of the problems with applying Bayard’s notion 
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of anticipatory plagiarism to works of literature is that it is difficult for a 
scholar to maintain the pretence of taking this idea sufficiently seriously 
all the way through to the end of an article, let alone a book. Doing 
so may give the impression that we are producing an influence study 
in drag, with the travestying of chronology merely serving to reaffirm 
linear time’s inescapability. Speaking about influence backwards can 
begin to resemble a kind of scholarly pig-Latin, an exercise in translation 
more cute than acute, reminiscent of a game show where all the answers 
have to be phrased as questions. 
Where the investigation of specific literary texts is concerned, 
anticipatory plagiarism works best when it functions as a heuristic 
conceit early on in the conceptualization of scholarship, when it reveals 
something about the ‘plagiarizing’ work that we would not have seen 
if we had not placed it in extremis by trying to fit it to Bayard’s model. 
From what future writers, one can ask a class, or oneself, did Gogol 
or Tolstoy plagiarize? Svetlana Yefimenko sees the value of anticipatory 
plagiarism as its ability to ‘illuminate latent tendencies’ in the work 
of the anticipatory plagiarizer. We force a text out of its latency by 
administering the interpretive equivalent of growth hormones, making 
it mature before it would otherwise be ready. The exercise might result 
in a grotesque version of what the original work has come to stand for, 
but the original work still exists in its original form, and we may now 
know something about its nature that we otherwise would not have 
grasped.
The notion of anticipatory plagiarism, and of the light that can be 
shed by unabashedly anachronistic methodologies, may be especially 
important in giving us the confidence not immediately to dismiss 
a reading when, chronologically speaking, it seems completely 
improbable. To cite one example, in Crime and Punishment (Prestuplenie 
i nakazanie, 1866) Raskolnikov overhears a student and an officer 
discussing whether they would kill the detested old pawnbroker whose 
murder Raskolnikov is himself contemplating. The ‘superstitious’ 
Raskolnikov becomes ‘greatly agitated’:
Of course, it was all the most common and ordinary youthful talk and 
thinking, he had heard it many times before, only in different forms and 
on different subjects. But why precisely now did he have to hear precisely 
such talk and thinking, when ... exactly the same thoughts had just been 
conceived in his own head? And why precisely now, as he was coming 
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from the old woman’s bearing the germ of his thought, should he chance 
upon a conversation about the same old woman? ... This coincidence 
always seemed strange to him. This negligible tavern conversation had 
an extreme influence on him in the further development of the affair; as 
though there were indeed some predestination, some indication in it….…
………..…………………………............................ [kak budto deistvitel’no bylo tut 
kakoe-to predopredelenie, ukazanie….…………..………………………….].17
The uncharacteristic extended ellipsis at the end highlights the 
importance of the passage and draws attention to its final words. 
Reflecting on the uncanniness of the moment, Raskolnikov almost has 
an insight: shimmering verbally before him, distorted—predopredelenie, 
ukazanie—lies the name of the novel Raskolnikov inhabits [Prestuplenie 
i nakazanie], the narrative that has always controlled his destiny. This 
isn’t the sort of move one expects to find in nineteenth-century realist 
fiction, let alone in Dostoevsky; it smacks of the poetics of some 
writers of the next century. We don’t have to accept that Dostoevsky 
has anticipatorily plagiarized this trick from Nabokov, but treating 
chronological boundaries as porous prevents us from dismissing this 
insight as meaningless; we can return to Dostoevsky to hunt for similar 
examples and begin to play with the various interpretive scenarios in 
which this reading might make sense.
To take one more example, Tolstoy was notoriously careless about 
time. In War and Peace (Voina i mir, 1869) Liza Bolkonskaya’s pregnancy 
lasts well over a year. Anna Karenina (1878), as Nabokov pointed out, 
begins on a day that is alternately Thursday and Friday.18 Moreover, 
paying close attention to the timeline reveals that in the first half of the 
novel Vronskii and Anna live through one more year than Kitty and Levin: 
‘The mated [live] faster than the mateless’.19 This is a quintessentially 
performative gesture by the interpreter; Nabokov is trying not so much 
to show that the off-kilter chronology of the novel makes intrinsic sense 
as to demonstrate that he, Nabokov, can make it seem to. 
There is another, perhaps more important moment, however, that 
Nabokov misses. (Even someone as protective of his own priority 
as Nabokov sometimes cannot tell when he is being anticipatorily 
plagiarized). 
In the novel’s seventh part, which terminates in Anna’s death, her 
brother Stiva goes to St Petersburg to try to obtain permission from 
Anna’s husband for a divorce. Stiva’s plans are thwarted largely because 
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the husband has fallen under the influence of a French mystic, Landau, 
formerly a salesman in Paris, who has been adopted by a princess and 
is now, ludicrously, accepted by Petersburg society as a prophet. Stiva 
himself falls asleep when Landau goes into a trance, whereupon the 
Frenchman orders Stiva out of the room: ‘“Que la personne qui est arrivée 
la dernière, celle qui demande, qu’elle sorte! Qu’elle sorte!” “C’est moi, n’est-ce 
pas?”’ Stiva asks, and leaves in a state of terror, ‘forgetting about his 
sister’s business’.20 Stiva’s abandonment of his sister’s mission is both 
comic and contemptible, but, ironically, most readers themselves 
probably forget about this episode in the following tense chapters that 
lead up to Anna’s throwing herself on the tracks. 
 Remembering that séance might be important, however, because 
three chapters later Vronskii and Anna receive a telegram from Stiva 
which subtly indicates—‘Decisive answer promised in a day or two’—
that in returning the narrative to Moscow, Tolstoy has gone back a day 
in time, without explicitly telling the reader that he has done so.21 There 
is an odd specificity in the pages to follow about the timing of Anna’s 
final moments. Tolstoy tells us the exact hour of her train’s departure 
(8:02 pm), and he emphasizes that her final moments are lit by ‘bright 
evening sunlight.’22 If the reader recalls the details of Stiva’s visit to 
Petersburg, she might remember that even though he arrives a little 
late for his evening appointment with Landau and Anna’s husband, ‘it 
was still broad daylight outside’.23 In other words, it is likely that the 
séance with Landau and Anna’s death are occurring at roughly the 
same time on the same day, and that Landau’s final words ‘“Qu’elle 
sorte”’ are directed not only at Stiva (gendered as feminine by being 
the last person—la personne—to enter the room) but, more crucially, at 
Anna, who, after all, is the ‘she’ of the book. Simultaneously Landau is 
ordering the brother out of the room and the sister out of the book. He 
may even be the novel’s final incarnation of the fatidic muzhik of Anna’s 
nightmares, who, we should remember, also speaks French.
This sort of subtle narrative trickery is not typical of Tolstoy. For 
Tolstoy to have planned this parallel would make him a different author 
from the one we think he is. This synchronization might well be random, 
and if I had noticed it twenty years ago I would have dismissed it as a 
curiosity. With an awareness that Tolstoy may have roots in the twentieth 
century, however, and with an inkling that he may even have intuited 
the content of the lectures Nabokov would deliver about him eighty 
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years later at Cornell, I hold on to this discovery, seek others like it, and 
begin to imagine more comprehensive readings into which it might fit.24 
The essential questions for those primarily invested in a specific 
author or a specific work of literature are the point at which we 
should remove the Bayardian scaffolding, and whether we should 
even admit that it was there in the first place. Should the scholar who 
uses anticipatory plagiarism as an exploratory device worry about the 
evidence so gained being tainted, the way a court might hesitate before 
admitting for the jury’s consideration an illegally obtained confession? 
Here is where Bayard’s affect comes in handy. He dispels the anxiety 
of influence by muddying the question of influence’s vector. This is no 
less true for scholars than it is for writers. One imagines future reviews 
and convention cocktail party chatter: ‘Your new book is a marvel; I must 
admit that I began stealing from it long ago’. Rarely will an assertion 
of priority have seemed so gracious. The doctrine of anticipatory 
plagiarism—like all of Bayard’s work—is actually a celebration of 
readerly originality, and of Bayard’s in the first instance, but it also 
removes some of the pressure to pretend to be saying something original 
in the first place. If Bayard were given a home in the syllabi of literature 
departments, would the result be more plagiarism, less plagiarism, or 
better plagiarism that would raise this fundamental academic crime to 
a form of art?
The joyousness of the world of Bayard’s scholarship is particularly 
striking. He speaks of ‘ghosts’, ‘revenants’, ‘survenants’ and occasionally 
of ‘haunting’, but fear takes the day off. The game of anticipatory 
plagiarism is not an ego-bruising sport, even though it might not be 
flattering to all the players involved. One of the take-aways from 
Muireann Maguire’s inspired discovery of the reciprocal plagiarism 
between Tolstoy and Hall Caine is that she has provided documentation 
for just how bad Resurrection (Voskresenie, 1899) is. (The author of Anna 
Karenina could certainly not have engaged in such a relationship with 
this partner, but by the time he wrote his last novel, Tolstoy was no 
longer the same person who had written that earlier book). Bayard, to be 
sure, provides the scholar with the tools to step in and help rather than 
castigate; in another work of ‘interventionist criticism’ he has suggested 
how a critic might improve ‘failed works’.25
The downside of this release from professional panic is that we may 
lose some of the sense of political and social engagement with which, 
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for better or worse, so many Russian writers have been concerned. 
Enmeshing a writer like Andrei Platonov in the game of anticipatory 
plagiarism might deprive his work of its most powerful features, without 
providing a corresponding pay-off in new insight into his prose. (For 
Platonov, the jury is still out: does his intense involvement on so many 
levels with the Soviet project limit his survival as a meaningful writer 
once the relevance of the Soviet Union subsides?). Can writers who lived 
through eras of transformative violence find any place in a methodology 
so invested in the ‘play’ of ideas? 
Pierre Bayard’s Nose
It may well be that Bayard’s various conceits, including anticipatory 
plagiarism, work better for authors whose writing has come to be 
appreciated as timeless, speculative and playful rather than those 
enmeshed in the social questions of their day—among the Russians, that 
group would include Gogol, Krzhizhanovsky, Kharms, and, above all, 
Nabokov. Other Russian writers, such as Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, can fit 
into that group only with great effort (through, as the French would say, 
a willingness to se couper en quatre).
As Timothy Langen and Ilya Vinitsky demonstrate, Gogol offers a 
terrific match for Bayard’s methodology. Gogol’s stories furnish much 
fodder for traditional psychoanalysis, and they have been subjected 
to repeated reductive readings. In a psychoanalytic context Gogol’s 
stories need not be read, however, as parables about castration anxiety 
or fantasies about a return to the womb; on the contrary, Gogol 
provides fertile territory for Bayard’s practice of applying literature to 
psychoanalysis. Let’s look at the potential for such an approach in ‘The 
Nose’ (Nos, 1836) that comedic nightmare about a body part which 
liberates itself from its owner and takes over the whole of his existence.
We begin with one of Freud’s most famous cases. After his analysis 
with Freud came to an end, Sergei Pankejeff, otherwise known as the 
Wolf Man, sought treatment with another analyst, Ruth Mack Brunswick, 
who would also write up his case. Pankejeff had produced one of the 
most celebrated dreams in the history of psychoanalysis: his vision of 
wolves sitting in a walnut tree, which Freud interpreted as a reflection of 
the primal scene, the witnessing by a child of his parents’ coitus. When 
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he came to Brunswick, Pankejeff was suffering from what she termed 
a ‘hypochondriacal idée fixe’.26 This was a constant preoccupation with 
his nose, which he examined every few minutes in a pocket mirror 
and which he took to several doctors for various forms of unnecessary 
treatment. At times, he was troubled by the shape of his nose; at others, 
he complained of a pimple or a hole in it. 
During the period of his analysis with Freud, the Wolf Man had 
been treated as well for the obstruction of his sebaceous glands. Both 
therapeutic interventions had concluded with apparent success. The 
glands had begun to function properly and the Wolf Man’s unconscious 
had given Freud enough material to produce insight into the patient’s 
unconscious. Now both mind and nose were perceived by Pankejeff as 
needing treatment once more, but the two problems had become explicitly 
conjoined. Brunswick was impressed by ‘the monosymptomatic nature 
of the psychosis. The patient when talking about anything except his 
nose was entirely sane. The mention of that organ made him act like the 
classic lunatic’.27 
Brunswick confidently asserted that ‘the nose is, of course, the 
genital’.28 Reductively, she saw her patient’s desire to inflict a wound 
on his nose as a castration fantasy, and the hostility he had developed 
towards dermatologists as a reaction against it.
The Wolf Man had one more symptom which Brunswick found 
difficult to incorporate into her analysis: he had developed an inability to 
read fiction. This was due to his refusal to ‘identify himself with the hero 
of a book, because that hero, created by the author, was wholly in the 
power of his creator; on the other hand, his sense of creative inhibition 
made it impossible for him to identify with the author’.29
Brunswick had great difficulty in forcing her patient to discuss his 
nose. He did, however, bring her dreams to analyze, including the 
following one:
He is standing at the prow of a ship, carrying a bag containing jewelry—
his wife’s earrings and her silver mirror. He leans against the rail, breaks 
the mirror, and realizes that, as a result, he will have seven years of bad 
luck.30
Pankejeff told Brunswick that he realized that his nose was present here 
in the boat’s prow, since in Russian ‘nos’ means both a nose and the 
front of a ship. The jewels were objects which in real life Pankejeff had 
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not told Freud about because he feared that if Freud knew about them, 
he would cease giving him money. Brunswick read the dream as bound 
up with the patient’s refusal to acknowledge his own unscrupulousness 
(towards Freud), as well as with his adoption of the feminine habit of 
looking frequently at himself, which she later linked to sexual ideation 
aligned with the patient’s domination by his wife: ‘The passivity 
formerly directed entirely towards his father and even here masked 
as activity, had now broken its bounds and included in its sweep both 
homosexual and heterosexual relations’.31 The seven years were the 
elapsed time since her patient’s analysis with Freud, during which time 
he had begun concealing his jewels. Pankejeff’s hiding his wealth from 
Freud had resulted in this dream about punishing himself: ‘when one 
breaks a mirror one simultaneously breaks one’s own reflection. Thus 
the patient’s own face was damaged along with the mirror’.32
Had Brunswick paid more attention to her patient’s difficulty with 
literature, she might have realized that the key to this dream and to his 
symptoms rested elsewhere than in already ossifying psychoanalytic 
theory. Brunswick did not speak Russian, and so she did not grasp the 
linguistic (and conceptual) linkage between Pankejeff’s nasal problems 
and his need for further psychoanalysis. Both the sebaceous glands and 
the unconscious needed to be unblocked, so that they might give up 
their sekrety, a word which in Russian means secrets and secretions. 
(Here Ilya Vinitsky’s reference in this volume to Gogol’s ‘secretics’ 
acquires additional significance). More importantly, she does not seem 
to have read much Russian literature, because if she had, she would 
have seen the connection between the Wolf Man’s predicament and 
Gogol’s famous story. Gogol’s intended original Russian title for that 
tale was ‘son’ (a dream)—which. as many of the story’s readers realize, 
is nose spelled backwards.33 Looking at his nose repeatedly in a mirror, 
Pankejeff was obsessively contemplating his famous dream.
This dream had come to define Pankejeff and would continue to 
do so for the remainder of his life. He became, in effect, a ward of the 
psychoanalytic community. As George Dimock has observed:
In his later years, the Wolf-Man collaborated within such a mire of 
vacillation and conflicting interpretations, actively solicited by him 
from many different psychoanalytic quarters, as to make a mockery of 
the traditional therapeutic relationship. In interpreting the patient’s 
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difficulties, indecisiveness, and ambivalences (most often concerning 
heterosexual erotic entanglements), it becomes impossible to distinguish 
finally between the patient’s struggle for mental health and a mode of 
existence organized subtly yet effectively around exploiting his place 
in the early history of psychoanalysis as a test case whose outcome 
remained forever in doubt.34
Pankejeff had become a prisoner of his dream, which his monomaniacal 
obsession with his nose had turned into his principal symptom. Freud’s 
reading of Pankejeff’s dream was based on the dynamics of reversal—
the wolves in the dream are still because in reality his parents were 
engaged in violent coital motion; the beasts are watchful because the 
dreamer was originally watching them, etc.35 So it makes perfect sense 
that Pankejeff’s later dream would employ an even more explicit form 
of visual reversal: spelling backwards. Brunswick may have been right 
about the dream’s aggressivity towards Freud, but that hostility was 
connected not (or not only) with the analysand’s repressed awareness 
of his own duplicity but with his desire to shatter Freud’s reading 
and the character into which Freud had made him.36 In this dynamic 
the earrings also play a role. A serezhka is not only an earring, but a 
diminutive form of the dreamer’s first name, the name that would have 
been used to address Pankejeff as a child and thus his identity at the time 
of his famous dream. To pursue this reading further, the wolf dream had 
become a sign of Serezhka’s infantilization by psychoanalysis; smashing 
his dream, Pankejeff was rebelling against his status as Freud’s son 
(i.e. the son [dream] that made him Freud’s sohn [son]) and, perhaps, 
insisting on recovering the Russian element of his unconscious from its 
German captivity.37 His dream about the mirror and the earrings was a 
meta-dream, less about castration anxiety than about the relationship 
between patient and analyst.
From this perspective it makes perfect sense that Pankejeff’s inability 
to read literature would be bound up with his nasal preoccupations. 
He was disturbed by the dynamic of a protagonist finding himself 
completely controlled by his author, as though the hero had a prior 
identity that had been lost in the process of storytelling. Here is where 
Gogol’s story comes in. What was once a part of the principal character 
appropriates his entire identity. Like Pankejeff, Kovalev, the principal 
figure in Gogol’s story, inspects himself frequently in the mirror, and he 
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initially suspects that the absence of his nose [nos] may be a dream [son], 
but he doesn’t connect those two words to see that it is his dream that 
has replaced him in the world of the story. Pankejeff was fond of Russian 
literature and had probably read Gogol’s story, but that likelihood is of 
less consequence than Gogol’s anticipation of what might be considered 
one of the central dynamics of psychoanalysis: this usurpation of the 
conscious subject by a suddenly rampant part or product of his identity.38 
Freud himself later observed that after the conclusion of his initial 
treatment, the Wolf Man ‘had been seized with a longing to tear himself 
free of my influence’.39 Gogol’s story allegorizes an analysand’s fear of 
subsumption by his symptoms and serves as a nightmarish realization 
of the patient’s wish to be free of them. To steal Dimock’s phrase, Gogol 
‘makes a mockery of the traditional therapeutic relationship’. After all, 
the primal scene of psychoanalysis has nothing to do with parental 
coitus but is, rather, the analyst’s interpretation of the patient’s dream.
Pankejeff regarded himself as Freud’s partner in the analysis of his 
own psychopathology, and by this point he had presumably grasped 
the psychoanalytic penchant for portraying the analysand as, in Peter 
Brooks’ words, ‘mak[ing] raids on a putative masterplot in order 
to remedy the insufficiencies of his own unsatisfactory plot’.40 It is 
thus not surprising that his unconscious would turn to literature to 
represent his psychic plight, although it is unexpected that he would 
displace Oedipus and the sphinx with Kovalev and his nose, filling in 
what Freud called the ‘gaps in individual truth’, not with ‘prehistoric 
truth’, as did Jung and Freud, but with Gogol.41 What is astonishing 
is that long before Anticipatory Plagiarism, the Wolf Man had at least 
unconsciously understood that Gogol had foreseen, or, in nineteenth-
century terminology ‘prophesized’, one of the potential pitfalls of 
psychoanalysis.
Gogol went into the future to capture the analysand’s predicament. 
It might even be that many of Gogol’s mature works of fiction, and, in 
particular, the Petersburg tales, are anticipatory parables of different 
aspects of the psychoanalytic situation. (The next step would be 
to determine what aspects of Gogol’s poetics allowed him to so 
compellingly foresee psychoanalytic practice.) Pankejeff’s irrational 
hatred of tailors during his analysis with Freud might lead us to have 
a look at ‘The Overcoat’ (‘Shinel’’, 1842) in which the predicament of 
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the ‘Certain Significant Person’, an initially powerful figure haunted at 
the story’s end by the ghost of the pathetic Akaky Akakievich, might 
function as an exemplary representation of the analyst undone by 
counter-transference. And as for Dead Souls… (Mertvye dushi, 1842). We 
will stop here; Bayard has taken us far enough. 
Pierre Bayard—Ivan Karamazov
Bayard’s boldest engagement with Russian writers comes in a recent 
book, The Tolstoevsky Enigma. He begins by arguing with critics who 
have based their work on the far-fetched hypothesis that Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky were different people. As everyone knows, one author, 
Tolstoevsky, is responsible for the single body of work that some have 
wanted to distribute between two writers. 
It is certainly difficult to admit that Anna Karenina and the Brothers 
Karamazov might be products of the same pen, the question of unity is 
posed in [all of Tolstoevsky’s] novels. How else to explain that the same 
author could have set before us characters as different as Anna and Kitty, 
or Alyosha and the Karamazov father?42 
There is a long tradition of treating these two writers as part of a dyad, or, 
as in Allen’s Love and Death (1975), as the most important contributors to 
a common Russian cultural storehouse from which items can be drawn 
for a variety of philosophical or comic purposes. Bayard lumps them 
together for a novel reason: he uses Tolstoevsky to argue for a theory 
of multiple personality that could challenge the Freudian notion of the 
unconscious. 
Although multiple personality is considered a psychiatric disorder, 
like many such pathologies the disease represents an exaggerated 
state of a normal aspect of the human condition. Bayard shows how 
Tolstoevsky’s characters act inconsistently in the course of each book. 
It isn’t that Prince Andrei or Natasha change, but that they become 
“other”; within each of them are several personalities capable of taking 
control at a given point. This division of a subject into several selves 
explains how Natasha can simultaneously love two men or Myshkin 
two women: 
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[...] if it is possible to fall simultaneously in love with several people, it is 
because we are several, and there should be no cause to be astonished by 
the coincidence in us of parallel loves, something no stranger than if two 
of our friends fall at the same time for two different women.43 
As this insight suggests, Tolstoevsky is teaching his readers a message 
that has been hitherto missed: ‘All of Tolstoevsky’s work, as well as his 
life, suggests that we are multiples’.44 ‘The entire oeuvre of Tolstoevsky’, 
Bayard concludes, ‘never stops proclaiming: we are not a being divided 
into distinct parts, we are several persons who fight or sometimes unite, 
and it is this division which makes us suffer so’.45
Towards the end of the book, Bayard implicitly nods to the 
Tolstoevsky scholar who, apparently, must not be named explicitly: ‘It 
is necessary to think less in terms of [the characters’] psychic evolution 
than in terms of an internal polyphony that remains active until the 
end; vanquished personalities or those who have remained discrete 
do not disappear but seek a chance to seize power up to the very last 
moment’.46 In effect, Bayard transforms Bakhtin’s notion of polyphony 
from a serious ideological aspect of Dostoevsky’s formal poetics 
into a semi-comic psychic principle underlying Tolstoevsky’s work. 
The result is not only a parody of Bakhtin’s Problems of Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics (Problemi poetiki Dostoevskogo, 1963) but also an anticipatory 
parody of Yuri Corrigan’s Dostoevsky and the Riddle of the Self (2017), 
which appeared the same year as Bayard’s book and which argues 
that Dostoevsky’s work is about the suffering produced by ‘invasive 
intimacy’ and the porousness of the human personality: 
Behind such examples of feverishly intersecting personalities looms the 
foundational riddle of Dostoevsky’s writing, perhaps the most confusing, 
contradictory, and agonized aspect of his philosophical worldview, 
namely, his simultaneous advocacy for and rejection of the notion of an 
individual self. As an enemy of individualism, Dostoevsky categorically 
rejected the concept of a self that was not inherently integrated into other 
selves.47 
(The category of anticipatory parody merits its own chapter and raises 
the question for Slavists of how Bayard’s work might enrich Iurii 
Tynianov’s work on literary parody in particular and the work of the 
Russian Formalists in general, enabling us, for example, to catch the 
hidden double pun underlying Boris Eikhenbaum’s famous article 
‘How Gogol’s Polichinelle Was Made’).48
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The Tolstoevsky Enigma has additional parodic targets. It also takes 
as its object the work of both Dostoevsky and Tolstoy themselves. 
Bayard notes that Tolstoevsky’s oeuvre consistently concerns itself 
with the ethics of judgment, and he focuses on Resurrection and The 
Brothers Karamazov (Brat’ia Karamazovy, 1881), where the morality 
of judging comes under particular attack. Disregarding each novel’s 
superficially Christian framing of this issue, Bayard reveals that the 
biggest problem with passing judgment on another is that judgment 
relies on the ‘illusory’ assumption that man is stabilized ‘around a 
univocal essence’:
The dissolution of the ‘I’ in Tolstoevsky leads to the greatest caution in 
the evaluation of others, and especially in the project of punishing them. 
[…] The hypothesis of multiple personalities […] supposes the existence 
in us of several subjects in conflict and delineates on this basis a psychic 
universe that is largely uncontrollable, leading to a society where every 
act is pardonable from a certain point of view, since the unity of people 
which would allow for the organization of the collective has disappeared.49
While in the Brothers Karamazov the problematic of judgment is linked 
to a message of universal culpability—‘each of us is guilty in everything 
before everyone’50—in Bayard’s reading, the moral conflictedness of 
judging is born of a realization that we are all at least partly, or even 
mostly, innocent. This insight has relevance not only for criminal law 
but also for the regulation of marriage: ‘The legal status of unions 
between human beings should take into consideration the plurality 
exemplified by polyamorousness and should leave open the possibility 
of multiple unions among persons, permitting each of the many that 
we are to lead an autonomous life with the beings of our choice’.51 Most 
of all, Tolstoevsky urges us all to be less hard on ourselves. The theory 
of multiple personalities so evident in his work ‘calls on us to be more 
attentive to our own person, since it leads us to pay attention to our 
own selves and to those of our multiple inhabitants, and, as we develop 
a feeling of empathy towards ourselves, to avoid uselessly inculpating 
ourselves for acts we have not committed’.52
Not since D. H. Lawrence explicated ‘The Legend of the Grand 
Inquisitor’ has reading Tolstoevsky been so uplifting.53 One puts down 
Bayard’s book feeling like a better person. He urges us to be more 
attentive to others, to look, amidst the diversity of personalities offered 
to us in another as an interlocutor, for the one most likely to engage with 
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us in productive dialogue. Bayard finds the best in every character, too, 
as in the scene where Andrei forgives Anatole when they simultaneously 
undergo surgery in the same field hospital. It isn’t so much that either of 
them has been transformed as that a previously-existing person in each 
of them has now become dominant: 
It would be wrong to say that Andrei has changed, since he is not the same 
man as the one who was abandoned by Natasha, and it is almost absurd 
that he keeps the same name and that we use the pronoun ‘he’ to talk 
about ‘him.’ The passage from one personality to another has occurred 
in him progressively, and the war was the element that triggered this 
alternation. Coming face to face with the horrors of the front has played 
a role in what is less an evolution than a substitution.54
This is a charitable reading of the scene, which is far darker—and more 
susceptible to a Freudian interpretation—than Bayard admits. Andrei 
awakes from his abdominal surgery with a feeling of unexplainable 
bliss. Anatole is lying on a nearby table—his leg has been removed 
while Andrei slept:
‘Show me ... Oooh! oh! oooh!’ his moaning, broken by sobs, was heard, 
frightened and resigned to his suffering. Hearing those moans, Prince 
Andrei wanted to weep. Whether it was because he was dying without 
glory, or because he was sorry to part with life, or from those memories of 
long-lost childhood, or because he was suffering, others were suffering, 
and this man was moaning so pitifully before him, he wanted to weep 
childlike, kind, almost joyful tears.
The wounded man was shown his cut-off leg in a boot caked with 
blood!
‘Oh! Oooh!’ he sobbed like a woman. The doctor, who was standing 
in front of the wounded man, screening his face, stepped away.
‘My God! What is this? Why is he here?’ Prince Andrei said to himself.
In the unfortunate, sobbing, exhausted man whose leg had just been 
removed, he recognized Anatole Kuragin.55
Anatole weeps like a woman, because by the logic of castration he 
has become one. The amputation, occurring while Andrei was under 
anesthesia, might be read as the consequence of the fantasy of the 
vengeful Prince’s potent unconscious. In any case, the conscious Andrei 
can forgive Anatole, not because the Prince realizes that he, too, is guilty, 
or that Anatole was partly innocent, but because someone (‘My God!’) 
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has punished Anatole already. Those who are without sin do not have 
to cast the first stone; Tolstoy will do it for them. This moment is not like 
the gentle epiphany of Mitia Karamazov’s dream of ‘The Babe’, which 
emphasizes universal responsibility for the ills of the earth; rather it 
anticipates the epigraph—‘Vengeance is mine [sayeth the Lord], and I 
shall repay’—which will soon open Anna Karenina.56
The third object of the Tolstoevsky book’s parody (after 
Bakhtin/Corrigan and Tolstoy/Dostoevsky) is Pierre Bayard himself. 
In an earlier article, Bayard has summed up the diverse strands of his 
scholarly work under the rubric of ‘regressive criticism’. By this term he 
means several things, including not only a stylistic return to an early era, 
a time predating French humanistic writing of the 1970s (The Tolstoevsky 
Enigma might for several reasons have been entitled Anti-Anti-Oedipus), 
but also a return to unconscious and pre-rational modes of thought, 
where criticism owes much to the logic of dreams, in which identities 
can be swapped or condensed. A concomitant part of regression is 
its return of the critic to an infantile view of the world. ‘My texts can 
convey the feeling that they have been written not by a rational adult, 
but by a child who knows no limits and is animated by a feeling of 
omnipotence’.57 The critic becomes a ‘demiurge’ capable of intervening 
in a text and bestowing autonomous life on the characters. The resulting 
‘incompetent criticism’ also presses against and even ruptures one of 
the fundamental boundaries of writing, ‘the line which separates theory 
from fiction’.58 If scholarship and fiction begin to merge, there is no 
reason why the critic, like a writer of fiction, cannot employ a narrator 
who would be different in each scholarly work, or why he could not 
employ several narrators in the same work:
The narrators of my theoretical texts are for me characters from whom I 
maintain a rather large distance even if they resemble me in more than 
one aspect. I would say that they incarnate certain mad parts of me, 
but not more, just as an author of detective fiction seeks in himself the 
criminal impulses to which he only rarely yields in real life.59
In the light of these earlier methodological statements, it becomes clear 
that in The Tolstoevsky Enigma, Bayard’s narrator has pulled out all the 
stops, letting his impulses go as far as they can take him. In effect, 
he treats Russia as an arena for the fulfilment of his demiurgic will, 
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exercising a philological variant of the sense of unlimited freedom that 
Russians call volia; Russia, that stereotypical land of extremes, gives 
Bayard––like a tourist on an erotic vacation––carte blanche for the exercise 
of his interpretive libido. 
Bayard’s parodic treatment of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky operates 
through a dynamic of reversal, as it makes a mockery of their ethical 
values. Tolstoy’s principle of truth and Dostoevsky’s adherence to 
Christ are overthrown, and no absolute principle is installed in their 
place. The parodic treatment of Bayard by Bayard, however, operates 
through a different parodic mechanism: acceleration, as though a work 
like Anticipatory Plagiarism were projected (perhaps, backwards) at 
double-speed. (This is a process practiced in the hysterically funny 
final chapter of How to Improve Failed Works (Comment améliorer les 
oeuvres ratées?, 2000), where Bayard flips the switch to show how easy 
it is—by accentuating all their faults—to make failed works collapse 
completely.)60 A guilt-free Ivan Karamzov takes over, and everything 
is indeed permitted. Where Bakhtin insisted on the ethical imperative 
of incarnation, of assuming a place for which one will be responsible, 
Bayard embraces Bakhtin’s bête noire: ‘an alibi for being’.61 The scholar 
can never be reliably located behind his words, from which he always 
takes his distance. To use a term elaborated in Bakhtin’s Dostoevsky 
book, Bayard always retains a ‘loophole’.62
Does Bayard’s approach to literature have any constraints? He 
suggests in one book that because every literary text represents an 
incomplete world, the reader is always expected, even entitled, to 
supplement it, ‘for example by consciously or unconsciously imagining 
a multitude of details that are not directly provided’.63 In another book, 
when discussing the plots of The Third Man, Changing Places, and The 
Name of the Rose, he invents plot details which he reveals as false only 
much later.64 Would it be kosher not to reveal these changes? (This 
might explain why in Tolstoevsky Bayard has Petr Verkhovenskii execute 
Kirillov and why he implicates Pierre and the cross-dressing Sonia in 
an adulterous homosexual relationship.)65 Would it be permissible 
to invent quotations, for instance, to supplement phrases used as 
epigraphs? Are the footnotes, limited as they are, still sacrosanct 
territory, or may they refer to works of scholarship that should have 
been written but weren’t? If works of literature are allowed to exchange 
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their authors, can texts be reassigned in a bibliography? If the answer 
to these questions is ‘Yes’, can scholars liberated by Bayard profit from 
his insights but still be taken seriously in making original claims about 
a specific literary text?
Bayard’s embrace of dream logic frees the critic from all superficial 
rapport with the truth, because dreams represent a more profound 
truth that must be subjectively interpreted to be objectively useful for 
an understanding of the original texts involved. Is such a combination 
feasible? Bayard’s readers have an advantage over a psychoanalyst, who 
has access to a text only through the patient’s recitation of his dream. 
Clearly, we don’t need Bayard to read Tolstoy or Dostoevsky, but we 
can savour the absurd charm of his Tolstoevsky and then return to the 
original, to which we can apply the fruits of his “fecund” mistakes. Here 
we see the distance between Bayard and most of the essays in the current 
collection. Where Bayard’s narrator sees in Russia the potential for wild 
excess, a place where the analyst is freed of all responsibility to the texts 
under review, the articles in Reading Backwards view Russian literature 
as a place where Bayard’s energy can be harnessed. Enter, this book says 
to him, but please try to behave. We want to exploit you for our purposes, not 
the other way around.
Pierre Bayard, Victim of Anticipatory Plagiarism, or 
The Russian Empire Strikes Back
The idea of multiple personalities is taken from Proust, who ‘suggests 
at many points that we are divided into a multitude of “I”s’.66 In this 
respect, The Tolstoevsky Enigma is a culturally imperialist project, as 
though the French were invading Russia once again and appropriating 
its textual resources. To take a cue from Bayard’s other titles, this book 
might easily have been dubbed Et si Napoléon avait remporté la campagne 
de 1812? (What If Napoleon Had Won the Campaign of 1812?), for Russia’s 
defeat seems to be a repeated fantasy underlying Bayard’s work. In one 
chapter of his What if Works Swapped Authors (Et si les oeuvres changeaient 
d’auteur?, 2010), Bayard imagines Tolstoy as the author of Gone With the 
Wind (1936), a work that might substitute for War and Peace, since it, too, 
is described as dealing with a vanquished army and a sacked city:
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Born in 1828, Tolstoi had been struck, like all members of his generation, 
by the debacle of the Russian army and the stories of the Napoleonic 
invasion. [...] If the historical context of the [South in the American] Civil 
War is different, it is nevertheless the same story recounted in the two 
cases: that of a progressive military defeat, which leads to a foreign army 
taking control of the land on which one lives.67
Nowhere does Bayard mention that the Russians eventually defeated 
and expelled the French (nor that the Russian equivalent of slavery 
would not be abolished for another fifty years).
Interpretations of Tolstoevsky are not in short supply, and Russianists 
don’t have to corner that market, but we should be particularly wary 
of—to use Nabokov’s phrase—‘Proustianizing and Procrusteanizing’ 
readings of Tolstoy.68 Less than a decade after Proust’s death, some 
Russian writers in France sensed this danger, which arose, oddly, from 
the very proto-modernist features in Tolstoy that Bayard would see as 
evidence of anticipatory plagiarism. The Russian poet and critic Georgii 
Ivanov suggested that Proust could be used as a test to measure the 
vitality of Russia’s greatest writers. Stand Gogol up to Proust, Ivanov 
wrote, and Gogol remains Gogol, and the same is true for Pushkin, but 
Tolstoy begins to wither and fade. It is, Ivanov added, ‘an unpleasant 
spectacle’.69 
In other words, Tolstoy may need our help. The situation demands 
what Bayard might call ‘Counter-Interventionist Criticism’. Instead of 
accepting the notion that Tolstoevsky’s works should be hollowed out 
and reconstructed in accordance with Proust, mightn’t we turn the 
vector of influence around and point out—graciously but firmly—how 
in a more traditional but equally unexpected manner Bayard and Proust 
may have modelled themselves on Nabokov and Tolstoy?
Let’s begin with Nabokov. Within the paradigm of anticipatory 
plagiarism, there is no shame in admitting that much of what Pierre 
Bayard writes, Vladimir Nabokov stole first. Nabokov’s remarks about 
the topics that so fascinate Bayard are scattered among many works; 
they rarely become a consistent focus and are, so to speak, consistently 
exceptional. Thus, it is clear, according to the metrics laid out by Bayard, 
that this is a case of anticipatory and not classic plagiarism, because 
Bayard has treated these issues more systematically.70
The similarities are numerous and striking. Nabokov’s fiction and 
lectures abound with references to anachronistic reading and backwards 
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influence. In Lolita (1955) Humbert Humbert publishes an article 
entitled ‘The Proustian theme in a letter from Keats to Benjamin Bailey’.71 
Nabokov rated Charles Dickens much more highly than Jane Austen, 
and so he told his students at Cornell when the class moved forward 
chronologically from Mansfield Park (1814) to Bleak House (1853) that 
‘had Dickens come before Austen, we should have said that the Price 
family is positively Dickensian and that the Price children tie up nicely 
with the child theme that runs through Bleak House’.72 Nabokov begins 
his study of Gogol with the writer’s death and ended it with his birth, 
the model for a biography Bayard has envisioned for Oscar Wilde.73 He 
concludes his lecture on Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde (1886) with the kind of 
anecdote Bayard finds irresistible:
[Stevenson] went down to the cellar to fetch a bottle of his favorite 
burgundy, uncorked it in the kitchen, and suddenly cried out to his 
wife: what’s the matter with me, what is this strangeness, has my face 
changed?—and fell on the floor. A blood vessel had burst in his brain and 
it was all over in a couple of hours.What, has my face changed? There is 
a curious thematical link between this last episode in Stevenson’s life and 
the fateful transformations in his most wonderful book.74 
Some of Nabokov’s anachronizing fantasies are bizarre. Though he 
initially resisted the idea of having a child actress play Lolita in a film—
‘to make a real twelve-year-old girl play such a part in public would be 
sinful and immoral, I will never consent to it’—he eventually changed 
his mind: ‘a child should play the role. I wish I could turn back the 
clock on some of our better-known actresses’.75 Nabokov played with the 
idea of modelling his novels on works by Tolstoevsky: a student in Pnin 
(1957) dreams of learning Russian so that she can read Anna Karamazov 
in the original, and Pnin itself can be read as both a contestation and 
a mash-up of Tolstoevsky’s greatest works.76 Nabokov’s novels often 
have a circular design; one short story even begins with the words ‘In 
the second place’, and ends with a sentence starting ‘In the first place’.77 
Like Bayard, Nabokov comes close to effacing the boundary between 
scholarship and fiction; Pale Fire (1962) mirrors Nabokov’s commentary 
(1964) to Pushkin’s Eugene Onegin (1825–32), Bend Sinister (1947) and 
Pnin (1957) contain passages in which analyses of Hamlet (1609) and 
Anna Karenina are ingeniously interwoven into the thematics of the 
novel. Moreover, taking a page from Bayard’s book, Nabokov was not 
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averse to describing a non-existent scene when discussing a work of 
fiction, particularly if that work was his own.78
Perhaps most pertinently, Nabokov was fascinated by the theories of 
John W. Dunne and his 1927 book, An Experiment with Time. Dunne, who 
also interested Borges, viewed dreams not as the road to the unconscious, 
but as a reflection of the non-linear nature of time. In accordance with 
Dunne’s recommended experimental practice, Nabokov recorded his 
dreams immediately upon awakening and then, in the days to come, 
scanned his life as it unfolded for echoing events which, had they 
occurred before the dream, would have been seen as the source of the 
dream’s content. (Dunne compared this process to holding a book one 
has already read up to a mirror and rereading it with all the words 
backwards.) Dunne’s idea was that the universe was ‘really stretched 
out in Time, and that the lop-sided view we had of it—a view with the 
“future” part unaccountably missing, cut off from the growing “past” 
part by a travelling “present moment”—was due to a purely mentally 
imposed barrier which existed only when we were awake’.79 In dreams 
this barrier gave way; their content was shaped by the simultaneous 
presence of future and past. 
There are many reasons for Nabokov’s attraction to Dunne’s ideas; 
Nabokov’s model of good reading was to know a text so well that it 
lost its temporal dimension and became totally accessible all at once, 
like a painting. Moreover, Dunne’s method of reading dreams offered 
an interpretive paradigm that owed nothing to Freud. While Dunne 
was uninterested in questions of originality or plagiarism, his idea that 
dreams pick details out of both the future and the past owes much 
to one of the explanations offered by Bayard for the phenomenon of 
anticipatory plagiarism: the Borgesian idea that language is an enormous 
reservoir (un gigantesque combinatoire) from which writers from all times 
can draw inspiration.80 
The similarities between Bayard and Nabokov are so striking that 
a Bayardian model other than anticipatory plagiarism might be put 
into play: that of parallel universes. In There Exist Other Worlds (Il 
existe d’autres mondes, 2014), Bayard devotes a chapter to Lolita as part 
of his heuristic suggestion that the Freudian paradigms of phantasms 
(repeated libidinal scenarios) and sublimation might be replaced by the 
conceit that the same writer simultaneously pursues his psychic, creative, 
and even biographical existences in two or more parallel worlds.81 Since 
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the universe is infinite, not only life, but specific authors may exist in 
multiple incarnations, like nearly identical forms of books in an infinite 
library. One can conceive of this planetary multiplicity in psychic terms; 
an author’s work does not so much body forth or sublimate libidinal 
desires as imagine alternative paths. 
Strangely, Bayard does not perceive that he himself might be 
an alternative version of Nabokov, that their shared anachronistic 
fascinations might indicate that one of them has created the other. 
For Bayard, Nabokov is interesting primarily as an author obsessed 
with paedophilic desires; Bayard even imagines a parallel Nabokov 
raping in the woods a school girl attending one of his classes. This 
crime is presented with such specificity that the reader may wonder 
if the fantasy is shared by Bayard himself, or, at least, by his narrator.82 
Although its author may not have realized it, the logic of There 
Exist Other Worlds suggests that Bayard and Nabokov, with all their 
overlapping preoccupations, may actually be the same person. As 
Charles Kinbote, the ultimate interventionist critic, says at the end of 
Pale Fire (1962): 
God will help me, I trust, to rid myself of [suicidal] desire. I shall 
continue to exist. I may assume other disguises, in other forms, but I shall 
try to exist. I may turn up yet, on another campus, as a happy, healthy, 
heterosexual French intellectual?83
Not so fast. Anticipatory Plagiarism is based on a rhetoric of similarity, but 
the differences between Nabokov and Bayard may be more important 
than the likenesses. Nabokov was more attracted to difference: ‘perhaps 
the less noticeable the difference, the more that difference is divine...’.84 
To name just a few salient points of divergence, Nabokov is far less 
forgiving, and he certainly does not celebrate the ‘fecundity’ of mistakes. 
The concept of ‘the bad reader’ does not exist in Bayard’s gentle universe, 
while that category haunts Nabokov’s lectures, novels and classrooms. 
(Bayard does admit that there are ‘failed works’, but he spends an entire 
book pointing out how they might be improved.)85 Nabokov is probably 
the only author ever to write a manifesto in the form of a quiz.86 The fear 
of getting caught, or called out for a blunder, and the joy of catching 
another’s ‘howlers’ subtend the study of Nabokov, who was himself a 
savage reviewer. In the seven books by Bayard that I’ve read, and in the 
dozen or so that I have not, I have yet to find a dismissive or an unkind 
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word for a colleague; since everything is permitted, the world of literary 
scholarship does not need to be policed. Nabokov’s fiction, lectures 
and scholarship teem with gleeful references to awarding poor marks; 
returning his midterms on April Fools’ Day in 1957, he read aloud two 
failing exams that he himself had delightedly composed on behalf of a 
pair of fictitious class members from different economic backgrounds—
to show the students that they could not convincingly talk about books 
they hadn’t read.87 I imagine that at Paris VIII, Bayard is a far more 
indulgent grader.
A final difference comes with Nabokov’s insistence on authorial 
hierarchy and prioritization. Although he could play with anachronistic 
thoughts, it was very important that innovative artists be given their 
due. Richard Rorty has explained Nabokov’s hostility towards Freud as 
a case of Nabokov’s having discovered that someone had already stolen 
his best lines.88 The Oedipal complex aside, Nabokov might have been 
expected to appreciate Freud’s genius for paranomasia, but he claimed 
that Freud’s flair in this regard was but a pale imitation of Shakespeare’s 
talent. Asked by an interviewer what neighbour he would like in heaven, 
Nabokov responded: ‘It would be fun to hear Shakespeare roar with 
ribald laughter on being told what Freud (roasting in the other place) 
made of his plays’.89
The writer for whom Nabokov made the most affirmative claims 
of innovation was Tolstoy. He insisted, for example, that Tolstoy had 
invented stream of consciousness and interior monologue narration 
long before Joyce.90 He notes parenthetically in the midst of his lecture 
on Proust that ‘the first homosexuals in modern literature are described 
in Anna Karenin[a]’.91 And he interrupts his Proust lecture once more 
when he analyzes Proust’s device of unfolding extended metaphors. He 
directs his class’s attention to a passage from the first volume of the 
Recherche (1913–1927), where a chain of metaphors enables the author 
to cover an enormous amount of ground; he pays close attention to the 
way one Proustian simile unfolds from another, in a potentially endless 
succession of performatively imagined likenesses. What particularly 
interests him is the ‘peculiar’ way in which Proust’s narrator ‘drifts from 
the idea of pale light to that of remote music—the sense of vision grades 
into the sense of hearing’.92 He then adds an unexpected likeness of his 
own, in a formulation that will be familiar to any reader who recalls the 
second paragraph of Lolita.93 He tells his class:
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But Proust had a precursor. In part six, chapter 2, of Tolstoy’s War and 
Peace (1864–1869) Prince Andrey stays at the country manor of an 
acquaintance, Count Rostov. He cannot sleep [….] ‘Prince Andrey left his 
bed and went up to the window to open it. As soon as he had unfolded 
its shutters, the moonlight broke into the room as if it had been waiting 
a long time outside on the watch for such a chance. He opened the 
window. The night was cool and motionlessly luminous. The trimmed 
trees that stood in a row just in front of the window were black on one 
side and silvery bright on the other… Beyond them was [some kind of] 
a roof all shining with dew. On the right stood a great thick-leaved tree, 
its bole and branches a brilliant white, and overhead an almost full moon 
was riding the starless spring sky.’
Presently at the window of the floor above him he hears two young 
feminine voices—one of them belongs to Natasha Rostov—singing and 
repeating a musical phrase…. A little later Natasha leans out of that 
window above and he hears the rustle of her dress and the sound of her 
breathing, and ‘The sounds become still like the moon and the shadows.’94
Nabokov tells his class to notice three characteristics of this passage 
as ‘foreglimpses of Proust’: the ‘pathetic fallacy’ of the animated 
moonlight, the ‘clearcut quality of the description, and the intermingled 
sensual perceptions produced by sight and sound’. He directs them to 
compare this scene to a passage he has read them from Proust: ‘Notice 
the elaboration of the moonlight in Proust, the shadows that come out of 
the light like the drawers of a chest, and the remoteness and the music’. 95
In Bayard’s terminology this might be called a case of anticipatory 
plagiarism, but to my mind it is extremely unconvincing. If Tolstoy’s 
attempt was felonious, he was a very poor thief. Unlike the passage 
from Maupassant that Bayard offers to us in Anticipatory Plagiarism as 
proto-Proustian, the focus on this passage seems to attest primarily 
to the lengths Nabokov could stretch to assert the primacy of Russian 
literature. The most one could claim here would be attempted anticipatory 
plagiarism. 
But was Nabokov’s mistake entirely devoid of fecundity? To my 
mind, he was onto something very important: this was a moment for 
Nabokov similar to that experienced by Marcel at Balbec, where he 
verges on an epiphany that will explain to him the profound beauty 
of a specific view… but falls short of connecting what he has seen to 
the cause of its visual echo. Uncharacteristically, Nabokov was thinking 
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purely in terms of similarity, when he should have also been thinking 
metonymically. 
Andrei’s gaze out of the window is located just adjacent to a passage 
in Tolstoy’s novel that Proust may have consciously—and crucially—
echoed. That scene on the balcony, which becomes a moment of rebirth 
for Prince Andrei, is the central panel of a triptych. On his way to visit 
the Rostov family on business, Prince Andrei has seen an old leafless 
oak that struck him as resolutely impervious to the influence of the new 
spring:
‘Spring, and love, and happiness!’ the oak seemed to say. ‘And how is it 
you’re not bored with the same stupid, senseless deception! Always the 
same and always a deception! There is no spring, no sun, no happiness. 
Look, there sit those smothered, dead fir trees, always the same; look 
at me spreading my broken, flayed fingers wherever they grow […]. 
As they’ve grown, so I stand and I don’t believe in your hopes and 
deceptions’ […].
‘Yes, it’s right, a thousand times right, this oak,’ thought Prince 
Andrei. ‘Let others, the young ones, succumb afresh to this deception, 
but we know life—our life is over!’ A whole new series of thoughts in 
connection with the oak, hopeless but sadly pleasant, emerged in Prince 
Andrei’s soul. During this journey it was as if he again thought over his 
whole life and reached the same old comforting and hopeless conclusion, 
that there was no need for him to start anything, that he had to live out 
his life without doing evil, without anxiety, and without wishing for 
anything.96
After returning from the Rostovs and having been enchanted by 
Natasha, Andrei passes the oak again and at first fails to recognize it, 
just as Nabokov has failed to recognize this scene’s eventual importance 
for Proust. The oak has been transformed, ‘spreading out a canopy of 
juicy green leaves’.
‘Yes, it’s the same oak,’ thought Prince Andrei, and suddenly a causeless 
springtime feeling of joy and renewal came over him. All the best 
moments of his life suddenly recalled themselves to him at the same 
time. Austerlitz with the lofty sky, and the dead, reproachful face of his 
wife, and Pierre on the ferry, and a girl excited by the beauty of the night, 
and that night itself, and the moon—all of it suddenly recalled itself to 
him.
‘No, life isn’t over at the age of thirty-one,’ Prince Andrei suddenly 
decided definitively, immutably. ‘It’s not enough that I know all that’s in 
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me, everyone else must know it, too: Pierre, and that girl who wanted to 
fly into the sky, everyone must know me, so that my life is not only for 
myself; so that they don’t live like that girl, independently of my life, but 
so that it is reflected in everyone, and they all live together with me!’97
This return to life ostensibly serves as a great communal moment—
Andrei’s renewed desire to live occurs through a desire for others—even 
if there is a sneaky admixture of aesthetic narcissism concealed here—
the inclusion of his wife’s death as one of the best moments in Andrei’s 
life can be read as Tolstoy’s self-congratulatory celebration of the best 
executed moments in his book. It is worth noting that of all Tolstoy’s 
characters Prince Andrei not only is the one who sounds most like his 
author, but he is also the character most like Proust’s Marcel. His initial 
attraction to Natasha is occasioned by the intolerable idea of Natasha’s 
ignorance of his existence. 
For some reason, Prince Andrei suddenly felt pained. The day was so 
beautiful, the sun was so bright, everything around was so cheerful; and 
this slender and pretty girl did not know and did not want to know of 
his existence and was content and happy with some separate—probably 
stupid—but cheerful and happy anxiety of her own.98 
The desire that a woman be marked by an awareness of his existence 
is similar to Marcel’s preoccupation with the fisher girls at Balbec: ‘I 
wished that the idea of me, in entering her, in becoming part of her, might 
attract not only her attention, but her admiration, her desire, and might 
force it to keep a memory of me against the day when I might be able to 
benefit from it’.99 Once Natasha does notice Andrei, indeed, when she 
has fallen in love with him, Andrei’s reaction anachronistically recalls 
Marcel’s insistence that Albertine not kiss him but issue a promissory 
note for a baiser at some point in the future:
‘Ah, I’m so happy,’ [Natasha] replied, smiling through her tears, leaned 
closer to him, thought for a second, as if asking herself whether she 
could, and kissed him.
Prince Andrei held her hand, looked into her eyes, and did not find 
the former love for her in his soul. Something suddenly turned over 
in his soul: the former poetic and mysterious delight of desire was not 
there, but there was pity for her woman’s and child’s weakness, there 
was fear before her devotion and trust, a heavy but at the same time 
joyful consciousness of duty that bound him to her forever.100
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Everything that happens afterwards in War and Peace suggests that 
this avowed seriousness and joyful sense of duty are suspect. What 
we would call Marcel’s raincheck has its antecedent in the year-long 
separation imposed by Andrei’s father, and accepted by Andrei, before 
his marriage to Natasha.
So what scene in Proust was Tolstoy anticipatorily plagiarizing? Or, 
to put the question differently, how did Proust manage to spirit this 
scene out of Russia and melt it down for his own purposes in France?
In the final pages of the Recherche’s final volume, Marcel is returning 
to Paris after a long stay at a sanatorium, depressed about his health 
and his lack of aptitude for literature, convinced that he will never write 
anything of value. In the middle of a long paragraph his railway journey 
comes to a brief halt in front of a row of trees:
‘Trees,’ I thought, ‘you no longer have anything to say to me. My heart 
has grown cold and no longer hears you’. I am in the midst of nature. 
Well, it is with indifference, with boredom that my eyes register the line 
which separates the luminous from the shadowy side of your trunks. 
If I ever thought of myself as a poet, I know now that I am not one. 
Perhaps in the new, the so desiccated part of my life which is about to 
begin, human beings may yet inspire in me what nature can no longer 
say. But the years in which I might have been able to sing her praise will 
never return.’ But in thus consoling myself with the thought that the 
observation of humanity might possibly come to take the place of an 
unattainable inspiration, I knew that I was merely seeking to console 
myself. I knew that I knew myself to be worthless. If I really had the soul 
of an artist, surely I would be feeling pleasure at the sight of this curtain 
of trees lit by the setting sun….101
There are probably other scenes in world literature in which despairing 
heroes express their melancholy in arboreal address, and if Andrei 
and Marcel were religious, these moments would read like initially 
unanswered prayers to pagan deities of the sort with which, as Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick has reminded us, the Recherche is strangely and 
explicitly rife.102 In Proust’s aesthetically charged universe, the most 
important aspect of this echo is its meta-fictive transposition. The words 
are spoken not only about the arc of a character’s life but about writing 
itself. The ‘heart’ mentioned here stands not just for romance but for 
artistic talent. 
But it is what happens next that should interest us most. Having 
returned to Paris, Marcel goes to a party at the mansion of the Prince 
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de Guermantes, an event at which many of the characters from earlier 
volumes will be present and which thus assumes an epilogic cast. There 
he has a series of involuntary memories, the first one produced by a 
mysteriously familiar sensation of unsteadiness as he steps on a paving 
stone, a literal pedal note which, as he repeats the motion, eventually 
recalls to his conscious mind an earlier trip to Venice. The second occurs 
as he walks into the house. The passage below is long, but if we listen 
carefully, we can catch not simply unfolding comparisons but distinct 
reminiscences of Tolstoy:
[W]hen I had gone upstairs, a butler requested me to wait for a few 
minutes in a little sitting room used as a library, next to the room 
where the refreshments were being served, until the end of the piece of 
music which was being played […]. And at that very moment a second 
intimation came to reinforce the one which had been given to me by the 
two uneven paving-stones and to exhort me to persevere in my task. A 
servant, trying unsuccessfully not to make a noise, chanced to knock a 
spoon against a plate and again that same species of happiness which had 
come to me from the uneven paving-stones poured into me; the sensation 
was again of great heat, but entirely different: heat combined with a 
whiff of smoke and relieved by the cool smell of a forest background; and 
I recognised that what seemed to me now so delightful was that same 
row of trees which I had found tedious both to observe and to describe 
but which I had just now for a moment, in a sort of daze—I seemed to be 
in the railway carriage again, opening a bottle of beer—supposed to be 
before my eyes, so forcibly had the identical noise of the spoon knocking 
against the plate given me, until I had had time to remember where I 
was, the illusion of the noise of the hammer with which a railwayman 
had done something to a wheel of the train while we stopped near the 
little wood. And then it seemed as though the signs which were to bring 
me, on this day of all days, out of my disheartened state and restore to 
me my faith in literature, were thronging eagerly about me, for, a butler 
who had long been in the service of the Prince de Guermantes having 
recognised me and brought to me in the library where I was waiting, 
so that I might not have to go to the buffet, a selection of petits fours 
and a glass of orangeade, I wiped my mouth with the napkin which he 
had given me; and instantly, as though I had been the character in the 
Arabian Nights who unwittingly accomplishes the very rite which can 
cause to appear, visible to him alone, a docile genie ready to convey him 
to a great distance, a new vision of azure passed before my eyes, but 
an azure that this time was pure and saline and swelled into blue and 
bosomy undulations […]. And what I found myself enjoying was not 
merely these colours but a whole instant of my life on whose summit they 
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rested, an instant which had been no doubt an aspiration towards them 
and which some feeling of fatigue or sadness had perhaps prevented me 
from enjoying at Balbec but which now, freed from what is necessarily 
imperfect in external perception, pure and disembodied, caused me to 
swell with happiness.103
It is fitting that this scene occurs in a library, because it is not only 
the start of the character’s rereading and writing of his own life but a 
rereading and rewriting of Tolstoy, who is there not only through that 
arboreal scene in War and Peace but also in that illusion of the noise of 
the hammer with which a railway man has done something to a wheel of 
the train—a reminiscence of the motif of the French-speaking muzhik 
from the railway (‘“il faut le battre, le fer, le broyer, le pétrir”’)—whose 
indeterminate activity and presence haunt Anna Karenina.104 Both sets 
of tree scenes end in epiphanies, moments of transcendence for central 
characters. Note, though, the fundamental difference: where in War and 
Peace the great breakthrough comes through contact, however fleeting, 
with another human being—Natasha—and promises, illusorily for 
Andrei, a communal future of interrelated beings, in Time Found Again 
(Le Temps retrouvé, 1927) everything takes place within the self. Marcel 
does not need to meet or communicate with another being to suddenly 
blossom as an artist. There is no need to return to that wood; indeed, if 
Marcel were to return there it might be as dead to him as before. Here 
beauty and art are born in an artistic overcoming of time that occurs 
within the self. If an ‘other’ is present, that other is a book. The clink of 
the hammer is part of an immersion in Tolstoy that provokes the hero 
to an epiphany about the nature of art. Aesthetic metamorphosis has 
occurred not in a perceived object but in the subject/viewer.105
The candle illuminating the book—the image that accompanies the 
muzhik’s final appearance in Anna—will for Proust burst into brighter 
flame rather than sputter out, because Marcel’s epiphany will not only 
end but begin his book. Epilogue becomes prologue, and Tolstoy has 
provided the spark that enables Marcel to make this transition, which is 
also something of an apotheosis of the self. One might even say that—
like Lolita for Humbert—Tolstoy has been safely solipsized. 
In the course of the past few paragraphs I’ve backed away from 
Bayard’s model of anticipatory plagiarism for a more old-fashioned 
notion of traditional inspiration and influence. (Had I remained with 
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that paradigm, I might have been forced to conclude that the fatidic 
francophone muzhik in Anna Karenina, and in particular his penultimate 
incarnation as Landau, was none other than Marcel Proust!) But 
Nabokov and his proto-Bayardian ‘foreglimpses’ have motivated this 
entire enterprise. And now, covering my Bayardian tracks, I am too 
much a creature of discipline not to do some of the spade work that 
Bayard would scorn, or perhaps relegate to a footnote.
I would remind you of how well Proust knew Tolstoy. Proust came 
late to his appreciation of Russian literature. At the age of twenty-six 
he wrote to a friend asking him to please find out who had written The 
Brothers Karamazov,106 although he had begun reading Anna Karenina 
earlier, in the summer of 1894.107 But he became enamoured of both 
Tolstoy and Dostoevsky—he once said that if he had to choose the most 
beautiful novel ever written it would be The Idiot (Idiot, 1869).108 Tolstoy 
he considered, rather oddly, to have been Dostoevsky’s student, albeit 
a talented one: ‘In Dostoevsky there’s concentrated, still tense and 
peevish, a great deal of what was to blossom later on in Tolstoy’.109 Proust 
read Tolstoy carefully; one friend recalls Proust being able to recite bits 
of the French translation of War and Peace by heart,110 and he was ready 
to draw on that knowledge in his analogical poetics, once comparing 
his friend Robert Dreyfus’s description of a little corner of the Parisian 
sky to Prince Andrei’s vision of the sky at Austerlitz. Slightly later, 
right after Tolstoy’s death, Proust wrote that he had found something 
poetical in Dreyfus’s suggestion that Tolstoy would be forever linked to 
the figure of the simple stationmaster at Astapovo, where he had died: 
‘[Your article on Tolstoy and the stationmaster] pleased me especially 
since it was as though Tolstoy [had] made this junction between two 
images without comparable importance—it even made me think of the 
little muzhik in the train in Anna Karenina’.111 
Proust knew Tolstoevsky not only for his greatest hits, but also for the 
little ones. Marcel tells Albertine in a creepy scene that is half foreplay, 
half lecture on literary composition and Russian literature, ‘I have talked 
about the same scene recurring in different novels, but within the same 
novel scenes and characters can be repeated, if the novel is very long. I 
could easily give you an example from War and Peace’.112 Proust dug into 
War and Peace the way a miner extracts ore, finding marginal characters 
who interested him and giving them more prominence. He sent the 
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idiotic diplomat Hippolyte Kuragin to medical school and, allowing 
him to retain his propensity for impulsive, meaningless utterances, 
renamed him Cottard. Morel, a member of a military band who is also 
a virtuoso violinist, the lover of the Baron de Charlus and the son of 
Marcel’s uncle’s valet, must be the great grandson of a soldier of the 
same name, a French officer’s orderly in War and Peace who is also not 
without a fondness for music and is forced by the exigencies of war to 
cross-dress. The writer Bergotte’s death, which Bayard sees as prescient 
of Proust’s own demise, was probably modeled on an episode from 
Tolstoy’s second Sebastopol story, translated in 1886 as an excerpt in a 
French collection of Tolstoy’s greatest death scenes.113
Most important, though, is that as the Recherche began to expand, 
readers and correspondents began to compare it to War and Peace. The 
similarity surfaces as early as 1913—when Proust discusses his own 
notion of memory along with those of Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, recalling, 
in particular, a line from Crime and Punishment and adding ‘you must 
understand that if I cite these great names it is not in order to put myself 
on their level’.114 We hear the comparison again towards the end of 
Proust’s life, when a correspondent appreciative of the brilliance of his 
prose cautions him about writing too densely and too much: ‘War and 
Peace offers itself to the reader as a very long work, but the reader has 
already been tipped off that it is a masterpiece’ which is something that 
the readers Proust wants to acquire don’t yet know about the Recherche.115
All of this, though, would come at the point of revision. I began by 
pursuing Nabokov’s desire that Tolstoy foreglimpse Proust and, infused 
with the confidence that I could begin collecting evidence to make a 
case of anticipatory plagiarism, I paused and began rocking one text 
against another, as though, my forward movement suddenly arrested in 
a courtyard, I were moving my foot up and down against a paving stone 
until I arrived at the place where plagiarism suddenly became a gift. 
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